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Abstract
In the current era of digital world, the amount of sensitive data produced by many organi-
zations is outpacing their storage ability. The management of such huge amount of data is
quite expensive due to the requirements of high storage capacity and qualified personnel.
Storage-as-a-Service (SaaS) offered by cloud service providers (CSPs) is a paid facility that
enables organizations to outsource their data to be stored on remote servers. Thus, SaaS
reduces the maintenance cost and mitigates the burden of large local data storage at the
organization’s end.
For an increased level of scalability, availability and durability, some customers may
want their data to be replicated on multiple servers across multiple data centers. The
more copies the CSP is asked to store, the more fees the customers are charged. Therefore,
customers need to have a strong guarantee that the CSP is storing all data copies that are
agreed upon in the service contract, and these copies remain intact.
In this thesis we address the problem of creating multiple copies of a data file and
verifying those copies stored on untrusted cloud servers. We propose a pairing-based
provable multi-copy data possession (PB-PMDP) scheme, which provides an evidence that
all outsourced copies are actually stored and remain intact. Moreover, it allows authorized
users (i.e., those who have the right to access the owner’s file) to seamlessly access the file
copies stored by the CSP, and supports public verifiability.
We then direct our study to the dynamic behavior of outsourced data, where the data
owner is capable of not only archiving and accessing the data copies stored by the CSP,
but also updating and scaling (using block operations: modification, insertion, deletion,
and append) these copies on the remote servers. We propose a new map-based provable
multi-copy dynamic data possession (MB-PMDDP) scheme that verifies the intactness and
consistency of outsourced dynamic multiple data copies. To the best of our knowledge, the
proposed scheme is the first to verify the integrity of multiple copies of dynamic data over
untrusted cloud servers.
As a complementary line of research, we consider protecting the CSP from a dishonest
owner, who attempts to get illegal compensations by falsely claiming data corruption over
iii
cloud servers. We propose a new cloud-based storage scheme that allows the data owner
to benefit from the facilities offered by the CSP and enables mutual trust between them.
In addition, the proposed scheme ensures that authorized users receive the latest version
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This chapter briefly describes the cloud computing paradigm, which is an emerging com-
puting model over a shared pool of resources (Section 1.1). It presents a number of key
advantages offered by cloud computing compared with traditional means of local computing
(Section 1.2). It also summarizes the major challenges facing cloud computing from being
widely deployed and used (Section 1.3). In addition, this chapter describes our motivation
and research problem (Section 1.4). At the conclusion, it outlines our main contributions
(Section 1.5) and thesis organization (Section 1.6).
1.1 Overview of Cloud Computing
Cloud computing is a distributed computational model over a large pool of shared-virtualized
computing resources (e.g., storage, processing power, memory, applications, services, and
network bandwidth), where customers are provisioned and de-provisioned recourses as
they need. Cloud computing represents a vision of providing computing services as public
utilities like water and electricity. The architecture of cloud computing can be split in
two: front-end and back-end. The front-end represents cloud customers, organizations, or
applications (e.g., web browsers) that use the cloud services. The back-end is a huge net-
work of data centers with many different applications, system programs, and data storage
1
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systems. It is metaphorically believed that, cloud service providers (CSPs) have almost
infinite computation power and storage capacity. A conceptual framework of cloud com-
puting architecture is illustrated in Figure 1.1 with its two main parts.
Figure 1.1: Conceptual framework for Cloud Computing architecture.




The widely used model of cloud computing services is the AaaS model, in which the
customers have access to the applications running on the cloud provider’s infrastructure.
Google Docs, Google Calendar, and Zoho Writer are known examples of this model. In the
PaaS model, the customers can deploy their applications on the provider’s infrastructure
2
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under condition that these applications are created using tools supported by the provider.
The cloud service provider (CSP) hosts a set of software and development tools on its
servers to be used by the developers to create their own applications. Google Apps is
one of the best known PaaS models. IaaS model enables customers to rent and use the
provider’s resources (storage, processing, and network). Hence, the customers can deploy
any applications including operating systems.
The cloud computing architecture can be deployed under different models [64]:
• Public cloud. The infrastructure of the CSP is publicly accessible by general cus-
tomers and organizations in exchange for pre-specified fees according to the usage of
the CSP’s services.
• Private cloud. The cloud infrastructure is dedicated to an organization which may
manage the infrastructure or leave this management to a third party.
• Hybrid cloud. The cloud infrastructure is composed of two or more clouds (private or
public). The organizations provide and handle some internal and external resources.
For example, an organization can use a public cloud service as Amazon Elastic Com-
pute Cloud (Amazon EC2) [5] to perform the general computation, while the data
files are stored within the organization’s local data center in a private cloud.
1.2 Cloud Computing Characteristics
The considerable attention of cloud computing paradigm is due to a number of key ad-
vantages, which make it an interesting research area in both academia and industry. The
following are some of the essential characteristics of cloud computing paradigm:
• Supplies cost-effective means of doing business over a shared pool of resources, where
users can avoid capital expenditure on hardware, software, and services as they pay
only for what they use [64].
3
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• Provides low management overhead and immediate access to a wide range of appli-
cations.
• Reduces maintenance cost as a third party is responsible for everything from running
the cloud to storing data.
• Supports flexibility to scale up and down information technology (IT) capacity over
time to business needs.
• Offers more mobility where customers can access information wherever they are,
rather than having to remain at their desks.
• Allows organizations to store more data on remote servers than on private computer
systems. Organizations will no longer be worried about constant server updates and
other computing issues [88].
There are a variety of areas where cloud computing has a significant role: virtual
worlds which require excessive amount of computing powers, e-bushiness where scalability
can be achieved by assigning new servers as needed, social network, and searching. Figure
1.2 represents a survey made by International Data Corporation (IDC) [55] to indicate
why customers value cloud computing paradigm as a new approach of doing business.
Cost effectiveness and easiness of deployment are among the main benefits that customers
believe they can gain from moving to cloud computing as a new attitude of IT architecture.
1.3 Cloud Computing Challenges
Cloud computing has received considerable attention from research communities in academia
as well as industry; however, there are many challenges facing cloud computing to be widely
deployed and used. The major challenge is security, which is related to infrastructure and
data. A recently conducted survey about the challenges of cloud computing has indicated
that security represents 87.5% of users’ cloud fears [55]. Among the other challenges that
may hinder the broad use of cloud computing are [33]:
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Figure 1.2: Benefits commonly ascribed to Cloud Computing [55].
• Availability. Cloud computing model encourages single points of failure where
cloud services are subject to more attacks. Among the well-publicized incidents of
cloud outages are Gmail (one-day outage) [43] and Amazon Simple Storage Service
(Amazon S3), which was down for over 7 hours [51]. Therefore, it is of significant
importance to develop new methods and techniques for sustained availability and
speedy recovery from attacks.
• Computational Integrity. Outsourcing computation is a growing trend for resource-
constrained clients to benefit from powerful cloud servers. The ability to verify out-
sourced computations and validate the returned results is a key requirement of cloud
customers. Another imperative point is that the amount of work performed by the
clients to verify the outsourced computations must be substantially cheaper than
performing the actual computations on the client side.
• Authentication. The development of cloud computing encourages the use of resource-
constrained devices (e.g., PDA and cell phones) on the client side. Rather than data
storage and software installation on local devices, users will authenticate in order to
be able to access the data and use cloud applications. This computing model makes
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software piracy more difficult and enables centralized monitoring. Although cloud
computing architecture stimulates mobility of users, it increases the need of secure
authentication. User authentication based on passwords in not an efficient approach
for sensitive data/applications on the cloud. The use of passwords is a major point
of vulnerability in computer security, as passwords are often easy to guess by auto-
mated programs running dictionary attacks [32]. Moreover, users cannot remember
very long passwords, and usually they use some meaningful passwords making them
subject to dictionary attacks.
• Auditing. The internal operations of the CSP are opaque, and thus the auditing
process is a major challenge. Customers with constrained computing resources and
capabilities resort to external audit party to check the integrity of their outsourced
data. They need to assure that there is no information leakage even by this third
party. Third party auditing process should bring in no new vulnerabilities towards
the privacy of client’s data
Figure 1.3 represents the results of a survey made to indicate the challenges ascribed
to cloud computing model, and the different percentages of users’ cloud fears [55].
1.4 Motivation and Research Problem
1.4.1 Research Motivation
In our current digital world, various organizations produce a large amount of sensitive data
including personal information, electronic health records, and financial data. The amount
of digital data is increasing at a staggering rate; doubling almost every year and a half
[85], and outpacing the storage ability of many organizations. This data often needs to
be stored at multiple locations for a long time due to operational purposes and regulatory
compliance. The local management of such huge amount of data is problematic and costly
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Figure 1.3: Challenges commonly ascribed to Cloud Computing [55].
due to the requirements of high storage capacity and qualified personnel. While there is a
steady drop in the cost of storage hardware, the management of storage has become more
complex and represents approximately 75% of the total ownership cost [85]. Storage-as-
a-Service (sort of IaaS) offered by CSPs is an emerging solution to mitigate the burden
of large local data storage and reduce the maintenance cost by means of outsourcing data
storage.
Through outsourcing data storage scenario, organizations delegate the storage and man-
agement of their data to a CSP in exchange for pre-specified fees metered in GB/month.
Such outsourcing of data storage enables organizations to store more data on remote servers
than on private computer systems. In addition, some organizations may create large data
files that must be archived for many years but are rarely accessed, and thus there is no
need to store such files on the local storage of the organizations. More importantly, the
CSP often provides better disaster recovery by replicating the data on multiple servers
across multiple data centers achieving a higher level of availability. Therefore, many au-
thorized users are allowed to access the remotely stored data from different geographic
locations making it more convenient for them. A relatively recent survey indicates that IT
7
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outsourcing has grown by a staggering 79% as organizations seek to focus more on their
core competencies and reduce costs [89].
However, the fact that data owners no longer physically possess their sensitive data
raises new challenges to the tasks of data confidentiality and integrity in cloud comput-
ing systems. Unauthorized access and misuse of customers’ confidential data are serious
concerns regarding data outsourcing; hence, it is of significant importance to be aware
of data administrators (CSPs) and their extend of data access right. In some practical
applications, data confidentiality is not only a privacy concern, but also a juristic issue.
For example, in e-Health applications inside the USA the usage and exposure of protected
health information should meet the policies admitted by Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) [2], and thus keeping the data private on the remote storage
servers is not just an option, but a demand. The confidentiality feature can be guaranteed
by the owner via encrypting the data before outsourcing to remote servers. As such, it is
a crucial demand of customers to have a strong evidence that the cloud servers still pos-
sess their data and it is not being tampered with or partially deleted over time, especially
because the internal operation details of the CSP may not be known to cloud customers.
The completeness and correctness of customers’ data in the cloud may be at risk due
to the following reasons. First, the CSP – whose goal is to make a profit and maintain
a reputation – has an incentive to hide data loss (due to hardware failure, management
errors, various attacks) or reclaim storage by discarding data that has not been or is rarely
accessed. Second, a dishonest CSP might delete some of the data or might not store all
data in a high performance storage required by the contract with certain customers, i.e.,
place it on low cost (and hence slow) media. Third, the cloud infrastructures are subject
to a wide range of internal and external security threats. Incidences of security breaches
of cloud services surface from time to time [51, 58]. In short, although outsourcing data to
the cloud is attractive from the view point of cost and complexity of long-term large-scale
data storage, it does not offer sufficient guarantee on data integrity. This problem, if not
properly handled, may hinder the successful deployment and wide acceptance of the cloud
paradigm.
Once customers’ data has been outsourced to remote servers, efficient verification of
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the completeness and correctness of the outsourced data becomes a formidable challenge.
Traditional cryptographic primitives for data integrity and availability based on hashing
and signature schemes are not applicable to outsourced data without having a local copy.
It is impractical for the owners to download all stored data to validate its integrity; this
would require an expensive I/O operations and immense communication overheads across
the network. Therefore, efficient techniques are needed to verify the integrity of outsourced
data with reduced communication, computation, and storage overheads. Consequently,
many researchers have focused on the problem of provable data possession (PDP), and
proposed different schemes to audit the data on remote storage sites (PDP will be discussed
in more details in Chapter 2).
The main focus of the most work done in the PDP area is to verify the integrity of a
single outsourced data copy. A small number of researchers have addressed the integrity
verification of multiple data copies stored over remote servers. In addition, protecting
the CSP from a dishonest owner – who attempts to get illegal compensations by falsely
claiming data corruption over cloud servers – is an imperative concern to be addressed.
This concern, if not properly handled, can cause the CSP to go out of business [73].
1.4.2 Research Problem
For an increased level of scalability, availability and durability, some customers may want
their data to be replicated on multiple servers across multiple data centers. Data replication
varies according to the nature of data; more copies are needed for critical data that cannot
easily be reproduced, while non-critical, reproducible data are stored at reduced levels of
redundancy. The more copies the CSP is asked to store, the more fees the customers are
charged. For example, Amazon S3 maintains more copies of customers’ data than that of
Amazon Reduced Redundancy Storage (Amazon RRS), which enables customers to reduce
their costs. The pricing for Amazon S3 is approximately 40% higher than that of Amazon
RRS [6] (see Table 1.1). Therefore, customers need to have a strong guarantee that the
CSP is storing all data copies that are agreed upon in the service contract and all these
copies remain intact.
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One of the core design principles of outsourcing data is to provide dynamic scalability
of data for various applications. This means that the remotely stored data can be not only
accessed by authorized users (i.e., those who have the right to access the owner’s file),
but also updated and scaled by the data owner. Thus, there must be a guarantee that all
outsourced copies are consistent with the most recent modifications issued by the owner.
Another important issue is that the CSP needs to be safeguarded from any false ac-
cusation that may be claimed by a data owner to get illegal compensations. Moreover,
authorized users have to receive the latest version of the outsourced dynamic data, and
there must be a mechanism to grant or revoke access to the outsourced data.
In this thesis, we study the problem of creating multiple copies of a data file and
verifying those copies stored on untrusted cloud servers. In addition, we address the
integrity verification for multiple copies of dynamic data, where the data owner issues
block-level dynamic requests to update the data on the CSP side. To complement our
research, we consider achieving mutual trust between the data owner and the CSP, where
the owner is enabled to utilize the facilities offered by the CSP, and release concerns
regarding confidentiality, integrity, and access control of the outsourced data. Meanwhile,
a dishonest owner is not able to falsely accuse the CSP and claim data corruption over
cloud servers to get illegal compensations.
Table 1.1: Amazon storage pricing [6]
Standard Storage Reduced Redundancy Storage
Tier Pricing Pricing
First 1 TB/month $0.125/GB $0.093/GB
Next 49 TB/month $0.110/GB $0.083/GB
Next 450 TB/month $0.095/GB $0.073/GB
Next 500 TB/month $0.090/GB $0.063/GB
Next 4000 TB/month $0.080/GB $0.053/GB




In this section we present a summary of our major contributions. The work done in
this thesis has contributions in three main directions related to outsourcing data storage
to remote cloud servers: multiple static data copies, multiple dynamic data copies, and
mutual trust for cloud-based storage systems.
1.5.1 Multiple Static Data Copies
• We propose a pairing-based provable multi-copy data possession (PB-PMDP) scheme.
This scheme provides an adequate guarantee that the CSP stores all copies that are
agreed upon in the service contract, and these copies are intact. The authorized users
can seamlessly access the copies received from the CSP. The PB-PMDP scheme sup-
ports public verifiability, i.e., anyone who knows the owner’s public key can challenge
the remote server and verify that the server is still possessing the owner’s files.
• We justify the performance of the proposed PB-PMDP scheme through theoretical
analysis, experimental results on a commercial cloud platform, and comparison with
the multiple-replica provable data possession (MR-PDP) scheme due to Curtmola et
al. [37].
• We show the security of the PB-PMDP scheme against colluding servers. In addition,
we discuss a slight modification of the proposed scheme to identify corrupted copies.
1.5.2 Multiple Dynamic Data Copies
• We propose a map-based provable multi-copy dynamic data possession (MB-PMDDP)
scheme. The MB-PMDDP scheme supports outsourcing of dynamic data, i.e., it
supports block-level operations such as block modification, insertion, deletion, and
append. Moreover, it ensures that all outsourced copies are consistent with the most
recent modifications issued by the data owner. To the best of our knowledge, the
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MB-PMDDP scheme is the first to address the integrity verification of multiple copies
of dynamic data over untrusted cloud servers.
• We give a thorough comparison of MB-PMDDP with a reference scheme, which one
can obtain by extending existing PDP models for dynamic single-copy data. We also
report our implementation and experiments using Amazon cloud platform.
• We prove the security of the MB-PMDDP scheme against colluding servers depend-
ing on the security of the computational Diffie-Hellman and the discrete logarithm
problems.
1.5.3 Mutual Trust for Cloud-Based Storage Systems
• We design and implement a cloud-based storage scheme that has the following fea-
tures:
– Allows a data owner to outsource the data to a remote CSP, and perform full
dynamic operations at the block-level (block modification, insertion, deletion,
and append)
– Ensures the newness property, i.e., the authorized users receive the most recent
version of the outsourced data
– Establishes indirect mutual trust between the data owner and the CSP since
each party resides in a different trust domain
– Enforces the access control for the outsourced data
• We discuss the security features of the proposed scheme. Besides, we justify its
performance through theoretical analysis and a prototype implementation on Amazon




The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 contains a literature survey
for different PDP schemes, the rationale behind these schemes, their features and limita-
tions. We start with PDP schemes for static data, then we direct our survey to models that
deal with dynamic data. We also highlight the concept of proof of retrievability, which is
a complementary approach to PDP.
In Chapter 3, we consider the integrity verification for multiple data copies, for which
we start with a basic provable multi-copy data possession scheme followed by a review
of the MR-PDP scheme due to Curtmola et al. [37]. This chapter also describes our
proposed PB-PMDP scheme, gives the system model and assumptions, and presents the
security analysis and the performance evaluation for the PB-PMDP scheme. In addition,
a slight modification of the proposed PB-PMDP scheme is discussed to identify the indices
of corrupted copies.
Our proposed MB-PMDDP scheme to verify the integrity verification of multiple copies
of dynamic data is elaborated in Chapter 4. Moreover, we present an extension to dynamic
single-copy PDP models to work in the setting of dynamic multiple data copies. This exten-
sion servers as a reference model for comparison with the proposed MB-PMDDP scheme.
The performance analysis of the MB-PMDDP scheme – validated through experimental
results – and the security proof against colluding servers are also presented.
Chapter 5 describes our proposed cloud-based storage scheme to achieve mutual trust
between a data owner and a CSP. We present related work and review some techniques
pertaining to the construction of our proposed scheme. We detail the performance analysis
and the prototype implementation on Amazon EC2 and Amazon S3. In addition, we
investigate the security of the proposed scheme by analyzing its fulfillment of the assigned
security requirements, namely, confidentiality, integrity, newness, access control, and CSPs
defence.




Review of Provable Data Possession
In this chapter we explain the concept of provable data possession (PDP) (Section 2.1).
We present a review for different PDP schemes for static data (Section 2.2). We then direct
our survey to PDP models that deal with dynamic data (Section 2.3). We also highlight
the concept of proof of retrievability, which is a complementary approach to PDP (Section
2.4). We finally present a short summary of this chapter (Section 2.5).
2.1 Introduction
Provable data possession (PDP) is a technique that allows an entity to prove that the data
is in its possession for validating data integrity over remote servers. In a typical PDP model,
the data owner generates some metadata/information for a data file to be used later for
verification purposes through a challenge-response protocol with the remote/cloud server.
The owner sends the file to be stored on a remote server which may be untrusted, and
deletes the local copy of the file. As a proof that the server is still possessing the data
file in its original form, it needs to correctly compute a response to a challenge vector
sent from a verifier – who can be the original data owner or a trusted entity that shares
some information with the owner. Shortly, PDP schemes allow a verifier to efficiently,
periodically, and securely validate that a remote server – which supposedly stores the
owner’s potentially very large amount of data – is actually storing the data intact.
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The problem of data integrity over remote servers has been addressed for many years
and there is a simple solution to tackle this problem as follows. The data owner computes
a message authentication code (MAC) of the whole file before outsourcing to a remote
server. The owner keeps only the computed MAC on his local storage, sends the file to
the remote server, and deletes the local copy of the file. Later, whenever a verifier needs
to check the data integrity, he sends a request to retrieve the file from the archive service
provider, re-computes the MAC of the whole file, and compares the re-computed MAC with
the previously stored value. Alternatively, instead of computing and storing the MAC of
the whole file, the data owner divides the file F into blocks {b1, b2, . . . , bm}, computes a
MAC σj for each block bj: σj = MACsk(j||bj)1≤j≤m, sends both the data file F and the
MACs {σj}1≤j≤m to the remote/cloud server, deletes the local copy of the file, and stores
only the secret key sk. During the verification process, the verifier requests for a set of
randomly selected blocks and their corresponding MACs, re-computes the MAC of each
retrieved block using sk, and compares the re-computed MACs with the received values
from the remote server [92]. The rationale behind the second approach is that checking
part of the file is much easier than the whole of it. However both approaches suffer from a
severe drawback; the communication complexity is linear with the queried data size which
is impractical especially when the available bandwidth is limited.
2.2 Provable Static Data Possession
In this section, we review different PDP schemes for static data. We provide the rationale
behind these schemes, their features and limitations. We then give a comparison between
the presented schemes from different perspectives.
2.2.1 PDP Schemes of Deswarte et al.
MAC-based approaches for remote data integrity are associated with high communication
overhead. Deswarte et al. [39] thought of a technique to reduce the communication cost by
using two functions f and H ′, where H ′ is a one-way function and f is another function.
15
2.2. PROVABLE STATIC DATA POSSESSION
The relation between H ′ and f is that f(C,H ′(File)) = h(C||File), where h is any secure
hash function and C is a random challenge number sent from the verifier to the remote
server. Thus, the data owner has to compute H ′(File) and store it on his local storage. To
audit the file, the verifier generates a random challenge C, computes V = f(C,H ′(File)),
and sends C to the remote server. Upon receiving the challenge C, the server computes
S = h(C||File) and sends the response S to the verifier. To validate the file integrity, the
verifier checks V
?
= S. At least one of the two functions f and H ′ must be kept secret
because if both were public, it would be easy for a malicious server to compute and store
only H ′(File) that is not the entire file, and then dynamically responds with a valid value
f(C,H ′(File)) that is not the expected one h(C||File).
Unfortunately, Deswarte et al. [39] have not found such functions f , H ′, and h satisfying
the desired verification rule. To workaround this problem, a finite number Ñ of random
challenges are generated offline for the file to be checked, and the corresponding responses
h(Ci||File)1≤i≤Ñ are pre-computed and stored on the verifier local storage. To audit the
file, one of the Ñ challenges is sent to the remote server and the received response is
compared with the pre-computed one (previously stored on the verifier side). However,
this solution limits the number of times a particular data file can be checked by the number
of random challenges Ñ . Once all random challenges {Ci}1≤i≤Ñ are consumed, the verifier
has to retrieve the data file from the storage server to compute new responses, but this is
unworkable.
Deswarte et al. [39] provided another protocol to overcome the problem of limited
number of audits per file. In this protocol the data file is represented as an integer d.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the scheme presented in [39].
The main limitation in the protocol of Deswarte et al. [39] is the computation overhead
on the server side. In each verification, the remote server has to do the exponentiation
over the entire file. Thus, if we are dealing with huge files, e.g., in order of Terabytes (as
most practical applications require) this exponentiation will be heavy. The data owner can
reduce the exponent part in the computation M = ad mod N by utilizing the Fermat-Euler
theorem [59], where ad ≡ admodφ(N) mod N and φ(N) = (p−1)(q−1) is the Euler’s totient
function. The remote server cannot use this trick because φ(N) is not known in public.
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Data owner:
− Represents the data file as an integer d
− Generates RSA modulus N = pq (p & q are prime numbers)
− Pre-computes and stores M = ad mod N (a ∈R ZN)
− Sends the file value d to the remote server
Challenge Response
Verifier Remote Server
1. Picks r ∈R ZN
2. Computes a challenge A = ar mod N
A−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
3. Computes a response S = Ad mod N
a
B←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−




Figure 2.1: The PDP protocol by Deswarte et al. [39].
2.2.2 More RSA-Based PDP Schemes
Filho et al. [48] proposed a scheme to verify data integrity using the RSA-based homo-
morphic hash function. A function Ĥ is homomorphic if, given two operations + and × ,
we have Ĥ(d+ d′) = Ĥ(d)× Ĥ(d′). The protocol in [48] is illustrated in Figure 2.2.
The server’s response S = Ĥ(d) is a homomorphic function; Ĥ(d+d′) ≡ rd+d′ ≡ rdrd′ ≡
Ĥ(d)Ĥ(d′) mod N . To find a collision for this hash function, one has to find two messages
d, d′ such that rd ≡ rd′ , i.e., rd−d′ ≡ 1 mod N . Thus, d − d′ must be multiple of φ(N).
Finding such two messages d, d′ is believed to be difficult since the factorization of N is
unknown. The limitation of the protocol presented in [48] is similar to that of the protocol
in [39]: the archive service provider has to exponentiate the entire data file, which is a
heavy computation overhead especially for large files.
17
2.2. PROVABLE STATIC DATA POSSESSION
Data owner:
− Generates RSA modulus N = pq (p & q are prime numbers)
− Computes φ(N) = (p− 1)(q − 1)
− Pre-computes and stores h̄(d) = d mod φ(N) (d is the data file)
− Sends the data file d to the remote server
Challenge Response
Verifier Remote Server
1. Picks r ∈R ZN
r−−−−−−−−−→
2. Computes a response S = Ĥ(d) = rd mod N
a
R←−−−−−−−−−




Figure 2.2: The PDP protocol by Filho et al. [48].
To circumvent the problem of exponentiating the entire file, Sebé et al. [80] presented
a scheme to remotely verify data integrity by first fragmenting the file into blocks, finger-
printing each file block, and then using an RSA-based hash function on the blocks. Thus,
the data file F is divided into a set of m blocks: F = {b1, b2, . . . , bm}, where m fingerprints
{Mj}1≤j≤m are generated for the file and stored on the verifier local storage. Their scheme
does not require the exponentiation of the entire file. Figure 2.3 demonstrates the protocol
of Sebé et al. [80].
Although the protocol presented by Sebé et al. [80] does not require exponentiation
of the entire file, a local copy of the fingerprints – whose size is linear in the number of
file blocks – must be stored on the verifier side. The verifier has to store the fingerprints
{Mj}1≤j≤m, each of size |N | bits consuming m|N | bits from the verifier local storage, which
may impede the verification process when using small devices like PDAs or cell phones.
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Moreover, this protocol supports only private verifiability, i.e., only the data owner can
challenge the remote server and validate the data possession. If there is a dispute regarding
data integrity, we cannot resort to a trusted third party auditor to resolve such a dispute.
Data owner:
− Generates RSA modulus N = pq (p & q are prime numbers)
− Computes φ(N) = (p− 1)(q − 1)
− Divides the data file F into m blocks: F = {b1, b2, . . . , bm}
− Pre-computes and stores Mj = bj mod φ(N) (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
− Sends the data file F to the remote server
Challenge Response
.......Verifier Remote Server
1. Picks r ∈R ZN
2. Generates l(≤ m) random values {cj}1≤j≤l
a
r,{cj}1≤j≤l−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→




a 4. Computes S = ra mod N
a
R←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
5. Computes a′ =
l∑
j=1
cj ·Mj mod φ(N)






Figure 2.3: The PDP protocol by Sebé et al. [80].
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2.2.3 Data Storage Commitment Schemes
Golle et al. [52] provided a scheme to verify data storage commitment, a concept that is
weaker than integrity. They investigated ”storage-enforcing commitment scheme”. Through
their scheme a storage server demonstrates that it is making use of storage space as large as
the client’s data, but not necessarily the same exact data. The storage server does not di-
rectly prove that it is storing a file F , but proves that it has committed sufficient resources
to do so. Their scheme is based on n-Power Computational Diffie-Hellman (n-PCDH)
assumption: for a group Zp (p is a prime number) with a generator g, there is no known




, . . . , gx
n−1
with non-negligible probability. Figure 2.4 illustrates the scheme of Golle et al. [52].
Each file block bj ∈ Zp can be represented by dlog2 pe bits, and thus the total number
of bits to store the file F = mdlog2 pe bits. For the storage server to cheat by storing all
the possible values of fk (i.e., m+ 1 values), it needs (m+ 1)dlog2 pe bits which is slightly
larger than the size of the original file.
The guarantee provided by the protocol in [52] is weaker than data integrity since it
only ensures that the server is storing something at least as large as the original data file
but not necessarily the file itself. In addition, the verifier’s public key is about twice as
large as the data file.
2.2.4 Privacy-Preserving PDP Schemes
Shah et al. [82, 83] presented privacy-preserving PDP protocols. Using their schemes,
an external third party auditor (TPA) can verify the integrity of files stored by a remote
server without knowing any of the file contents. The data owner first encrypts the file,
then sends both the encrypted file along with the encryption key to the remote server.
Moreover, the data owner sends the encrypted file along with a key-commitment that fixes
a value for the key without revealing the key to the TPA. The primary purposes of the
schemes presented in [82, 83] are to ensure that the remote server is correctly possessing
the client’s data along with the encryption key, and to prevent any information leakage
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Setup
− File F = {b1, b2, . . . , bm}, bj ∈ Zp
− Let n = 2m+ 1
− Secret key sk = x ∈R Zp
− Public key pk = (gx, gx2 , . . . , gxn) = (g1, g2, . . . , gn)








1. Picks a random k ∈ [0,m]
a
k−−−−−−−−−→













Figure 2.4: The PDP protocol by Golle et al. [52].
to the TPA which is responsible for the auditing task. Thus, clients – especially with
constrained computing resources and capabilities – can resort to external audit party to
check the integrity of outsourced data, and this third party auditing process should bring
in no new vulnerabilities towards the privacy of client’s data. In addition to the auditing
task of the TPA, it has another primary task which is extraction of digital contents. For
the auditing task, the TPA interacts with the remote server to check that the stored data
is intact. For the extraction task, the TPA interacts with both the remote server and the
data owner to first check that the data is intact then delivers it to the owner. The protocols
presented by Shah et al. [82, 83] are illustrated in Figure 2.5.
21
2.2. PROVABLE STATIC DATA POSSESSION
Setup
− Data owner sends a key K and the encrypted file EK(F ) to the remote server
− Data owner sends a key-commitment value gK and the encrypted file EK(F )
to the TPA (g is a generator for Zp)
− The TPA generates a list L of random values and HMACs: L = {(Ri, H̃i)}1≤i≤Ñ ,
H̃i = HMAC(Ri, EK(F )), and Ri is a random number.
− TPA keeps {L, h(EK(F )), gK} and can discard EK(F ) (h is a secure hash function)
TPA Remote Server
Checking Data Integrity
1. Picks any (Ri, H̃i) from L and updates L = L\{(Ri, H̃i)}
a
Ri−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→







1. Generates β ∈R Zp
a
gβ−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→










• Checks the hash of its local cached copy:
.. h(EK(F ))
?
= h(Ds). If valid, sends EK(F ) to the owner
Key Extraction
• Assume that the owner and the server agree on a shared random secret X
a
K+X, gX←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
• Checks gK+X ?= gK · gX . If valid, sends K +X to the owner
• Owner gets K = (K +X)−X
Figure 2.5: The PDP protocols by Shah et al. [82, 83].
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The protocols presented in [82, 83] achieve privacy-preserving towards third party au-
diting process and extract digital contents from remote servers, but have some limitations:
• Limited number of verifications for a particular data item (must be fixed beforehand).
• Storage overhead on the TPA; it has to store Ñ hash values for each file to be audited.
• Lack of support for stateless verification; the TPA has to update its state (the list L)
between audits to prevent using the same random number or the same HMAC twice.
• High communication complexity to retrieve EK(F ) if the TPA wants to regenerate a
new list of hash values to achieve unlimited number of audits.
2.2.5 PDP in Database Context
In the database outsourcing scenario, the database owner stores data at a storage service
provider and the database users send queries to the service provider to retrieve some
tuples/records that match the issued query. Data integrity is an imperative concern in
the database outsourcing paradigm; when a user receives a query result from the service
provider, it is crucial to verify that the received tuples are not being tampered with by
a malicious service provider. Mykletun et al. [69] investigated the notion of signature
aggregation to validate the integrity of the query result. Signature aggregation enables
bandwidth- and computation-efficient integrity verification of query replies. In the scheme
presented in [69], each database record is signed before outsourcing the database to a
remote service provider.
Mykletun et al. [69] provided two aggregation mechanisms: one is based on RSA [76]
and the other is based on BLS signature [27]. For the scheme based on the RSA signature,
each record in the database is signed as: σj = h(bj)
d mod N , where h is a one-way hash
function, bj is the data record, d is the RSA private key, and N is the RSA modulus.
A user issues a query to be executed over the outsourced database, the server processes
the query and computes an aggregated signature σ =
∑t
j=1 σj mod N , where t is the
number of records in the query result. The server sends the query result along with the
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j=1 σj mod N , where e is the RSA public key.
The second scheme presented by Mykletun et al. [69], which is based on the BLS
signature [27] is similar to the first scheme but the record signature σj = h(bj)
x, where





j=1 h(bj), y), where g is a generator of the group Zp, y = gx(public key), and
ê is a computable bilinear map (will be explained later in the thesis).
Correctness and Completeness are imperative concerns in the database outsourcing
paradigm. Completeness means that the service provider should send all records that
satisfy the query criteria not just subset of them. The completeness requirement was not
considered by the schemes presented in [69], and it has been addressed by other researchers
(see for example [89, 60]).
The schemes provided in [69] depend on the retrieved records of the query result to verify
the integrity of the outsourced database. On the other hand, efficient PDP schemes require
blockless verification, i.e., the verifier has to have the ability to validate data integrity even
though he neither possesses nor retrieves any of the file blocks. Blockless verification is a
main concern to minimize the required communication cost over the network.
2.2.6 PDP Schemes Based on Homomorphic Verifiable Tags
Ateniese et al. [8] presented a model to overcome some of the limitations of other PDP
protocols: limited number of audits per file determined by fixed challenges that must be
specified in advance, expensive server computation by doing the exponentiation over the
entire file, storage overhead on the verifier side by keeping some metadata to be used later
in the auditing task, high communication complexity, and lack of support for blockless
verification. Ateniese et al. [8] provided a PDP model in which the data owner fragments
the file F into blocks {b1, b2, . . . , bm} and generates metadata (a tag) for each block to be
used for verification. The file is then sent to be stored on a remote/cloud server, which
may be untrusted and the data owner may delete the local copy of the file. The remote
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server provides a proof that the data has not been tampered with or partially deleted
by responding to challenges sent from the verifier. The scheme presented in [8] provides
probabilistic guarantee of data possession, where the verifier checks a random subset of
stored file blocks with each challenge (spot checking).
Homomorphic verifiable tags (HVTs)/homomorphic linear authenticators (HLAs) are
the basic building blocks of the PDP scheme presented in [8]. Briefly, the HVTs/HLAs
are unforgeable verification metadata constructed from the file blocks in such a way that
the verifier can be convinced that a linear combination of the file blocks is accurately
computed by verifying only the aggregated tag/authenticator. In the work of [8], the
authors differentiate between the concept of public verifiability and private verifiability. In
public verifiability anyone – not necessarily the data owner – who knows the owner’s public
key can challenge the remote server and verify that the server is still possessing the owner’s
files. On the other side, private verifiability allows only the original owner to perform the
auditing task. Two main PDP schemes are presented in [8]: sampling PDP (S-PDP) and
efficient PDP (E-PDP) schemes. In fact, there is a slight difference between these two
models, but the E-PDP scheme provides a weaker guarantee of data possession. The E-
PDP protocol guarantees only the possession of the sum of file blocks and not necessarily
the possession of each one of the blocks being challenged. Both protocols presented in [8]
are illustrated in Figure 2.6.
The schemes of Ateniese et al. [8] have resolved many constraints of other PDP pro-
tocols. However, their schemes are based on RSA, which make the HVTs relatively long;
each file block has an HVT in order of |N | bits. Thus, to achieve 80-bit security level, the
generated tag should be of size 1024 bits. Shacham and Waters [81] presented an attack
against the E-PDP scheme, which enables a malicious server to cheat with non-negligible
probability requiring no more storage than an honest server to store the file.
Ateniese et al. [10] showed that the HLAs can be constructed from homomorphic
identification protocols. They provided a ”compiler-like” transformation to build HLAs
from homomorphic identification protocols and showed how to turn the HLA into a PDP
scheme. As a concrete example, they applied their transformation to a variant of an
identification protocol proposed by Shoup [84] yielding a factoring-based PDP scheme.
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− N = pq is the RSA modulus (p & q are prime numbers)
− g is a generator of QRN (QRN is the set of quadratic residues modulo N)
− Public key pk = (N, g, e), secret key sk = (d, v), v ∈R ZN , and
ed ≡ 1 mod (p− 1)(q − 1)
− π is a pseudo-random permutation, f is a pseudo-random function, H is a hash-and-
encode function (H : {0, 1}∗ → QRN), and h is a cryptographic hash function.
− File F = {b1, b2, . . . , bm}
− Data owner generates a tag Tj for each block bj: Tj = (H(v||j) · gbj)d mod N
− Data owner sends F = {bj}1≤j≤m and {Tj}1≤j≤m to the remote server
Challenge Response
Verifier Remote Server
1. Picks two keys k1(key for π), k2(key for f),
aac(# of blocks to be challenged), and gs = g
s mod N(s ∈R ZN)
a
c, k1, k2, gs−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
a 2. Computes challenged block indices:
a {ji} = πk1(i)1≤i≤c
a 3. Computes random values:
a {ai} = fk2(i)1≤i≤c
a 4. Computes T =
c∏
i=1
T aiji mod N






6. Computes {ji} = πk1(i)1≤i≤c and {ai} = fk2(i)1≤i≤c
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II. E-PDP scheme
a
The only difference between the E-PDP and the S-PDP is that : {ai}1≤i≤c = 1, and thus








− Step 7 : τ = T ec∏
i=1
H(v||ji)
Figure 2.6: The S-PDP and E-PDP protocols by Ateniese et al. [8].
2.2.7 Comparison
Table 2.1 provides a comparison between the PDP schemes presented in this section. This
comparison is based on the following:
• Owner pre-computation: the operations performed by the data owner to process the
file before being outsourced to a remote server.
• Verifier storage overhead: the extra storage required to store some metadata on the
verifier side to be used later during the verification process.
• Server storage overhead: the extra storage on the server side required to store some
metadata – not including the original file – sent from the owner.
• Server computation: the operations performed by the server to provide the data
possession guarantee.
• Verifier computation: the operations performed by the verifier to validate the server’s
response.
• Communication cost: bandwidth required during the challenge response phase.
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• Unbounded challenges: whether the scheme allows unlimited number of auditing the
data file, or a fixed number of challenges.
• Fragmentation: whether the file is treated as one chunk, or divided into smaller
blocks.
• Type of guarantee: whether the guarantee provided from the remote server is deter-
ministic guarantee, which requires to access all file blocks, or probabilistic guarantee
that depends on spot checking.
• Prove data possession: whether the scheme proves the possession of the file itself, or
proves that the server is storing something at least as large as the original file.
We use the notations EXF to indicate the EXponentiation of the entire File, DET to indi-
cate deterministic guarantee, and PRO to indicate probabilistic guarantee. For simplicity,
the security parameter is not included as a factor for the relevant costs.
Table 2.1: Comparison of PDP schemes for a file containing m blocks, c is the number of
blocks to be challenged, and Ñ is a finite number of random challenges.
Scheme [39] [48] [80] [52] [82, 83] [8]
Owner pre-computation aEXFa aO(1) a aO(m) a aO(m) a aO(1) a aO(m)a
Verifier storage overhead O(1) O(1) O(m) O(1) O(Ñ) -
Server storage overhead - - - - - O(m)
Server computation EXF EXF O(c) O(m) O(1) O(c)
Verifier computation O(1) O(1) O(c) O(1) O(1)† O(c)
Communication cost O(1) O(1) O(1) O(1) O(1) O(1)
Unbounded challenges X X X X × X
Fragmentation × × X X × X
Type of guarantee DET DET DET/ PRO DET DET PRO‡
Prove data possession X X X × X X
† Verifier pre-computation is O(Ñ) to generate a list L of HMACs.
‡ The scheme in [8] can be easily modified to support deterministic guarantee.
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2.3 Provable Dynamic Data Possession
One of the core design principles of outsourcing data is to provide dynamic scalability of
data for various applications. In this section we review different provable dynamic data
possession (PDDP) schemes, where the data owner can issue requests to update and scale
the outsourced data.
2.3.1 Hash-Based PDDP Schemes
Ateniese et al. [11] proposed a dynamic version of the PDP scheme based on cryptographic
hash function and symmetric key encryption. Their scheme is efficient but allows only a
fixed number of challenges due to the fact that through the scheme setup they come up
with all future challenges and store pre-computed responses as tokens. These tokens can be
stored either at the verifier side in a plain form or at the server side in an encrypted form.
Block insertion in [11] cannot explicitly be supported (append operation is supported).
Figure 2.7 summarizes the scheme presented in [11].
2.3.2 PDDP Schemes Based on Authenticated Data Structures
Rank-Based Authenticated Skip Lists
A skip list is a hierarchical structure of linked lists [74], and is used to store a sorted set of
items. Each node v in a normal skip list stores two pointers (right and down) denoted by
rgt(v) and dwn(v) to be used during the searching procedure for a specific target in the leaf
nodes (nodes at the base/bottom level). On the other hand, each node v in an authenticated
skip list stores rgt(v), dwn(v), and a label f(v) computed by recursively applying a hash
function to f(rgt(v)) and f(dwn(v)). The authenticated skip list can provide a proof to
indicate whether a specific element belongs to the set represented by the list or not. In
addition to rgt(v), dwn(v) and f(v), each node v in a rank-based authenticated skip list
stores the number of nodes at the bottom level that can be reached from v. This number
is called the rank of v: r(v).
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Setup
− Data file F is a set of blocks {b1, b2, . . . , bm}
− g is a pseudo-random permutation, f is a pseudo-random function, and h is a cryp-
tographic hash function. f is used to generate keys for g and to generate random
numbers.
− EK and E−1K are encryption and decryption algorithms under a key K
− Two master keys W and Z
− Data owner generates t random challenges and their corresponding responses/tokens
{νi}1≤i≤t as follows.
- for i = 1 to t do
—- 1. Generate ki = fW (i) and ci = fZ(i)
—- 2. νi = h(ci, 1, bgki (1))⊕ · · · ⊕ h(ci, r, bgki (r)) /* r is # of blocks per token */
—- 3. ν ′i = Ek(ctr, i, νi) /* ctr is an integer counter */
− Owner sends the file F = {bj}1≤j≤m and {ν ′i}1≤i≤t to the remote server.
Challenge Response
Data owner Remote Server
Begin challenge i
—1. Generates ki = fW (i) and ci = fZ(i)
-
ki,ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
- 2. z = h(ci, 1, bgki (1))⊕ · · · ⊕ h(ci, r, bgki (r))
-
z,ν′i←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
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Dynamic Operations
Modify
/* Assume that block bj is to be updated to b
′
j */
Data owner Remote Server
-
1. {ν′i}1≤i≤t←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
-2. ctr = ctr + 1
-3. for i = 1 to t do





——-/* if decryption fails, exit*/
——-/* if z′i is not prefixed by (ctr-1) and i, exit */
— 3.2 extracts νi from z
′
i
— 3.3 computes ki = fW (i) and ci = fZ(i)
—/* update all tokens even if they do not include the block to be updated */
— 3.4 for l = 1 to r do
———–if (gki(l) == j) then
—————νi = νi ⊕ h(ci, l, bj)⊕ h(ci, l, b′j)
— 3.5 ν ′i = Ek(ctr, i, νi)
-
j, b′j , {ν′i}1≤i≤t−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Delete
/* Assume that block bj is to be deleted */
The logic of Delete is similar to Modify operation but replaces the block to be modified
with a special block ”DBlock”. So, the inner for loop (step 3.4) will be:
3.4 for l = 1 to r do
—if (gki(l) == j) then
—–νi = νi ⊕ h(ci, l, bj)⊕ h(ci, l,DBlock)
Insert
Physical insert is not supported. Append operation is allowed by viewing the data file
as a two dimensional structure (matrix), and appending the new block in a round robin
fashion.
Figure 2.7: The PDDP protocol by Ateniese et al. [11].
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Figure 2.8 [42] shows an example of rank-based skip list, where the number inside the
node represents its rank. The top leftmost node (w7) of the skip list is considered to be
the start node. To access any node at the bottom level, searching should begin from the
start node.












Figure 2.8: Example of rank-based skip list [42].
PDDP Schemes of Erway et al.
Erway et al. [42] constructed a PDDP scheme based on the PDP model of [8] to support
provable updates of stored data files using rank-based authenticated skip lists. Their pro-
tocol supports block insertion by eliminating the index information in the tag computation
of [8]. The purpose of using the rank-based authenticated skip list in [42] is to authenticate
the tag information of the blocks to be updated or challenged.
In the PDDP scheme of [42], the File F is fragmented into m blocks {b1, b2, . . . , bm}.
A representation/tag T (bj) of block bj is computed as T (bj) = gbj mod N (N is the RSA
modulus and g is an element of high order in Z∗N). The block representation T (bj) is
stored at the jth bottom-level node of the authenticated skip list and the block itself is
stored elsewhere by the server. The tags protect the integrity of file blocks, while the
authenticated list ensures the security and integrity of tags.
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During the challenge phase, the client requests the server to prove the integrity of
randomly selected c blocks {bji}1≤j1,...,jc≤m. The server sends the tags {T (bji)}1≤j1,...,jc≤m
along with their search/verification paths. The server also sends a combined block M =∑c
i=1 ai.bji , where {ai}1≤i≤c are random values sent by the client as part of the challenge.
The owner verifies the search/verification paths of the block tags using metadata Mc,
which is the label of the start node. Besides, the owner computes T =
∏c
i=1 T (bji)ai mod
N . Data integrity is valid only if the search paths are verified and T = gM mod N .
The authenticated skip list is used to modify, insert, and delete the block tags achieving
the dynamic behavior of the data file. Nodes of skip list along the search/verification path
– from the start node to the node associated with the block to be updated – are only
affected by the dynamic operations of file blocks.
The scheme presented in [42] can be summarized by the following procedures:
• Key-generation. This procedure is run by the data owner (the client) and outputs a
secret key sk and public key pk. The secret key is kept by the client and the public
key is sent to the remote server.
• Update-preparation. This procedure is run by the client to prepare a part of the file
for storage on a remote server, which may not be trustworthy. The input parameters
to this procedure are sk, pk, a part of the file F , updates to be performed (e.g., full
re-write, modify block, delete block, or insert block), and the previous metadataMc.
The output is an encoded version of that part of the file e(F ), encoded information
e(info) about the update, and the new metadata e(M). The output of this procedure
is sent to the remote server.
• Update-execution. Upon receiving an update request from the data owner, the server
runs this procedure in response to the owner’s request. The input parameters to this
procedure are pk, the previous version of the file denoted as Fi−1, the metadataMi−1,
and the values produced by the client during the Update-preparation algorithm. The
outputs of this procedure are the new version of the file denoted as Fi , metadata
Mi , and metadata M′c to be sent to the owner along with its proof PM′c .
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• Update-verification. This procedure is run by the client to verify the server’s behavior
during the updates. The input parameters to this procedure are all inputs of Update-
preparation algorithm, the metadataM′c, and the proof PM′c (M′c and PM′c are sent
from the server as outputs of the Update-execution algorithm). The output of the
Update-verification algorithm is either acceptance or rejection signal.
• Challenge. This procedure is run by the client to challenge the server and verify the
integrity of the remotely stored data file. It takes as input sk, pk, and the latest
client metadata Mc. The output is a challenge c that is sent from the client to the
server.
• Proof-computation. Upon receiving the challenge c from the client, the server runs
the Proof-computation algorithm in response to the owner’s challenge. The input
parameters to this procedure are pk, the latest version of the file, the metadata, and
the challenge c. It outputs a proof P that is sent to the client.
• Proof-verification. This procedure is run by the client to validate the proof P received
from the server. The input parameters to this procedure are sk, pk, the client
metadata Mc, the challenge c, and the proof P sent by the server. The output
of this procedure is ”accept” to indicate that the server still possesses the file intact
or ”reject” otherwise.
In their work, Erway et al. [42] presented a variant of the PDDP scheme using RSA
trees instead of rank-based authenticated lists. Wang et al. [87] used Merkle hash trees
[67] (instead of skip lists) and homomorphic authenticators built from BLS signatures [27]
to construct a PDDP scheme.
2.3.3 RSA-Based PDDP Schemes
Hao et al. [54] adapted the protocol presented in [80] to support both data dynamic and
public verifiability. The latter allows that anyone who knows the owner’s public key can
challenge the remote server and verify that the server is still possessing the owner’s files.
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If a dispute regarding data integrity occurs between the owner and the CSP, a third party
auditor can determine whether the data integrity is maintained or not. This third party
auditing process should bring in no new vulnerabilities towards the privacy of owner’s
data. The protocol presented in [54] ensures that the data is kept private during the third
party verification, where no private information contained in the data is leaked. Figure 2.9
summarizes the protocol presented in [54].
Setup
− N = pq is the RSA modulus (p and q are prime numbers)
− g is a generator of QRN (QRN is the set of quadratic residues modulo N)
− Public key pk = (N, g) and secret key sk = (p, q).
− f is a pesudo-random function
− File F = {b1, b2, . . . , bm}.
− Data owner generates a tag Dj for each block bj, where Dj = gbj mod N
− The tags are stored on the owner side and the file is sent to the remote server.
Challenge Response
Verifier Remote Server
1. Generates a random key r
2. Computes gs = g
s mod N (s ∈R ZN)
-
r,gs−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
- 3. Generates random coefficients {aj = fr(j)}1≤j≤m
- 4. Computes P = (gs)
∑m
j=1 aj .bj mod N
-
R←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
5. Generates a set of random coefficients {aj = fr(j)}1≤j≤m




j mod N) mod N
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Dynamic Operations
Modify
/* Assume that block bj is to be updated to b
′
j */
− Server updates bj to b′j
− Owner computes a new block tag D′j = gb
′
j mod N .
So, the new block tags are {D1, D2, . . . , D′j, . . . , Dm}
Insert
/* Assume a new block b̂ is to be inserted after position j or appended at the end */
− The server updates its file to be
{b1, b2, . . . , bj, b̂, . . . , bm+1} (insert: bj+1 = b̂) or {b1, b2, . . . , bm, b̂} (append).
− The owner computes a new block tag D̂ = gb̂ mod N , and changes the block tags to
{D1, D2, . . . , Dj, D̂, . . . , Dm+1} (insert: Dj+1 = D̂) or {D1, D2, . . . , Dm, D̂} (append)
Delete
/* Assume a block at position j is to be deleted*/
− Server deletes the block bj
− Owner deletes the corresponding tag Dj
Figure 2.9: The PDDP protocol by Hao et al. [54].
2.3.4 Cooperative PDP Schemes
Zhu et al. [93] addressed the construction of cooperative PDP scheme on hybrid clouds to
support scalability of service and data migration. A hybrid cloud is a deployment model
in which an organization provides and handles some internal and external resources. For
example, an organization can use a public cloud service like Amazon EC2 [5] to perform
the general computation, while the data files are stored within the organization’s local
data center in a private cloud. In their work, Zhu et al. [93] consider the existence of
multiple CSPs that cooperatively store customers’ data. The data owners are allowed to
dynamically access and update their data for various applications, and the verification
process is performed for the owners in hybrid clouds.
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Remark. Generally speaking, PDP and PDDP schemes are considered to be secure if (i) a
polynomial-time algorithm that can cheat the verifier and pass the auditing procedure with
non-negligible probability does not exist; and (ii) there exists a polynomial-time extractor
that can repeatedly execute the challenge response protocol until it extracts the original
data file.
2.4 Proof of Retrievability
Proof of retrievability (POR) is a complementary approach to PDP, and is stronger than
PDP in the sense that the verifier can reconstruct the entire data file from the responses
that are reliably transmitted from the server. This is due to encoding of the data file, for
example using erasure codes, before outsourcing to allow more error-resiliency. Thus, if it
is a crucial demand to detect any modification or deletion of tiny parts of the data file,
then encoding could be applied before outsourcing data to remote servers.
Schwartz and Miller [79] have proposed the use of algebraic signatures to verify data
integrity across multiple servers. Through keyed algebraic encoding and stream cipher
encryption, they are able to detect file corruptions. The communication complexity in the
model of [79] is an issue for it is linear with respect to the queried data size. Moreover,
the security of their proposal is not proven and remains in question [92].
The work done by Juels and Kaliski [56] is one of the first efforts to consider formal
models for POR schemes. In their model, the data is first encrypted then disguised blocks
(called sentinels) are embedded into the ciphertext. The sentinels are hidden among the
regular file blocks in order to detect data modification by the server. In the auditing phase,
the verifier requests for randomly picked sentinels and checks whether they are corrupted
or not. If the server corrupts or deletes parts of the data, then sentinels would also be
influenced with a certain probability. The scheme in [56] allows only for a limited number
of challenges on the data files, which is specified by the number of sentinels embedded into
the data file. This limited number of challenges is due to the fact that sentinels and their
position within the file must be revealed to the server at each challenge and the verifier
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cannot reuse the revealed sentinels.
Shacham and Waters [81] proposed a compact proof of retrievability model that enables
the verifier to unboundedly challenge the server addressing the limitation of [56]. Among
the main contributions of [81] is the construction of HLAs that enable the server to aggre-
gate the tags of individual file blocks and to generate a single short tag as a response to
the verifier’s challenge. Shacham and Waters [81] proposed two HLAs: one is based on the
pseudo-random function, and the other is based on the BLS signature [27].
Bowers et al. [29] presented a distributed cryptographic system known as HAIL (High-
Availability and Integrity Layer), which improves upon POR deployed on individual servers.
Their system allows a set of servers to prove to a data owner that the outsourced data is
intact and retrievable. Various POR schemes can be found in the literature, e.g., [36, 30, 41]
2.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have described the concept of PDP as a technique to verify the integrity
of data stored on remote sites. We have reviewed different PDP schemes designed for static
data. To efficiently validate the integrity of outsourced data, a number of challenges have to
be addressed: (i) the computation overhead on the server side to prove data possession, (ii)
the verifier’s computations complexity to check server responses, (iii) the storage overhead
on both the verifier and server sides, (iv) the communication cost to send a challenge vector
and receive a response; and (v) the permission for unlimited number of data audits.
Moreover, in this chapter we have presented some PDDP models that deal with dynamic
data. Through these models the data owner is able to send requests to the remote server for
updating/scaling the stored data. The verifier is enabled to make sure that the outsourced
data is consistent with the most recent modifications issued by the owner. We have also
highlighted the concept of POR as a complementary approach to PDP. The main idea
of POR schemes is to apply encoding to data files before outsourcing, which allows to




Finally, the PDP, PDDP, and POR schemes presented in this chapter focus on a single
copy of the file and provide no proof that the CSP stores multiple copies of the owner’s
file. The problem of creating multiple copies of a data file and auditing those copies to
verify their completeness and correctness was outside the scope of the schemes presented in
this chapter. There are some previous work on maintaining file copies through distributed
systems to achieve availability and durability (e.g., [34, 61]), but it does not focus on
guaranteeing that multiple copies of the data file are actually stored.
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Chapter 3
Integrity Verification for Multiple
Data Copies
In this chapter, we consider the problem of verifying the integrity of multiple data copies
stored on cloud/remote servers, and describe the scheme we proposed in [20, 15, 18]. Section
3.1 highlights the motivation of this work. Section 3.2 presents a basic provable multi-copy
data possession scheme, and a review of the multiple-replica provable data possession (MR-
PDP) scheme due to Curtmola et al. [37]. Our system model and assumptions are presented
in Section 3.3. Our proposed scheme for verifying the integrity of multiple data copies is
elaborated in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 contains the security analysis of the proposed scheme.
The performance analysis is shown in Section 3.7. Section 3.8 presents the implementation
and experimental results. How to identify the corrupted copies is discussed in Section 3.9.
A summary is given in Section 3.10.
3.1 Introduction
Storage-as-a-Service offered by cloud service providers (CSPs) enables customers to store
and retrieve almost unlimited amount of data by paying fees metered in GB/month. For
an increased level of scalability, availability and durability, some customers may want their
data to be replicated on multiple servers across multiple data centers. The more copies
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the CSP is asked to store, the more fees are charged. Therefore, customers need to have a
strong guarantee that the CSP is storing all data copies that are agreed upon in the service
contract.
In this chapter, we propose a pairing-based provable multi-copy data possession (PB-
PMDP) scheme, which provides an evidence that all outsourced copies are actually stored
and remain intact. Moreover, it allows authorized users (i.e., those who have the right to
access the owner’s file) to seamlessly access the file copies stored by the CSP, and supports
public verifiability. The proposed scheme is proved to be secure against colluding servers.
We illustrate the performance of the PB-PMDP scheme through theoretical analysis, which
is then validated by experimental results. The verification time of the proposed scheme
is practically independent of the number of file copies. Additionally, we discuss how to
identify corrupted copies by slightly modifying the proposed PB-PMDP scheme.
3.2 Provable Multi-Copy Data Possession Schemes
In this section, we consider the case of provable possession for multiple data copies, for
which we start with a basic provable multi-copy data possession scheme followed by a
review of the scheme due to Curtmola et al. [37].
3.2.1 Basic Provable Multi-Copy Data Possession Scheme
Suppose that a CSP offers to store n copies of an owner’s file on different servers for pre-
specified fees according to the used storage space. Thus, the data owner needs a strong
evidence to ensure that the CSP is actually storing no less than n copies, all these copies
are complete and correct, and the owner is not paying for a service that he does not get. A
straightforward solution to this problem is to use a single-copy PDP scheme to separately
challenge and verify the integrity of each copy on each server. This is not a workable
solution, since the CSP can convince the data owner that n copies of the file are stored,
while there is only one copy. Whenever a request for a PDP scheme execution is made to
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one of the n severs, it is forwarded to the server which actually possesses the stored copy.
The core of this cheating is that the n copies are identical making it trivial for the CSP to
deceive the owner. Therefore, a step towards the solution is to leave the control of the file
copying operation in the owner’s hand to create unique differentiable copies.
In the basic provable multi-copy data possession scheme, the data owner creates n
distinct copies by encrypting the file under n different keys. Hence, the CSP cannot use
one copy to answer the challenges for another. This natural solution enables the verifier to
separately challenge each copy on the remote servers, and ensure that the CSP is possessing
not less than n copies.
Although the above basic scheme is a workable solution, it is impractical and has the
following drawbacks:
• Data access and key management are serious problems with the basic scheme. Since
the file is encrypted under n different keys, the owner has to keep these keys secret
from the CSP, and share the n keys with each authorized user for each data file.
Moreover, when an authorized user interacts with the CSP to retrieve the data file, it
is not necessarily to receive the same copy each time. According to the load balancing
mechanism used by the CSP to organize the work of the servers, the authorized user’s
request is directed to the server with the lowest congestion. Consequently, each copy
should contain some indicator about its encryption key to enable the authorized user
to properly decrypt and access the received copy.
• The computation and communication complexities of the verification task are linear
with the number of copies.
3.2.2 Multiple-Replica Provable Data Possession Scheme
Curtmola et al. [37] were the first to present a multiple-replica provable data possession
(MR-PDP) scheme that creates multiple copies of an owner’s file and audit them. The
MR-PDP scheme increases data availability; a corrupted data copy can be reconstructed
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using duplicated copies on other servers. The interaction between authorized users (those
who have the right to access the owner’s file) and the CSP was not considered in [37].
The MR-PDP scheme supports only private verifiability, i.e., only the data owner can
check data possession. Public verifiability is a key feature in remote data checking schemes
to avoid disputes that may arise between the data owner and the CSP. Delegating the
auditing process (without revealing secret keys) to a trusted third party for verifying the
data integrity can resolve such disputes.
The MR-PDP scheme of [37] is based on the single-copy PDP model of [8]. In [37] dis-
tinct copies of a data files are created by first encrypting the file using one key, then masking
the encrypted version (n times) with different randomness generated from a pseudo-random
function.
Initially, a file F is fragmented into blocks {bj}1≤j≤m. The owner encrypts F using
a key K to obtain an encrypted version F̃ = {b̃j}1≤j≤m, where b̃j = EK(bj). The owner
generates n distinct copies {F̂i}1≤i≤n, where F̂i = {b̂ij}1≤j≤m, b̂ij = b̃j + rij (added as large
integers in Z), and rij = fx(i||j). fx is a pseudo-random function keyed with a secret key
x. Figure 3.1 gives a summary of the MR-PDP scheme.
In the MR-PDP scheme, if an authorized user interacts with the CSP to access an
owner’s file, the CSP retrieves one of the available copies. Upon receiving this copy, the
authorized user has to know the copy index to properly unmask it before decryption. Due to
the opaqueness of the internal operations of the CSP, the authorized users cannot recognize
which copy has been received. If i (the copy index) is attached with each copy forming
the structure (i||F̂i), corrupting or swapping copy indices hinder the correct unmasking
process. Thus, the authorized users are unable to access the data file.
For verification purposes, portion of the set {rij} is needed to be generated (rchal =∑
j∈A rzj in Figure 3.1). These random values cannot be publicly known, otherwise the
CSP can derive the encrypted version F̃ , and store only one copy. Hence, only private
verifiability is supported.
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Setup
− File F = {bj}1≤j≤m.
− N = ṕq́ is the RSA modulus (ṕ & q́ are prime numbers).
− ǵ is a generator of QRN (QRN is the set of quadratic residues modulo N).
− Public key pk = (N, ǵ, e), secret key sk = (d, v, x), v, x ∈R ZN , and
ed ≡ 1 mod (ṕ− 1)(q́ − 1).
− πk is a pseudo-random permutation keyed with a key k.
− fx is a pseudo-random function keyed with the secret key x.
− H is a hash function (H : {0, 1}∗ → QRN).
− EK is an encryption algorithm under a key K.
Data Owner
− Encrypts the data file F under the key K to obtain an encrypted version
F̃ = {b̃j}1≤j≤m, where b̃j = EK(bj)
− Uses the encrypted version F̃ to create a set of tags {Tj}1≤j≤m for all copies:
Tj = (H(v||j) · ǵb̃j)d mod N
− Generates n distinct copies {F̂i}1≤i≤n, F̂i = {b̂ij}1≤j≤m utilizing random masking:
aaafor i = 1 to n do
aaaaafor j = 1 to m do
aaaaaaa1. Computes a random value rij = fx(i||j)
aaaaaaa2. Computes the replica’s block b̂ij = b̃j + rij (added as large integers in Z)
− Sends the copy F̂i to a server Si, i : 1→ n
a =⇒ continue
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Checking possession of a replica F̂z
....Owner Remote Server Sz
1. Picks a key k for the function π,
aac (# of blocks to be challenged),
aaand ǵs = ǵ
s mod N (s ∈R ZN)
a
c, k, ǵs−−−−−−−−−−−−→
a 2. Computes a set A of random indices:
a A = {j} = πk(l)1≤l≤c










5. Computes A = {j} = πk(l)1≤l≤c








Figure 3.1: The MR-PDP scheme by Curtmola et al. [37].
3.3 Our System and Assumptions
System components. The cloud computing storage model considered in this work con-
sists of three main components as illustrated in Figure 3.2: (i) a data owner that can be an
individual or an organization originally possessing sensitive data to be stored in the cloud;
(ii) a CSP who manages cloud servers and provides paid storage space on its infrastructure
to store the owner’s files; and (iii) authorized users – a set of owner’s clients who have the
right to access the remote data.
The storage model used in this work can be adopted by many practical applications.
For example, e-Health applications can be envisioned by this model where the patients’
database that contains large and sensitive information can be stored on cloud servers.
In these types of applications, the e-Health organization can be considered as the data
owner, and the physicians as the authorized users who have the right to access the patients’
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Figure 3.2: Cloud computing data storage system model.
medical history. Many other practical applications like financial, scientific, and educational
applications can be viewed in similar settings.
In this work, we focus on sensitive archived and warehoused data, which is essential in
many applications such as digital libraries and astronomical/medical/scientific/legal repos-
itories. Such data are subject to infrequent change, so we treat them as static.
Data Redundancy. Data redundancy can be achieved using replication or coding schemes,
where the former is the simplest way that can be adopted by many storage systems. For a
data file with size |F | bits, the storage cost for n copies over cloud servers is n|F | bits. In
erasure codes, the file is divided into m blocks and encoded into ` blocks, where ` > m [3].
The encoded blocks are stored at ` different servers (one code block per server to prevent
simultaneous failure of all blocks), and thus the storage cost is |F |
m
` bits. The original file
can be reconstructed from any m out of the ` servers.
In the context of this work, we are considering economically-motivated CSPs that may
attempt to use less storage than required by the service contract through deletion of a
few copies of the file. The CSPs have almost no financial benefit by deleting only a
small portion of a copy of the file. Redundancy using erasure codes has less storage cost;
however, duplicating data file across multiple servers achieves scalability in the sense that if
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the number of users grows, then with more copies of data the user access time can be kept
below a certain threshold. Such scalability is a fundamental customer requirement in cloud
computing systems. A file that is duplicated and stored strategically on multiple servers –
located at various geographic locations – can help reduce access time and communication
cost for users. On the other hand, in responding to a data access request for coding-based
systems, the CSP has to access at least m servers to reconstruct the original data file,
and thus increased time overhead (network latency and computation time to decode data
blocks) occurs at the CSP side.
More importantly, in case of data corruption, erasure codes require the precise iden-
tification of failed/corrupted blocks. Without the ability to identify which blocks have
been corrupted, there is potentially a factorial combination of blocks to try to reconstruct





. For replication-based systems, a server’s copy can be
reconstructed even from a complete damage using duplicated copies on other servers. As
a result of the aforementioned reasons, in our work we do not apply erasure codes to the
data file before outsourcing.
Outsourcing and accessing. The data owner has a file F consisting of m blocks and
the CSP offers to store n copies {F̃1, F̃2, . . . , F̃n} of the owner’s file on different servers –
to prevent simultaneous failure of all copies – in exchange for pre-specified fees metered
in GB/month. The number of copies depends on the nature of data; more copies are
needed for critical data that cannot easily be reproduced, and to achieve a higher level of
scalability. This critical data should be replicated on multiple servers across multiple data
centers. On the other hand, non-critical, reproducible data are stored at reduced levels of
redundancy. The CSP pricing model is related to the number of data copies.
For data confidentiality, the owner encrypts his data before outsourcing to the CSP.
An authorized user of the outsourced data sends a data-access request to the CSP and
receives a file copy in an encrypted form that can be decrypted using a secret key shared
with the owner. According to the load balancing mechanism used by the CSP to organize
the work of the servers, the data-access request is directed to the server with the lowest
congestion, and thus the authorized user is not aware of which copy has been received.
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We assume that the interaction between the owner and the authorized users to authen-
ticate their identities and share the secret key has already been completed, and it is not
considered in this work. Throughout this chapter, the terms cloud server and cloud service
provider are used interchangeably.
Threat model. The completeness and correctness of customers’ data in the cloud may be
at risk due to the following reasons. First, the CSP – whose goal is likely to make a profit
and maintain a reputation – has an incentive to hide data loss (due to hardware failure,
management errors, various attacks) or reclaim storage by discarding data that has not
been or is rarely accessed. Second, a dishonest CSP may store fewer copies than what has
been agreed upon in the service contact with the data owner, and try to convince the owner
that all copies are correctly stored intact. Third, the cloud infrastructures are subject to
a wide range of internal and external security threats. Incidences of security breaches of
cloud services surface from time to time [51, 58].
In short, although outsourcing data to the cloud is attractive from the view point of
cost and complexity of long-term large-scale data storage, it does not offer sufficient guar-
antee on data integrity. This problem, if not properly handled, may hinder the successful
deployment and wide acceptance of the cloud paradigm. The goal of the proposed scheme
is to detect (with high probability) the CSP misbehavior by validating the number and
integrity of file copies.
Underlying algorithms. The proposed scheme consists of five polynomial time algo-
rithms: KeyGen, CopyGen, TagGen, Prove, and Verify.
− (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(1κ). This algorithm is run by the data owner. It takes as input
a security parameter 1κ, and returns a public key pk (publicly known) and a private
key sk (kept secret by the owner).
− F̃ ← CopyGen(CNi, F )1≤i≤n. This algorithm is run by the data owner. It takes as
input a copy number CNi and a file F , and generates n copies F̃ = {F̃i}1≤i≤n. The
owner sends the copies F̃ to the CSP to be stored on cloud servers.
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− Φ← TagGen(sk, F̃). This algorithm is run by the data owner. It takes as input the
private key sk and the file copies F̃, and outputs tags/authenticators set Φ, which is
an ordered collection of tags for the data blocks. The owner sends Φ to the CSP to
be stored along with the copies F̃.
− P ← Prove(F̃,Φ, chal). This algorithm is run by the CSP. It takes as input the file
copies F̃, the tags set Φ, and a challenge chal (sent from a verifier). It returns a proof
P, which guarantees that the CSP is actually storing n copies and all these copies
are intact.
− {1, 0} ← Verify(pk,P). This algorithm is run by a verifier (original owner or any
other trusted auditor). It takes as input the public key pk, and the proof P returned
from the CSP. The output is 1 if the integrity of all file copies is correctly verified or
0 otherwise.
3.4 Security Model
Following [81], we would like the remote data checking scheme to be correct and sound.
These two requirements are defined as follows:
• Correctness requires that the verifier accepts valid server responses.
• Soundness requires that any cheating server that passes the verification process is
actually storing the owner’s data intact.
The security of the proposed scheme can be stated using a ”game” that captures the
data possession property [8, 42, 81]. The data possession game between an adversary A
(acts as a malicious CSP) and a challenger C (acts as a verifier) consists of the following:
• Setup. C runs the KeyGen algorithm to generate a key pair (pk, sk), and sends pk
to A.
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• Interact. A interacts with C to get the file copies and the verification tags set Φ.
A adaptively selects a file F and sends it to C. C runs the two algorithms CopyGen
and TagGen to create n distinct copies F̃ along with the tags set Φ, and returns both
F̃ and Φ to A.
Moreover, A can request challenges {chali}1≤i≤L for some parameter L ≥ 1 of his
choice, and return proofs {Pi}1≤i≤L to C. C runs the Verify algorithm and provides
the verification results to A. The Interact step between A and C can be repeated
polynomially-many times.
• Challenge. A decides on a file F previously used during the Interact step,
requests a challenge chal from C, and generates a proof P ← Prove(F̃′,Φ, chal),
where F̃′ is F̃ except that at least one of its file copies (or a portion of it) is missing
or tampered with. Upon receiving the proof P, C runs the Verify algorithm and if
Verify(pk,P) returns 1, then A has won the game. The Challenge step can be
repeated polynomially-many times for the purpose of data extraction.
The proposed scheme is secure if the probability that any polynomial-time adversary A
wins the game is negligible. In other words, if a polynomial-time adversary A can win the
game with non-negligible probability, then there exists a polynomial-time extractor that
can repeatedly execute the Challenge step until it extracts the blocks of data copies.
File swapping attack. In this type of attacks, the remote server tries to prove the
possession of the data using blocks from different files. A remote data checking scheme
must be secure against such an attack.
3.5 Proposed PB-PMDP Scheme
3.5.1 Overview and Rationale
Generating unique differentiable copies of the data file is the core to design a provable
multi-copy data possession scheme. Identical data copies enable the CSP to simply deceive
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the owner by storing only one copy and pretending that it stores multiple copies. Using
a simple yet efficient way, the proposed scheme generates distinct copies utilizing the
diffusion property of any secure encryption scheme. The diffusion property ensures that
the output bits of the ciphertext depend on the input bits of the plaintext in a very complex
way, i.e., there will be an unpredictable complete change in the ciphertext, if there is a
single bit change in the plaintext [35]. The interaction between the authorized users and
the CSP is considered through this methodology of generating distinct copies, where the
former can decrypt and access a file copy received from the CSP. In the proposed scheme,
the authorized users need only to keep a single secret key – shared with the data owner
– to decrypt the file copy, and it is not necessarily to recognize the index of the received
copy.
3.5.2 Notations
− F is a data file to be outsourced, and is composed of a sequence of m blocks, i.e.,
F = {b1, b2, . . . , bm}.
− πkey(·) is a pseudo-random permutation (PRP): key × {0, 1}log2(m) → {0, 1}log2(m).
− ψkey(·) is a pseudo-random function (PRF): key×{0, 1}∗ → Zp (p is a prime number).
− Bilinear Map/Pairing. Let G1, G2, and GT be cyclic groups of prime order p.
Let ḡ and g be generators of G1 and G2, respectively. A bilinear pairing is a map
ê : G1 ×G2 → GT with the following properties [65, 25]:
1. Bilinear : ê(ua, vb) = ê(u, v)ab ∀ u ∈ G1, v ∈ G2, and a, b ∈ Zp
2. Non-degenerate: ê(ḡ, g) 6= 1
3. Computable: there exists an efficient algorithm for computing ê.
− H(·) is a map-to-point hash function : {0, 1}∗ → G1.
− EK is an encryption algorithm with strong diffusion property and a key K, e.g., AES
(Advanced Encryption Standard) [38].
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Remark 1. Homomorphic linear authenticators (HLAs) [81, 41, 10] are basic building
blocks in the proposed scheme. Informally, the HLA is a fingerprint/tag computed by
the owner for each file block bj that enables a verifier to validate the data possession on
remote servers by sending a challenge vector chal of c elements: chal = {r1, r2, . . . , rc}.
As a response, the servers can homomorphically construct a tag authenticating the value∑c
j=1 rj · bj. The response is validated by a verifier, and accepted only if the servers
honestly compute the response using the owner’s file blocks. The proposed scheme in this
work utilizes the BLS (Boneh-Lynn-Shacham) HLAs [81].
3.5.3 PB-PMDP Procedural Steps
 Key Generation. As earlier, ê : G1 × G2 → GT is a bilinear map and g is a
generator of G2. The data owner runs the KeyGen algorithm to generate a private
key x ∈ Zp and a public key y = gx ∈ G2 along with s elements (u1, u2, . . . , us) ∈R
G1.
 Generation of Distinct Copies. The data owner runs the CopyGen algorithm to
create n differentiable copies F̃ = {F̃i}1≤i≤n. The copy F̃i is generated by concatenat-
ing a copy number i with the file F , then encrypting using EK , i.e., F̃i = EK(i||F ).
F̃i is divided into blocks {b̃ij}1≤j≤m, and the block b̃ij is further fragmented into s sec-
tors {b̃ij1, b̃ij2, . . . , b̃ijs}, i.e., the copy F̃i = {b̃ijk}1≤j≤m
1≤k≤s
, where each sector b̃ijk ∈ Zp
for some large prime p.
The authorized users need to keep only a single secret key K. Later, when an autho-
rized user receives a file copy from the CSP, he decrypts the copy and removes the
index from the copy header to reconstruct the plain form of the received file copy.
 Generation of Tags. Given the distinct file copies F̃ = {F̃i}, where F̃i = {b̃ijk},
the data owner runs the TagGen algorithm to generate a tag σij for each block b̃ij






x ∈ G1 (i : 1 → n, j : 1 → m, k : 1 → s). In the tag
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computation, IDF = Filename||n||m||u1|| . . . ||us is a unique fingerprint for each file
F comprising the file name, the number of copies for this file, the number of blocks
per copy, and the random values {uk}1≤k≤s. Embedding the IDF into the block tag
σij prevents the CSP from cheating by using blocks from different files (file swapping
attack).
In order to reduce storage overhead on cloud servers and lower communication cost,
the data owner generates an aggregated tag σj for the blocks at the same indices in
each copy F̃i as σj =
∏n
i=1 σij ∈ G1. Hence, instead of storing mn tags, the proposed
PB-PMDP scheme requires the CSP to store only m tags for the files copies F̃. Let
us denote the set of aggregated tags as Φ = {σj}1≤j≤m. The data owner sends
{F̃,Φ, IDF} to the CSP, and deletes the copies and the tags from its local storage.
 Challenge. For challenging the CSP and validating the integrity of all copies, the
verifier sends c (# of blocks to be challenged) and two fresh keys at each challenge:
a PRP(π) key k1 and a PRF(ψ) key k2. Both the verifier and the CSP use π keyed
with k1 and the ψ keyed with k2 to generate a set Q = {(j, rj)} of c pairs of random
indices and random values, where {j} = πk1(l)1≤l≤c and {rj} = ψk2(l)1≤l≤c.
 Response. The CSP runs the Prove algorithm to generate a set Q = {(j, rj)} of
random indices and values, and provide an evidence that the CSP is still correctly






j ∈ G1, µ = {µik}1≤i≤n
1≤k≤s
, and µik =
∑
(j,rj)∈Q
rj · b̃ijk ∈ Zp.
 Verify Response. Upon receiving the proof P = {σ, µ} from the CSP, the verifier












k , y). (3.1)
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In equation (3.1), the term
∑n
i=1 µik is linear in n, while the term [·]n costs one
more exponentiation for any value of n. If the verification equation passes, the Verify
algorithm returns 1, otherwise 0. The correctness of verification equation (3.1) can
be shown as follows:
















































































Remark 2. The proposed PB-PMDP scheme supports public verifiability where anyone,
who knows the owner’s public key but is not necessarily the data owner, can send a challenge
vector to the CSP and verify the response. Public verifiability can resolve disputes that
may arise between the data owner and the CSP regarding data integrity. If such a dispute
occurs, a trusted third party auditor (TPA) can determine whether the data integrity is
maintained or not. Since the owner’s public key is only needed to perform the verification
step, the owner is not required to reveal his secret key to the TPA. The PB-PMDP scheme
is presented in Figure 3.3.
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Setup
− File F = {b1, b2, . . . , bm}.
− ê : G1 ×G2 → GT is a bilinear map, g is a generator for G2.
− x ∈ Zp is a private key.
− y = gx ∈ G2 along with (u1, u2, . . . , us) ∈R G1 form a public key.
Data Owner
− Creates distinct file copies F̃ = {F̃i}1≤i≤n , where F̃i = EK(i||F )1≤i≤n.
Each copy F̃i is an ordered collection of blocks fragmented into sectors,
i.e., F̃i = {b̃ijk}1≤j≤m
1≤k≤s
, where b̃ijk ∈ Zp.







− Computes a set of aggregated tags Φ = {σj}1≤j≤m for the blocks




− Sends {F̃,Φ, IDF} to the CSP and deletes the copies and the tags
from its local storage.
Challenge Response
. Verifier CSP
1. Picks c (# of blocks to be challenged)
and two fresh keys k1 and k2
2. Generates a set Q = {(j, rj)},
{j} = πk1(l)1≤l≤c and {rj} = ψk2(l)1≤l≤c
a =⇒ continue
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a 3. Generates a set Q as the verifier did




























Figure 3.3: The proposed PB-PMDP scheme.
3.5.4 Reducing the Communication Cost
One can attempt to change the PB-PMDP scheme to reduce the communication cost
by a factor of n by permitting the CSP to compute and send µ = {µ̂k}1≤k≤s, where
µ̂k =
∑n

















Thus, the CSP can just keep the sectors summation
∑n
i=1 b̃ijk not the sectors themselves.
Moreover, the CSP can corrupt the block sectors and the summation is still valid. There-
fore, the proposed scheme requires the CSP to send µ = {µik}1≤i≤n
1≤k≤s
, and the summation∑n
i=1µik is done on the verifier side.
A slightly modified version of the PB-PMDP scheme can reduce the communication
cost by a factor of s during the response phase by allowing the CSP to compute and send
µ = {µi}1≤i≤n instead of µ = {µik}1≤i≤n
1≤k≤s
. In this version, a file copy F̃i is divided into
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blocks, but the blocks are not fragmented into sectors, i.e., a copy F̃i = {b̃ij}1≤j≤m, where
b̃ij ∈ Zp . A tag σij is generated for each block b̃ij: σij = (H(IDF ||j).ub̃ij)x ∈ G1, where u
is a generator for G1. Tags are aggregated into a set Φ = {σj}1≤j≤m, where σj =
∏n
i=1 σij.




j ∈ G1 and µ = {µi}1≤i≤n,
where µi =
∑






rj ]n · u
∑n
i=1 µi , y).
This reduced communication cost will be at the expense of increased storage overhead
on the CSP side, where each block b̃ij ∈ Zp will be accompanied with a tag σij ∈ G1 of
equal length. If the block size is greater than |p| (the bit length of the prime p), the CSP
can simply cheat by storing b̃ij mod p instead of the whole block b̃ij. Therefore, with this
slightly modified version, to store n copies each of size |F | bits, the total storage over the
CSP will be (n+1)|F | bits (using tag aggregation approach). The storage overhead equals
the size of a complete file copy. The more storage space is used over the CSP side, the
more fees the customers are charged (pay-as-you-go pricing model).
3.6 Security Analysis
Here we present the security analysis for the PB-PMDP scheme. First, in the proposed
scheme, we utilize PRP (π) and PRF (ψ) to compress the challenge, and thus reducing the
communication cost. Instead of sending the set Q of c pairs of random indices and values
to the CSP, the verifier sends only two keys k1 and k2 (over secure communication). Using
π and ψ in this manner is proved to be secure [10].
For the correctness security requirement, we have previously shown the correctness of
equation (3.1). For the soundness security requirement, we will show that if a polynomial-
time adversary A can win the data possession game (with non-negligible probability) with
a challenger C, then A is actually storing the n data copies F̃ in an uncorrupted state. For
an adversary A to cheat the verifier, he has to respond with a malicious proof P′ 6= P and
Verify(pk,P′) returns 1.
The soundness of the PB-PMDP scheme is based on the unforgeability of the used
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HLAs, which depends on the security of the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) and the
discrete logarithm (DL) problems.
Definitions.
1. CDH problem: given g, gx, h ∈ G for some group G and x ∈ Zp , compute hx
2. DL problem: given g, h ∈ G for some group G, find x such that h = gx .
The following theorem proves the unforgeability of the HLAs used in the proposed PB-
PMDP scheme. Our approach to prove the theorem is by investigating all possible com-
binations of malicious CSP responses 〈{σ′, µ′}, {σ, µ′}, {σ′, µ}〉, and checking whether any
of these combinations can pass the verification equation (3.1).
Theorem 1. Assuming the hardness of both the CDH and the DL problems in bilinear
groups, the verifier of the proposed PB-PMDP scheme accepts a response to a challenge




Proof. We prove the theorem by contradiction. The goal of an adversaryA (malicious CSP)
is to generate a response that is not correctly computed and pass the verification process
done by a challenger C (verifier). Let P′ = {σ′, µ′} be A’s response, where µ′ = {µ′ik}1≤i≤n
1≤k≤s
.







, and µik =
∑
(j,rj)∈Q rj · b̃ijk.
According to the correctness of PB-PMDP scheme, the expected proof P = {σ, µ}
satisfies the verification equation, i.e.,
ê(σ, g) = ê([
∏
(j,rj)∈Q







Assume that σ′ 6= σ, and σ′ passes the verification equation, then we have
ê(σ′, g) = ê([
∏
(j,rj)∈Q











Obviously, if µ′ik = µik ∀(i, k), it follows from the above verification equations that σ′ = σ,
which contradicts our assumption. Let us define ∆µik = µ
′
ik − µik (1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ k ≤ s).
It must be the case that at least one of {∆µik}1≤i≤n
1≤k≤s
is nonzero. Dividing the verification
equation for the malicious response by the verification equation for the expected response,
we obtain























We set uk = g
αkhβk for αk, βk ∈ Zp, and thus
































Hence, we have found a solution to the CDH problem unless evaluating the exponent
causes a division by zero. However, we noted that not all of {∆µik}1≤i≤n
1≤k≤s
can be zero and
the probability that βk = 0 is
1
p
, which is negligible. Therefore, if σ′ 6= σ, we can use the
adversary A to break the CDH problem, and thus we guarantee that σ′ must be equal to
σ.
It is only the values µ′ = {µ′ik}1≤i≤n
1≤k≤s
and µ = {µik}1≤i≤n
1≤k≤s
that can differ. Assume that
the adversary A responds with σ′ = σ and µ′ 6= µ. Now we have
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ê(σ, g) = ê([
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Now, we have found a solution to the DL problem unless evaluating the exponent
causes a division by zero. However, the probability that βk = 0 is
1
p
, which is negligible.




, we can use
the adversary A to break the DL problem. As a result, we guarantee that {µ′ik} must be
equal to {µik} ∀(i, k). 
Data Extraction. We have shown that if a polynomial-time adversary A can win the
data possession game (with non-negligible probability) with a challenger C, then A is
actually storing the data in an uncorrupted state. For the purpose of data extraction, the
challenger C interacts with A to extract data blocks. Suppose that C challenges c blocks,




·σrj2j2 . . . σ
rjc
jc
and µ = {µik}1≤i≤n
1≤k≤s
, where µik = rj1 ·b̃ij1k+rj2 ·b̃ij2k+· · ·+rjc ·b̃ijck. The
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challenger C can extract the actual data blocks {b̃ijk} in polynomially-many interactions
with A. If the challenge-response phase has been repeated c times (each time we challenge
c blocks), then there will be c proofs {P1,P2, . . . ,Pc}. Thus, a system of linear equations


















· b̃nj1s + rcj2 · b̃nj2s + · · ·+ r
c
jc · b̃njcs
Solving this system of linear equations yields the data blocks {b̃ijk}.
Finally, the PB-PMDP scheme is secure against file swapping attack. The file identifier
IDF is embedded into the block tag, and thus the CSP cannot use blocks from different
files and pass the auditing procedures even if the owner uses the same secret key x with
all his files.
3.7 Performance Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the presented schemes: MR-PDP and PB-
PMDP. The file F used in our performance analysis is of size 64MB divided in blocks of
4KB. Without loss of generality, we assume that the desired security level is 80-bit. Thus,
we utilize an elliptic curve defined over Galois field GF (p) with |p| = 160 bits (a point on
this curve can be represented by 161 bits using compressed representation [14]), and the
size of the RSA modulus N is 1024 bits.
Similar to [80, 11, 54], the computation cost for the MR-PDP and PB-PMDP is es-
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timated in terms of used cryptographic operations, which are notated in Table 3.1. G
indicates a group of points over a suitable elliptic curve in the bilinear pairing, and QRN
is a set of quadratic residues modulo N .
Table 3.1: Notation of cryptographic operations.
Notation Description Notation Description
HG Hashing to G HQRN Hashing to QRN
EG Exponentiation in G EZN Exponentiation in ZN
MG Multiplication in G MZ Multiplication in Z
MZp Multiplication in Zp DZ Division in Z
AZp Addition in Zp AZ Addition in Z
P Bilinear pairing EK Encryption using K
R Random-number generation
To perform a fair comparison between the PB-PMDP and the MR-PDP [37], we as-
sume two small modifications to the model presented in [37]. First, we assume that the
indices of the blocks being challenged are the same across all copies (this assumption is an
optimization for the verification computations of the MR-PDP). Second, for the CSP to
prove the possession of the blocks (not just only their sum), each block being challenged
is multiplied by a random value. The second modification makes the S-PDP version of [8]
to be the base of the MR-PDP scheme.
Let n, m, and s denote the number of copies, the number of blocks per copy, and
the number of sectors per block, respectively. Let c denote the number of blocks to be
challenged, and |F | denote the size of the file copy. Let the keys used with π and ψ be of size
128 bits. Table 3.2 presents a theoretical analysis for the setup, storage, communication,
and computation costs of the two schemes.
3.7.1 Comments
Sytem Setup. As it can be seen in Table 3.2, the cost of generating data copies in the
proposed PB-PMDP scheme is much less than that of the MR-PDP scheme. On the other
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Copies EK + nmR nEK
Generation + nmAZ
Tags 2m EZN +mMZ (s+ 1)nm EG +nmHG
Generation + mHQRN + (ns+n - 1)mMG
Storage
File Copies n|F | n|F |
CSP Overhead 1024m bits 161m bits
Communication
Challenge 1280 + log2(c) bits 256 + log2(c) bits
Response 1024(n+ 1) bits † 161 + 160ns bits
Computation
Proof
(c+n) EZN + (cn+ c - 1)MZ c EG + (c - 1)MG + csnMZp
+ (c - 1)nAZ + (c - 1)snAZp
Verification
(2n+ c+ 1) EZN+ cHQRN + DZ 2P + (c+ s+ 1) EG + cHG
+ (cn+ c+n - 1)MZ + (c - 1)nAZ + (c+ s - 1)MG + (n - 1)sAZp
† There is an optimization for this response to be 1024 + 160n bits using hashing.
hand, Curtmola et al. [37] efficiently reduce the computation cost of generating the block
tags. This is due to the fact that the tags are generated from the encrypted version of
the file before masking with some unique randomness to generate the differentiable copies.
In general, the impact of setup computations on the overall system performance may be
insignificant; setup is done only once during the life time of the data storage system, which
may be for tens of years.
Storage overhead. Storage overhead is the additional space used to store necessary
information other than the outsourced file copies F̃. Both schemes require n|F | bits to
store F̃, while the storage overhead for the PB-PMDP scheme is much less than that of the
MR-PDP model. The overheads on the CSP are 2MB and 0.31MB for the MR-PDP and
PB-PMDP schemes, respectively (about 84% reduction). Reducing the storage overhead
on the CSP side is economically a key feature to lower the fees paid by the customers.
Communication cost. The communication cost of the MR-PDP scheme is less than
that of PB-PMDP. For 20 copies of F , the communication costs for the MR-PDP and
PB-PMDP schemes are about 2.8KB and 80KB, respectively. However, for small s ( n),
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the PB-PMDP will have less communication cost.
Computation cost. As observed from Table 3.2, the cost expression of the proof for the
MR-PDP scheme has three terms linear in the number of copies n, while the PB-PMDP
scheme has two terms linear in n. Moreover, there are three terms linear in n in the
verification cost expression for the MR-PDP scheme, while the PB-PMDP scheme contains
only one term linear in n in the corresponding expression. These terms affect the total
computation time when dealing with a large number of copies in practical applications.
We note that since the cost of an addition is negligibly smaller than those of pairing and
exponentiation, the verification time in the proposed PB-PMDP scheme is practically not
affected by the value of n.
3.8 Implementation and Experimental Evaluation
3.8.1 Implementation
We have implemented the MR-PDP and PB-PMDP schemes on top of Amazon Elastic
Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) [5] and Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) [6]
cloud platforms. Amazon EC2 is a web service that enables customers to lunch and manage
Linux/Unix and Windows server instances (virtual servers) in Amazon’s data centers.
Customers can automatically scale up and down the number of EC2 instances according to
their demands. Moreover, customers can upgrade and downgrade a specific EC2 instance
to fit current requirements. Amazon S3 is storage for the internet. It provides a simple
web services interface that can be used to store and retrieve almost unlimited amount of
data. Customers are allowed to choose the geographic locations where Amazon S3 will
store the data.
Our implementation of the presented schemes consists of three modules: OModule
(owner module), CModule (CSP module), and VModule (verifier module). OModule, which
runs on the owner side, is a library that includes KeyGen, CopyGen, and TagGen algorithms.
CModule is a library that runs on Amazon EC2 and includes Prove algorithm. VModule is
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a library to be run at the verifier side and includes the Verify algorithm.
In the experiments, we do not consider the system pre-processing time to prepare the
different file copies and generate the tags set. Moreover, the time to access the file blocks is
not considered in the implementation, as the state-of-the-art hard drive technology allows
as much as 1MB to be read in just few nanoseconds [80]. Hence, the total access time is
unlikely to have substantial impact on the overall system performance.
Implementation settings. In our implementation we use a ”large” Amazon EC2 instance
to run CModule. This instance type provides total memory of size 7.5GB and 4 EC2
Compute Units (2 virtual cores with 2 EC2 Compute Units each). One EC2 Compute
Unit provides the equivalent CPU capacity of a 1.0 - 1.2GHz 2007 Opteron or 2007 Xeon
processor [4]. The OModule and VModule are executed on a desktop computer with Intel(R)
Xeon(R) 2GHz processor and 3GB RAM running Windows XP. We outsource copies of a
data file of size 64MB to Amazon S3. Algorithms (encryption, pairing, hashing, etc.) are
implemented using MIRACL library version 5.4.2. In the experiments, we utilize the MNT
curve [68] defined over prime field GF (p) with |p| = 160 bits and embedding degree = 6
(the MNT curve with these parameters is provided by the MIRACL library).
3.8.2 Experimental Evaluation
Timing measurements. The proposed PB-PMDP scheme is based on pairing and elliptic
curve cryptography, while the MR-PDP scheme is based on RSA. To estimate the timing
measurements for the cryptographic operations used in the implementations, we run the
MIRACL library on the the used desktop computer. Table 3.3 presents the measured times
(in milliseconds), where each reported measurement is an average of thousands of runs.
Table 3.3 shows three measurements for EZN : 68.92 ms, 2.15 ms, and 0.32 ms. The
reason is that the exponent part differs during the implementation of the MR-PDP scheme.
For example, the data owner performs ǵEXP mod N , where EXP is the exponent part of size
4KB (32768 bits). The owner does this operation during the tag generations and the
verification phase. Utilizing the Fermat-Euler theorem [59], the owner can reduce the
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Table 3.3: Timing measurements for the cryptographic operations
Operation Time (ms) Operation Time (ms)
HG 0.22 HQRN 0.34
EG 0.27 EZN 68.92/2.15/0.32
MG 0.01 MZ 0.02/0.004/0.0009
MZp 0.00025 DZ 0.00022
AZp 0.00017 AZ 0.009/0.00029
P 4.6
exponent part, where ǵEXP ≡ ǵEXPmodφ(N) mod N and φ(N) = (ṕ− 1)(q́ − 1) is the Euler’s
totient function. On the other hand, the CSP cannot use this trick because φ(N) is not
known in public. Therefore, EZN needs 68.92 ms and 2.15 ms at the CSP and the owner,
respectively. Besides, a random value of size 160 bits is used in our slight modification to
the MR-PDP scheme to prove the possession of the data blocks not only their sum. Thus,
EZN needs 0.32 ms when the exponent part is 160 bits. Similar scenarios arise for MZ
and AZ operations. MZ needs 0.02 ms for 32768-bits × 160-bits, 0.004 ms for 1024-bits
× 1024-bits, and 0.0009 ms for 1024-bits × 160-bits. AZ needs 0.009 ms for 32768-bits +
32768-bits, and 0.00029 ms for 1024-bits + 1024-bits.
Experimental results. We compare the presented MR-PDP and PB-PMDP schemes in
terms of both the proof computation times and the verification times. It has been reported
in [8] that if the remote server is missing a fraction of the data, then the number of blocks
that needs to be checked in order to detect server misbehavior with high probability is
constant independent of the total number of file blocks. For example, if the server deletes
1% of the data file, the verifier needs only to check for c = 460-randomly chosen blocks of
the file so as to detect this misbehavior with probability larger than 99%. Therefore, in
our experiments, we use c = 460 to achieve a high probability of assurance.
For different number of copies, Figure 3.4a presents the proof computation times (in
seconds). The timing curve of the proposed PB-PMDP scheme is less than that of the
MR-PDP scheme. For 20 copies, the proof computation times for the MR-PDP and the
PB-PMDP schemes are 1.68 and 0.86 seconds, respectively (about 49% reduction).
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(b) Verifier computation times (sec)
Figure 3.4: Computation costs of the MR-PDP and PB-PMDP.
Figure 3.4b presents the verification times (in seconds). For 20 copies, the verification
times for the MR-PDP and the PB-PMDP schemes are 0.40 and 0.29 seconds, respectively
(about 27% reduction).
More importantly, the verification timing curve of the PB-PMDP scheme is almost
unchanged for the range of number of copies considered in our experiments. This is due
to the fact that although the term (n − 1)sAZp in the verification cost of the PB-PMDP
scheme is linear in n (Table 3.2), in our experiments its numerical value is quite small
compared to those of the other terms in the cost expression. This feature makes the PB-
PMDP scheme computationally cost-effective and more efficient when verifying a large
number of file copies.
3.9 Identifying Corrupted Copies
Here we show how the proposed PB-PMDP scheme can be slightly modified to identify
the indices of corrupted copies. The proof P = {σ, µ} generated by the CSP will be valid
and will pass the verification equation (3.1) only if all copies are intact and consistent.
Thus, when there is one or more corrupted copies, the whole auditing procedure fails. To
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handle this situation and identify the corrupted copies, a slightly modified version of the
PB-PMDP scheme can be used. In this version, the data owner generates a tag σij for each
block b̃ij, but does not aggregate the tags for the blocks at the same indices in different
copies, i.e., Φ = {σij} 1≤i≤n
1≤j≤m
. During the response phase, the CSP computes µ = {µik}1≤i≤n
1≤k≤s







rj ∈ G1. Upon receiving the proof P = {σ, µ}, the verifier
first validates P using equation (3.1). If the verification fails, the verifier asks the CSP




ij . Thus, the verifier has two lists σList =
{σi}1≤i≤n and µList = {µik}1≤i≤n
1≤k≤s
(µList is a two dimensional list).
Utilizing a recursive divide-and-conquer approach (binary search) [46], the verifier can
identify the indices of corrupted copies. Specifically, σList and µList are divided into
halves: σList→ (σLeft:σRight), and µList→ (µLeft:µRight). The verification equation (3.1)
is applied recursively on σLeft with µLeft and σRight with µRight. Note that the individual
tags in σLeft or σRight are aggregated via multiplication to generate one σ that is used
during the recursive application of equation (3.1). The procedural steps of identifying the
indices of corrupted copies are indicated in Algorithm 1.
The binary search algorithm takes four parameters: σList, µList, start that indicates the
start index of the currently working lists, and end to indicate the last index of the working
lists. The initial call to the search algorithm takes (σList, µList, 1, n). The invalid indices
are stored in invalidList, which is a global data structure.
This slight modification to identify the corrupted copies will be associated with some
extra storage overhead on the cloud servers, where the CSP has to store mn tags for the
file copies F̃ (m tags in the original version). Moreover, the challenge-response phase may
be done in two rounds if the initial round to verify all copies fails.
We have performed experiments to show the effect of identifying the corrupted copies
on the verification time. We generate 100 copies (using same file/parameters from Section
3.8), which are verified in 0.3 seconds when all copies are accurate. A percentage – ranging
from 1% to 20% – of the file copies is randomly corrupt. Figure 3.5 shows the verification
time (in seconds) with different corrupted percentages. The verification time is about 3.87
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Algorithm 1: BS(σList, µList, start, end)
begin
len←− (end−start)+1 /* List length */


































if NOT verified then
/* work with the left and right halves of σList and µList */
mid←− b(start+end)/2c /* List middle */
BS(σList, µList, start, mid) /* Left part */




seconds when 1% of the copies are invalid. As observed from Figure 3.5, when the percent-
ages of corrupted copies are up to 15% of the total copies, the performance of using the
binary search algorithm in the verification is more efficient than individual verification for
each copy. It takes about 0.29 seconds to verify one copy, and thus individual verifications
of 100 copies requires 100×0.29 = 29 seconds.
In short, the proposed PB-PMDP scheme can be slightly modified to support the feature
of identifying the corrupted copies at the cost of some extra storage, communication,






































Figure 3.5: Verification times with different percentages of corrupted copies.
reputation, invalid responses to verifier’s challenges are sent in very rare situations, and
thus the original version of the proposed scheme is used in most of the time.
3.10 Summary
In this chapter, we have studied the problem of creating multiple copies of a data file and
verifying those copies stored on cloud servers. We have proposed a pairing-based provable
multi-copy data possession (PB-PMDP) scheme, which supports outsourcing of multiple
data copies to untrusted CSP. The interaction between the authorized users and the CSP
is considered in our scheme, where the authorized users can seamlessly access a data copy
received from the CSP using a single secret key shared with the data owner. Moreover, the
BP-PMDP scheme supports public verifiability, allows unlimited number of auditing, and
provides possession-free verification where the verifier has the ability to verify the data
integrity even though he neither possesses nor retrieves the file blocks from the server.
Our security analysis has shown that the proposed PB-PMDP scheme is provably se-
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cure against colluding servers. Through theoretical analysis, experimental results, and
comparison with the MR-PDP scheme, we have explained the improved performance of
the proposed scheme. The verification time of PB-PMDP is practically independent of the
number of file copies, which makes the scheme computationally cost-effective and more
efficient when verifying a large number of file copies.
A slight modification can be done on the proposed scheme to support the feature of
identifying the indices of corrupted copies of data. The corrupted copy can be reconstructed
even from a complete damage using duplicated copies on other servers.
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Chapter 4
Provable Multi-Copy Dynamic Data
Possession
In this chapter, we direct our study to the the dynamic behavior of multiple data copies
outsourced to cloud servers, and describe the scheme we proposed in [16, 19]. Section 4.1
highlights the motivation of this work. Our system model and assumptions are presented
in Section 4.2. The proposed scheme to verify the integrity of multiple dynamic data copies
stored by cloud servers is elaborated in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 presents an extension to
provable possession models for single-copy dynamic data to work in the setting of multiple
copies of dynamic data. Section 4.6 contains the security analysis of the proposed scheme.
The performance analysis is shown in Section 4.7. Section 4.8 presents the implementation
and experimental results. Section 4.9 discusses how to identify the corrupted copy among
the outsourced data copies. The chapter is summarized in Section 4.10.
4.1 Introduction
Increasingly more and more organizations are opting for outsourcing data to remote cloud
service providers (CSPs). This is primarily to reduce the maintenance cost and the burden
of large local data storage. Customers can rent the CSP’s storage infrastructure to store
and retrieve almost unlimited amount of data by paying fees metered in GB/month.
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Replicating data on multiple servers across multiple data centers achieves a higher level
of scalability, availability, and durability. The more copies the CSP is asked to store, the
more fees the customers are charged. Moreover, the remotely stored data can be not only
accessed by authorized users (i.e., those who have the right to access the owner’s file), but
also updated and scaled by the data owner. Therefore, customers need to have a strong
guarantee that the CSP is storing all data copies that are agreed upon in the service
contract, and all these copies are consistent with the most recent modifications issued by
the customers.
In this chapter, we propose a map-based provable multi-copy dynamic data possession
(MB-PMDDP) scheme that achieves three main goals: (i) it provides an evidence to the
customers that the CSP is not cheating by storing fewer copies, (ii) it supports outsourcing
of dynamic data, i.e., it supports block-level operations such as block modification, inser-
tion, deletion, and append, and (iii) it allows authorized users to seamlessly access the file
copies stored by the CSP. We show the security of the proposed scheme against colluding
servers. We also give a comparative analysis of the proposed MB-PMDDP scheme with a
reference model obtained by extending existing provable possession of dynamic single-copy
schemes. The theoretical analysis is validated through experimental results. Additionally,
we utilize similar ideas to that applied in the previous chapter to identify corrupted copies
by slightly modifying the proposed MB-PMDDP scheme. To the best of our knowledge,
there was no provable data possession (PDP) scheme for multiple copies of dynamic data
in the open literature.
4.2 Our System and Assumptions
System components. The cloud computing storage model considered in this chapter is
similar to that of Figure 3.2 (Chapter 3). It consists of three main components: a data
owner, a CSP, and authorized users.
Outsourcing, updating, and accessing. The data owner has a file F divided into m
blocks, and requests the CSP to store n copies {F̃1, F̃2, . . . , F̃n} of F on different servers
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– to prevent simultaneous failure of all copies. Replication strategy depends on the im-
portance of outsourced data; more copies are needed for critical data that cannot easily
be reproduced, and to achieve a higher level of scalability. For this critical data, multiple
copies are distributed on multiple servers, while needless reproducible data are stored at
reduced levels of redundancy. The data owner has to pay according to the used storage
space on the CSP side, where the pricing model is related to the number of data copies.
For data confidentiality, the owner encrypts his data before outsourcing to the CSP.
After outsourcing all n copies of the file, the owner may interact with the CSP to perform
block-level operations on all copies. These operations includes modify, insert, append, and
delete specific blocks of the outsourced data copies.
An authorized user of the outsourced data sends a data-access request to the CSP and
receives a file copy in an encrypted form that can be decrypted using a secret key shared
with the owner. According to the load balancing mechanism used by the CSP to organize
the work of the servers, the data-access request is directed to the server with the lowest
congestion, and thus the authorized user is not aware of which copy has been received.
We assume that the interaction between the owner and the authorized users to authen-
ticate their identities and share the secret key has already been completed, and it is not
considered in this work. Throughout this chapter, the terms cloud server and cloud service
provider are used interchangeably.
Threat model. The integrity of customers’ data in the cloud may be at risk due to the
following reasons. First, the CSP – whose goal is likely to make a profit and maintain
a reputation – has an incentive to hide data loss (due to hardware failure, management
errors, various attacks) or reclaim storage by discarding data that has not been or is rarely
accessed. Second, to save the computational resources, the CSP may totally ignore the
data-update requests issued by the owner, or not execute them on all copies leading to
inconsistency between the file copies. Third, a dishonest CSP may store fewer copies than
what has been agreed upon in the service contact with the data owner, and try to convince
the owner that all copies are correctly stored intact. The goal of the proposed scheme is to
detect (with high probability) the CSP misbehavior by validating the number and integrity
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of file copies.
Underlying algorithms. The proposed scheme consists of seven polynomial time algo-
rithms: KeyGen, CopyGen, TagGen, PrepareUpdate, ExecUpdate, Prove, and Verify.
− (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(). This algorithm is run by the data owner to generate a public
key pk and a private key sk. The private key sk is kept secret by the owner, while
pk is publicly known.
− F̃ ← CopyGen(CNi, F )1≤i≤n. This algorithm is run by the data owner. It takes as
input a copy number CNi and a file F , and generates n copies F̃ = {F̃i}1≤i≤n. The
owner sends the copies F̃ to the CSP to be stored on cloud servers.
− Φ← TagGen(sk, F̃). This algorithm is run by the data owner. It takes as input the
private key sk and the file copies F̃, and outputs tags/authenticators set Φ, which is
an ordered collection of tags for the data blocks. The owner sends Φ to the CSP to
be stored along with the copies F̃.
− (D′, UpdateReq) ← PrepareUpdate(D, UpdateInfo). This algorithm is run by the
data owner to update the outsourced file copies stored by the remote CSP. The
input parameters are a previous metadata D stored on the owner side, and some
information UpdateInfo about the dynamic operation to be performed on a specific
block. The outputs of this algorithm are a modified metadata D′ and an update
request UpdateReq. This request may contain a modified version of a previously
stored block, a new block to be inserted, or a delete command to delete a specific
block from the file copies. UpdateReq also contains updated (or new) tags for modified
(or inserted/appended) blocks, and it is sent from the data owner to the CSP in order
to perform the requested update.
− (F̃′, Φ′) ← ExecUpdate(F̃, Φ, UpdateReq). This algorithm is run by the CSP, where
the input parameters are the file copies F̃, the tags set Φ, and the request UpdateReq.
It outputs an updated version of the file copies F̃′ along with an updated tags set Φ′.
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− P ← Prove(F̃,Φ, chal). This algorithm is run by the CSP. It takes as input the file
copies F̃, the tags set Φ, and a challenge chal (sent from a verifier). It returns a proof
P which guarantees that the CSP is actually storing n copies and all these copies are
intact, updated, and consistent.
− {1, 0} ← Verify(pk,P,D). This algorithm is run by a verifier (original owner or any
other trusted auditor). It takes as input the public key pk, the proof P returned from
the CSP, and the most recent metadata D. The output is 1 if the integrity of all file
copies is correctly verified or 0 otherwise.
4.3 Security Model
As we have indicated in Chapter 3, two security requirements can be defined [81]: correct-
ness and soundness. The former means that the verifier accepts valid server responses, and
the latter indicates that any cheating server that passes the verification process is actually
storing the owner’s data intact.
The security of the proposed scheme can be stated using a ”game” that captures the
data possession property [8, 42, 81]. The data possession game between an adversary A
(acts as a malicious CSP) and a challenger C (acts as a verifier) consists of the following:
• Setup. C runs the KeyGen algorithm to generate a key pair (pk, sk), and sends pk
to A.
• Interact. A interacts with C to get the file copies and the verification tags set Φ.
A adaptively selects a file F and sends it to C. C divides the file into m blocks, runs
the two algorithms CopyGen and TagGen to create n distinct copies F̃ along with the
tags set Φ, and returns both F̃ and Φ to A.
Moreover, A can interact with C to perform dynamic operations on F̃. A specifies
a block to be updated, inserted, or deleted, and sends the block to C. C runs the
PrepareUpdate algorithm, sends the UpdateReq to A, and updates the local metadata
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D. A can further request challenges {chali}1≤i≤L for some parameter L ≥ 1 of A’s
choice, and return proofs {Pi}1≤i≤L to C. C runs the Verify algorithm and provides
the verification results to A. The Interact step between A and C can be repeated
polynomially-many times.
• Challenge. A decides on a file F previously used during the Interact step,
requests a challenge chal from C, and generates a proof P← Prove(F̃′,Φ, chal), where
F̃′ is F̃ except that at least one of its file copies (or a portion of it) is missing or
tampered with. Upon receiving the proof P, C runs the Verify algorithm and if
Verify(pk,P,D) returns 1, then A has won the game. Note that D is the latest
metadata held by C corresponding to the file F . The Challenge step can be
repeated polynomially-many times for the purpose of data extraction.
The proposed scheme is secure if the probability that any polynomial-time adversary A
wins the game is negligible. In other words, if a polynomial-time adversary A can win the
game with non-negligible probability, then there exists a polynomial time extractor that
can repeatedly execute the Challenge step until it extracts the blocks of data copies.
In addition, a remote checking scheme for dynamic data must be secure against the fol-
lowing types of attacks.
• File swapping attack. In this type of attacks, the remote server tries to prove the
possession of the data using blocks from different files.
• Replay attack. The remote server does not perform the data modification requests
issued by the owner, and sends stale date as a response to a challenge vector.
4.4 Proposed MB-PMDDP Scheme
4.4.1 Overview and Rationale
As mentioned in Chapter 3, generating unique differentiable copies of the data file is the
core to design a multi-copy provable data possession scheme. Identical data copies enable
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the CSP to simply deceive the owner by storing only one copy and pretending that it
stores multiple copies. Utilizing the diffusion feature of any secure encryption model, the
proposed scheme can generate distinct copies. The diffusion property ensures that there
will be an unpredictable complete change in the ciphertext, if there is a single bit change
in the plaintext [35]. Generating the distinct copies based on the diffusion feature enables
authorized users to seamlessly decrypt and access a file copy received from the CSP. The
received copy is decrypted using a single secret key (shared with the data owner), and it
is not necessarily to recognize which copy has been received.
In this chapter, we propose a MB-PMDDP scheme allowing the data owner to update
and scale the blocks of the file copies outsourced to cloud servers which may be untrusted.
Validating such dynamic data copies requires the knowledge of the block versions to ensure
that the data blocks in all copies are consistent with the most recent modifications issued
by the owner. Moreover, the verifier should be aware of the block indices to guarantee
that the CSP has inserted or added the new blocks at the requested positions in all copies.
To this end, the proposed MB-PMDDP scheme is based on using a small data structure
(metadata), which we call a map-version table.
4.4.2 Map-Version Table
The map-version table (MVT) is a small dynamic data structure stored on the verifier side
to validate the integrity and consistency of all file copies outsourced to the CSP. The MVT
consists of three columns: serial number (SN ), block number (BN ), and block version
(BV). The SN is an indexing to the file blocks. It indicates the physical position of a
block in a data file. The BN is a counter used to make a logical numbering/indexing
to the file blocks. Thus, the relation between BN and SN can be viewed as a mapping
between the logical number BN and the physical position SN . The BV indicates the
current version of file blocks. When a data file is initially created the BV of each block is
1. If a specific block is being updated, its BV is incremented by 1.
Remark 1. It is important to note that the verifier keeps only one table for unlimited
number of file copies, i.e., the storage requirement on the verifier side does not depend on
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the number of file copies on cloud servers. For n copies of a data file of size |F |, the storage
requirement on the CSP side is O(n|F |), while the verifier’s overhead is O(m) for all file
copies (m is the number of file blocks).
Remark 2. The MVT is implemented as a linked list to simplify the insertion and deletion
of table entries. For actual implementation, the SN is not needed to be stored in the
table; SN is considered to be the entry/table index, i.e., each table entry contains just
two integers BN and BV (8 bytes). Thus, the total table size is 8m bytes for all file
copies. We further note that although the table size is linear to the file size, in practice
the former would be smaller by several orders of magnitude. For example, outsourcing
unlimited number of file copies of a 1GB-file with 16KB block size requires a verifier to
keep MVT of only 512KB (less than 0.05% of the file size). More details on the MVT and
how it works will be explained later.
4.4.3 Notations
− F is a data file to be outsourced, and is composed of a sequence of m blocks, i.e.,
F = {b1, b2, . . . , bm}.
− πkey(·) is a pseudo-random permutation (PRP): key × {0, 1}log2(m) → {0, 1}log2(m). 1
− ψkey(·) is a pseudo-random function (PRF): key × {0, 1}∗ → Zp.
− Bilinear Map/Pairing. Let G1, G2, and GT be cyclic groups of prime order p.
Let ḡ and g be generators of G1 and G2, respectively. A bilinear pairing is a map
ê : G1 × G2 → GT with the following properties indicated in sub-section 3.5.2 of
Chapter 3: Bilinear, Non-degenerate, and Computable.
− H(·) is a map-to-point hash function : {0, 1}∗ → G1.
− h is a cryptographic hash function, e.g., SHA-2.
1The number of file blocks (m) will be changed due to dynamic operations on the file. We use HMAC-
SHA-1 with 160-bit output to allow up to 2160 blocks in the file.
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− EK is an encryption algorithm with strong diffusion property, e.g., AES (Advanced
Encryption Standard) [38].
4.4.4 MB-PMDDP Procedural Steps
 Key Generation. Let ê : G1 × G2 → GT be a bilinear map and g is a generator
of G2. The data owner runs the KeyGen algorithm to generate a private key x ∈ Zp
and a public key y = gx ∈ G2 along with (u1, u2, . . . , us) ∈R G1.
 Generation of Distinct Copies. For a file F = {bj}1≤j≤m, the owner runs the
CopyGen algorithm to create n differentiable copies F̃ = {F̃i}1≤i≤n, where a copy
F̃i = {b̃ij}1≤j≤m. The block b̃ij is generated by concatenating a copy number i with
the block bj, then encrypting using an encryption scheme EK , i.e., b̃ij = EK(i||bj).
The encrypted block b̃ij is fragmented into s sectors {b̃ij1, b̃ij2, . . . , b̃ijs}, i.e., the copy
F̃i = {b̃ijk}1≤j≤m
1≤k≤s
, where each sector b̃ijk ∈ Zp for some large prime p.
The authorized users need only to keep a single secret key K. Later, when an au-
thorized user receives a file copy from the CSP, he decrypts the copy blocks, removes
the copy index from the blocks header, and then recombines the decrypted blocks to
reconstruct the plain form of the received file copy.
 Generation of Tags. Given the distinct file copies F̃ = {F̃i}, where F̃i = {b̃ijk},
the data owner runs the TagGen algorithm to generate a tag σij for each block b̃ij as





x ∈ G1 (i : 1 → n, j : 1 → m, k : 1 → s).
In the tag computation, BN j is the logical number of the block at physical position
j, BVj is the current version of that block, and IDF = Filename||n||u1|| . . . ||us is
a unique fingerprint for each file F comprising the file name, the number of copies
for this file, and the random values {uk}1≤k≤s. We assume that IDF is signed with
some owner’s signing secret key (different than x), and the CSP verifies this signature
during different scheme operations to validate the owner’s identity. Embedding the
IDF into the block tag σij prevents the CSP from cheating by using blocks from
80
4.4. PROPOSED MB-PMDDP SCHEME
different files (file swapping attack).
In order to reduce storage overhead on cloud servers and lower communication cost,
the data owner generates an aggregated tag σj for the blocks at the same indices in
each copy F̃i as σj =
∏n
i=1 σij ∈ G1. Hence, instead of storing mn tags, the proposed
MB-PMDDP scheme requires the CSP to store only m tags for the files copies F̃.
Let us denote the set of aggregated tags as Φ = {σj}1≤j≤m. The data owner sends
{F̃,Φ, IDF} to the CSP, and deletes the copies and the tags from its local storage.
The MVT is stored on the local storage of the owner (or any trusted verifier).
 Dynamic Operations on the Data Copies. The dynamic operations in the
proposed MB-PMDDP scheme are performed at the block level via a request in
the general form 〈IDF ,BlockOp, j, {b∗i }1≤i≤n, σ∗j 〉, where IDF is the file identifier and
BlockOp corresponds to block modification (denoted by BM), block insertion (denoted
by BI), or block deletion (denoted by BD). The parameter j indicates the index of
the block to be updated, {b∗i }1≤i≤n are the new block values for all copies, and σ∗j is
the new aggregated tag for the new blocks.
 Modification. For a file F = {b1, b2, . . . , bm}, suppose the owner wants to
modify a block bj with a block b
′
j for all file copies F̃. The owner runs the
PrepareUpdate algorithm to do the following:
1. Updates BVj = BVj + 1 in the MVT
2. Creates n distinct blocks {b̃′ij}1≤i≤n, where b̃′ij = EK(i||b′j) is fragmented
into s sectors {b̃′ij1, b̃′ij2, . . . , b̃′ijs}













4. Sends a modify request 〈IDF ,BM, j, {b̃′ij}1≤i≤n, σ′j〉 to the CSP
Upon receiving the modify request, the CSP runs the ExecUpdate algorithm to
do the following:
1. Replaces the block b̃ij with b̃
′
ij∀i, and constructs updated file copies
F̃′ = {F̃ ′i}1≤i≤n
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2. Replaces σj with σ
′
j in the set Φ, and outputs Φ
′ = {σ1, σ2, . . . , σ′j, . . . , σm}
 Insertion. In the block insertion operation, the owner wants to insert a new
block b̂ after position j in a file F = {b1, b2, . . . , bm}, i.e., the newly constructed
file is F ′ = {b1, b2, . . . , bj, b̂, . . . , bm+1}, where bj+1 = b̂. In the proposed MB-
PMDDP scheme, the physical block index SN is not included in the block tag.
Thus, the insertion operation can be performed without recomputing the tags
of all blocks that have been shifted after inserting the new block. Embedding
the physical index in the tag results in unacceptable computation overhead,
especially for large data files. To perform the insertion of a new block b̂ after
position j in all file copies F̃, the owner runs the PrepareUpdate algorithm to do
the following:
1. Constructs a new table entry 〈SN ,BN ,BV〉= 〈j+1, (Max{BN j}1≤j≤m)+1,
1〉, and inserts this entry in the MVT after position j
2. Creates n distinct blocks {b̂i}1≤i≤n, where b̂i = EK(i||b̂) is fragmented into
s sectors {b̂i1, b̂i2, . . . , b̂is}




x ∈ G1, then generates an aggregated tag σ̂ =
∏n
i=1 σ̂i ∈ G1. Note
that BN j+1 is the logical number of the new block with current version
BVj+1 = 1
4. Sends an insert request 〈IDF ,BI, j, {b̂i}1≤i≤n, σ̂〉 to the CSP
Upon receiving the insert request, the CSP runs the ExecUpdate algorithm to
do the following:
1. Inserts the block b̂i after position j in the file copy F̃i ∀i, and constructs a
new version of the file copies F̃′ = {F̃ ′i}1≤i≤n
2. Inserts σ̂ after position j in the set Φ, and outputs Φ′ = {σ1, . . . , σj, σ̂, . . . , σm+1},
i.e., σj+1 = σ̂
Remark 3. To prevent the CSP from cheating and using less storage, the
modified or inserted blocks for the outsourced copies cannot be identical. To this
end, the proposed scheme in this work leaves the control of creating such distinct
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blocks in the owner hand. This illustrates the linear relation between the work
done by the owner during dynamic operations and the number of copies. The
proposed scheme assumes that the CSP stores the outsourced copies on different
servers to avoid simultaneous failure and achieve a higher level of availability.
Therefore, even if the CSP is honest to perform part of the owner work, this is
unlikely to significantly reduce the communication overhead since the distinct
blocks are sent to different servers for updating the copies. The experimental
results show that the computation overhead on the owner side due to dynamic
block operations is practical.
 Append. Block append operation means adding a new block at the end of the
outsourced data. It can simply be implemented via insert operation after the
last block of the data file.
 Deletion. Block deletion operation is the opposite of the insertion opera-
tion. When one block is deleted all subsequent blocks are moved one step
forward. To delete a specific data block at position j from all copies, the
owner deletes the entry at position j from the MVT and sends a delete re-
quest 〈IDF ,BD, j, null, null〉 to the CSP. Upon receiving this request, the CSP
runs the ExecUpdate algorithm to do the following:
1. Deletes the blocks {b̃ij}1≤i≤n, and outputs a new version of the file copies
F̃′ = {F̃ ′i}1≤i≤n
2. Deletes σj from Φ and outputs Φ
′ = {σ1, σ2, . . . , σj−1, σj+1, . . . , σm−1}
Figure 4.1 shows the changes in the MVT due to dynamic operations on the copies
F̃ of a file F = {bj}1≤j≤8. When the copies are initially created (Figure 4.1a),
SN j = BN j and BVj = 1: 1 ≤ j ≤ 8. Figure 4.1b shows that BV5 is incremented
by 1 for updating the block at position 5 for all copies. To insert a new block after
position 3 in F̃, Figure 4.1c shows that a new entry 〈4, 9, 1〉 is inserted in the MVT
after SN 3, where 4 is the physical position of the newly inserted block, 9 is the new
logical block number computed by incrementing the maximum of all previous logical
block numbers, and 1 is the version of the new block. Deleting a block at position 2
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from all copies requires deleting the table entry at SN 2 and shifting all subsequent
entries one position up (Figure 4.1d). Note that during all dynamic operations, the
SN indicates the actual physical positions of the data blocks in the file copies F̃.
Figure 4.1: Changes in the MVT due to different dynamic operations on copies of a file
F = {bj}1≤j≤8.
 Challenge. For challenging the CSP and validating the integrity and consistency of
all copies, the verifier sends c (# of blocks to be challenged) and two fresh keys at each
challenge: a PRP(π) key k1 and a PRF(ψ) key k2. Both the verifier and the CSP use
π keyed with k1 and the ψ keyed with k2 to generate a set Q = {(j, rj)} of c pairs of
random indices and random values, where {j} = πk1(l)1≤l≤c and {rj} = ψk2(l)1≤l≤c.
The set of random indices {j} is the physical positions (serial numbers SN ) of the
blocks to be challenged.
 Response. The CSP runs the Prove algorithm to generate a set Q = {(j, rj)} of
random indices and values, and provide an evidence that the CSP is still correctly
possessing the n copies in an updated and consistent state. The CSP responds with






j ∈ G1, µik =
∑
(j,rj)∈Q
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 Verify Response. Upon receiving the proof P = {σ, µ} from the CSP, the verifier












k , y) (4.1)
The verifier utilizes the set of random indices {j} (generated from π) and the MVT to
get the logical block number BN j and the block version BVj of each block being chal-
lenged. If the verification equation passes, the Verify algorithm returns 1, otherwise
0. The correctness of the verification equation (4.1) can be shown as follows:













































































One can attempt to slightly modify the MB-PMDDP scheme to reduce the com-
munication overhead by a factor of n via allowing the CSP to compute and send
µ = {µ̂k}1≤k≤s, where µ̂k =
∑n
i=1 µik. However, this modification enables the CSP
to simply cheat the verifier as follows:
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Thus, the CSP can just keep the sectors summation
∑n
i=1 b̃ijk not the sectors them-
selves. Moreover, the CSP can corrupt the block sectors and the summation is still
valid. Therefore, we require the CSP send µ = {µik}1≤i≤n
1≤k≤s
, and the summation∑n
i=1µik is done on the verifier side. The challenge response protocol in the MB-
PMDDP scheme is summarized in Figure 4.2.
Verifier CSP
1. Generates a PRP key k1 and a PRF key k2.
2. Determines c (# of blocks in the challenge vector)
3. Generates a set Q = {(j, rj)},
– {j} = πk1(l)1≤l≤c,
– and {rj} = ψk2(l)1≤l≤c
-
c, k1, k2−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
- 4. Uses k1 and k2 to generate the set Q


























Figure 4.2: Challenge response protocol in the MB-PMDDP scheme.
Remark 4. The proposed MB-PMDDP scheme supports public verifiability where anyone,
who knows the owner’s public key but is not necessarily the data owner, can send a challenge
vector to the CSP and verify the response. Public verifiability can resolve disputes that
may occur between the data owner and the CSP regarding data integrity. If such a dispute
occurs, a trusted third party auditor (TPA) can determine whether the data integrity is
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maintained or not. Since the owner’s public key is only needed to perform the verification
step, the owner is not required to reveal his secret key to the TPA.
4.5 Extending Dynamic Single-Copy PDP schemes
It is possible to obtain a provable multi-copy dynamic data possession scheme by extend-
ing existing PDP models for single-copy dynamic data. Such PDP schemes selected for
extension must meet the following conditions: (i) support of full dynamic operations (mod-
ify, insert, append, and delete), (ii) support of public verifiability, (iii) based on pairing
cryptography in creating block tags (homomorphic authenticators); and (iv) block tags are
outsourced along with data blocks to the CSP (i.e., tags are not stored on the local storage
of the data owner). Meeting these conditions allows us to construct a PDP reference model
that has similar features to the proposed MB-PMDDP scheme. Therefore, we can establish
a fair comparison between the two schemes and evaluate the performance of our proposed
approach.
Below we drive a scheme by extending PDP models, which are based on authenticated
data structures, e.g., [42] and [87]. Using Merkle hash trees (MHTs) [67], we construct a
scheme labelled as TB-PMDDP (tree-based provable multi-copy dynamic data possession),
but it can also be designed using authenticated skip lists [42] or other authenticated data
structures. The TB-PMDDP is used as a reference model for comparing the proposed
MB-PMDDP scheme.
4.5.1 Merkle Hash Tree
An MHT [67] is a binary tree structure used to efficiently verify the integrity of the data.
The MHT is a tree of hashes where the leaves of the tree are the hashes of the data
blocks. Figure 4.3 shows an example of an MHT used for verifying the integrity of a file F
consisting of 8 blocks (h denotes a cryptographic hash function, e.g., SHA-2).
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hE hF 
hR 
hA hB hC hD 
h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 h8 
b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 
Figure 4.3: Merkle hash tree.
The hash hj = h(bj) (1 ≤ j ≤ 8). At upper levels, hA = h(h1||h2), hB = h(h3||h4), and
so on. Finally, hR = h(hE||hF ) is the hash of the root node that is used to authenticate
the integrity of all data blocks. The data blocks {b1, b2, . . . , b8} are stored on a remote
server, and only the authentic value hR is stored locally on the verifier side. For example,
if the verifier requests to check the integrity of the blocks b2 and b6, the server will send
these two blocks along with the authentication paths A2 = {h1, hB} and A6 = {h5, hD}
that are used to reconstruct the root of the MHT. Aj – the authentication path of bj – is
a set of node siblings (grey-shaded circles) on the path from hj to the root of the MHT.
The verifier uses the received blocks and the authentication paths to recompute the root
in the following manner. The verifier constructs h2 = h(b2), h6 = h(b6), hA = h(h1||h2),
hC = h(h5||h6), hE = h(hA||hB), hF = h(hC ||hD), and hR = h(hE||hF ). After computing
hR, it is compared with the authentic value stored locally on the verifier side.
The MHT is commonly used to authenticate the values of the data blocks. In the
dynamic behavior of outsourced data, we need to authenticate both the values and the
positions of the data blocks, i.e., we need an assurance that a specific value is stored at
a specific leaf node. For example, if a data owner requires to insert a new block after
position j, the verifier needs to make sure that the server has inserted the new block at
the requested position. To validate the positions of the blocks, the leaf nodes of the MHT
are treated in a specific sequence, e.g., left-to-right sequence [62]. So, the hash of any
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internal node = h(left child || right child), e.g., hA = h(h1||h2) 6= h(h2||h1). Besides, the
authentication path Aj is viewed as an ordered set, and thus any leaf node is uniquely
specified by following the used sequence of constructing the root of the MHT.
4.5.2 Directory MHT for File Copies
In the TB-PMDDP scheme an MHT is constructed for each file copy, and then the roots
of the individual trees are used to build a hash tree which we call a directory MHT. The
key idea is to make the root node of each copy’s MHT as a leaf node in a directory MHT
used to authenticate the integrity of all file copies in a hierarchical manner. The directory
tree is depicted in Figure 4.4. The verifier can keep only one hash value (metadata)
M = h(IDF ||hDR), where IDF is a unique file identifier for a file F , and hDR is the




hDR Directory root 
h2R hnR h1R 
MHT for copy #1 MHT for copy #2 MHT for copy #n 
h11 h12 h1m   h21 h22 h2m   hn1 hn2 hnm  
Figure 4.4: Directory tree.
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4.5.3 TB-PMDDP Procedural Steps
 Key Generation. The same as in the MB-PMDDP scheme.
 Generation of Distinct Copies. The same as in the MB-PMDDP scheme.
 Generation of Tags and Trees. Given the distinct file copies F̃ = {F̃i}, where
F̃i = {b̃ijk}, the data owner runs the TagGen algorithm to create a tag σij for each





x ∈ G1 (i : 1→ n, j : 1→ m, k : 1→ s).
Similar to the MB-PMDDP scheme, the data owner reduces the storage overhead on
the CSP side by generating an aggregated tag σj for the blocks at the same indices
in each copy F̃i as σj =
∏n
i=1 σij ∈ G1. Let us denote the set of aggregated tags as
Φ = {σj}1≤j≤m.
The data owner then generates an MHT for each file copy F̃i. The leaf nodes of
each tree are the ordered set {h(H(b̃ij))}, i.e., the leaf nodes of the MHT are the
cryptographic hashes of H(b̃ij), and the root of the tree is denoted as hiR. Using
the roots {hiR}1≤i≤n, the data owner generates a directory MHT in which the leaf
nodes are {hiR}1≤i≤n, and the directory root is denoted as hDR. Note that the MHTs
are constructed using a specific sequence, e.g., left-to-right sequence to authenticate
both the value and the position of H(b̃ij). The owner computes a metadata M =
h(IDF ||hDR), where IDF = Filename||n||u1|| . . . ||us is a unique identifier for each
owner’s file F . The data owner sends 〈F̃,Φ, IDF , {MHTi}1≤i≤n〉 to the CSP and
deletes the copies, the tags, and the trees from its local storage. The metadata M
is stored on the local storage of the owner (or any trusted verifier).
 Dynamic Operations on the Data Copies. The dynamic operations in the TB-
PMDDP scheme are performed at the block level – as in the MB-PMDDP scheme
– via a request in the general form 〈IDF ,BlockOp, j, {b∗i }1≤i≤n, σ∗j 〉. IDF is the file
identifier, BlockOp is BM for modification, BI for insertion, or BD for deletion, j
indicates the index of the block to be updated, {b∗i }1≤i≤n are the new block values
for all copies, and σ∗j is the new aggregated tag for the new blocks.
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 Modification. For a file F = {b1, b2, . . . , bm}, suppose the owner wants to
modify a block bj with a block b
′
j for all file copies F̃. The owner runs the
PrepareUpdate algorithm to do the following:
1. Creates n distinct blocks {b̃′ij}1≤i≤n, where b̃′ij = EK(i||b′j) is fragmented
into s sectors {b̃′ij1, b̃′ij2, . . . , b̃′ijs}















3. Sends a modify request 〈IDF ,BM, j, {b̃′ij}1≤i≤n, σ′j〉 to the CSP
Upon receiving the modify request, the CSP runs the ExecUpdate algorithm to
do the following:
1. Replaces the block b̃ij with b̃
′
ij∀i, and constructs updated file copies F̃′ =
{F̃ ′i}1≤i≤n
2. Replaces h(H(b̃ij)) with h(H(b̃′ij)) in the leaf nodes of each copy’s MHT,
and accordingly updates the MHTs
3. Calculates the authentication paths 〈Aij〉1≤i≤n of the updated blocks at
position j in all copies. Aij is an ordered set of node siblings on the path
from the leaf node h(H(b̃′ij)) to the root of the MHT of copy i
4. Replaces σj with σ
′
j in the aggregated tags set Φ, and outputs
Φ′ = {σ1, σ2, . . . , σ′j, . . . , σm}
5. Sends 〈Aij〉1≤i≤n to the owner
Upon receiving 〈Aij〉1≤i≤n from the CSP, the owner uses these authentication
paths and {b̃′ij}1≤i≤n to generate a new directory root h′DR and update the
metadata M′ = h(IDF ||h′DR).
 Insertion. Inserting a new block b̂ after position j in a file F = {b1, b2, . . . , bm}
constructs a new file F ′ = {b1, b2, . . . , bj, b̂, . . . , bm+1}, where bj+1 = b̂. The
physical block index is not included in the block tag, and thus a new block can
be inserted without recomputing the tags of all blocks that have been shifted
after the insertion operation. MHTs are used to validate the positions of file
blocks.
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To perform the insertion of a new block b̂ after position j in all file copies, the
owner runs the PrepareUpdate algorithm to do the following:
1. Creates n distinct blocks {b̂i}1≤i≤n, where b̂i = EK(i||b̂) is fragmented into
s sectors {b̂i1, b̂i2, . . . , b̂is}






then generates an aggregated tag σ̂ =
∏n
i=1 σ̂i ∈ G1
3. Sends an insert request 〈IDF ,BI, j, {b̂i}1≤i≤n, σ̂〉 to the CSP
Upon receiving the insert request, the CSP runs the ExecUpdate algorithm to
do the following:
1. Inserts the block b̂i after position j in the file copy F̃i ∀i, and then adds a
leaf node h(H(b̂i)) after the leaf node h(H(b̃ij)) for each copy’s MHT. This
leads to constructing a new version of the file copies F̃′ = {F̃ ′i}1≤i≤n, and a
new version of the MHTs
2. Calculates the authentication paths 〈Âi〉1≤i≤n of the newly inserted blocks
{b̂i}1≤i≤n in all copies. Âi is an ordered set of node siblings on the path
from the leaf node h(H(b̂i)) to the root of the MHT of copy i
3. Inserts σ̂ after position j in the set Φ, and outputs Φ′ = {σ1, . . . , σj, σ̂, . . . , σm+1},
i.e., σj+1 = σ̂
4. Sends 〈Âi〉1≤i≤n to the owner
Upon receiving 〈Âi〉1≤i≤n from the CSP, the owner uses these authentication
paths and {b̂i}1≤i≤n to generate a new directory root h′DR and update the meta-
data M′ = h(IDF ||h′DR).
 Append. It can simply be implemented via insert operation after the last block
of the data file.
 Deletion. To delete a specific data block at position j from all copies, the owner
sends a delete request 〈IDF ,BD, j, null, null〉 to the CSP. Upon receiving this
request, the CSP runs the ExecUpdate algorithm to do the following:
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1. Calculates the authentication paths 〈Aij〉1≤i≤n of the blocks at position j
(blocks to be deleted) in all copies. Aij is an ordered set of node siblings on
the path from the leaf node h(H(b̃ij)) to the root of the MHT of copy i
2. Deletes the existing blocks {b̃ij}1≤i≤n and the leaf nodes {h(H(b̃ij))}1≤i≤n,
and outputs new file copies F̃′ along with a new version of the MHTs
3. Deletes σj from Φ, and outputs Φ
′ = {σ1, σ2 . . . , σj−1, σj+1 . . . , σm−1}
4. Sends 〈Aij〉1≤i≤n to the owner
The owner uses the authentication information received from the CSP to gen-
erate a new directory root h′DR and update the metadata M′ = h(IDF ||h′DR).
Remark 5. Appendix A contains examples that demonstrate how the dy-
namic operations performed on the outsourced file copies affect the MHTs on
the CSP side. Moreover, these examples show how the owner uses the informa-
tion received from the CSP to generate the new directory root and update the
metadata M.
 Challenge. The same as in the MB-PMDDP scheme.
 Response. The CSP runs the Prove algorithm to generate a set Q = {(j, rj)} of
random indices and values, and provide an evidence that the CSP is still correctly
possessing the n copies in an updated and consistent state. The CSP responds with










j ∈ G1 , µik =
∑
(j,rj)∈Q





are the authentication paths of {H(b̃ij)} 1≤i≤n
(j,∗)∈Q
.





from the CSP, the verifier runs the Verify algorithm to do the following:
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2. Generates a value V = h(IDF ||hDR), and checks V
?
= M, where M is the
authenticated-most-recent metadata stored on the verifier side. If the checking















k , y) (4.2)
If the verification equation passes, the verifier accepts the response, otherwise rejects.
The correctness of equation (4.2) can be illustrated as follows:

















































































For the verification purpose of the TB-PMDDP scheme, it is not sufficient to check
only V ?= M. The directory root hDR is reconstructed using hash values sent from
the CSP. Thus, if the scheme counts only on verifying V ?=M, the CSP can simply
cheat by storing the hashes of the outsourced data blocks not the blocks themselves.
The scheme needs to verify equation (4.2) that guarantees the storage of the actual




1. Picks c (# of blocks to be challenged),
... and two fresh keys k1 and k2
2. Generates a set Q = {(j, rj)} :
... {j} = πk1(l)1≤l≤c and {rj} = ψk2(l)1≤l≤c
-
c, k1, k2−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
- 3. Generates a set Q as the verifier did










rj · b̃ijk ∈ Zp















8. Computes V = h(IDF ||hDR), and checks V
?
=M (if fails returns 0).














Figure 4.5: The challenge response protocol in the TB-PMDDP scheme.
4.6 Security Analysis
In this section, we present the security analysis for the MB-PMDDP scheme. The security
proof for the TB-PMDDP is quite similar and is not presented here. For the TB-PMDDP
scheme, we should however note that the verification step of the metadataM will fail unless
the CSP sends the correct information {H(b̃ij)} 1≤i≤n
(j,∗)∈Q
along with the accurate authentica-
tion paths 〈Aij〉 1≤i≤n
(j,∗)∈Q
for the blocks being challenged. This is due to the collision resistance




The MB-PMDDP scheme utilizes PRP (π) and PRF (ψ) to compress the challenge,
and thus reducing the communication cost. Instead of sending the set Q of c pairs of
random indices and values to the CSP, the verifier sends only two keys k1 and k2 (over
secure communication). Using π and ψ in this manner is proved to be secure [10].
For the correctness security requirement, we have previously shown the correctness of
equation (4.1). For the soundness security requirement, we will show that if a polynomial-
time adversary A can win the data possession game (with non-negligible probability) with
a challenger C, then A is actually storing the n data copies F̃ in an updated and consistent
state. For an adversary A to cheat the verifier, he has to respond with a malicious proof
P′ 6= P and Verify(pk,P′) returns 1.
The soundness of the MB-PMDDP scheme is based on the unforgeability of the used
HLAs (homomorphic linear authenticators), which depends on the security of the compu-
tational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) and the discrete logarithm (DL) problems (refer to Section
3.6 for the definitions of CDH and DL problems).
The following theorem proves the unforgeability of the HLAs used in the proposed
MB-PMDDP scheme. Our approach to prove the theorem is by investigating all possible
combinations of malicious CSP responses 〈{σ′, µ′}, {σ, µ′}, {σ′, µ}〉, and checking whether
any of these combinations can pass the verification equation (3.1).
Theorem 1. Assuming the hardness of both the CDH and the DL problems in bilinear
groups, the verifier of the proposed MB-PMDDP scheme accepts a response to a challenge




Proof. We prove the theorem by contradiction. The goal of an adversaryA (malicious CSP)
is to generate a response that is not correctly computed and pass the verification process
done by a challenger C. Let P′ = {σ′, µ′} be the A’s response, where µ′ = {µ′ik}1≤i≤n
1≤k≤s
.







, and µik =
∑
(j,rj)∈Q rj · b̃ijk.
According to the correctness of MB-PMDDP scheme, the expected proof P = {σ, µ}
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satisfies the verification equation, i.e.,
- ê(σ, g) = ê([
∏
(j,rj)∈Q







Assume that σ′ 6= σ, and σ′ passes the verification equation, then we have
- ê(σ′, g) = ê([
∏
(j,rj)∈Q









Obviously, if µ′ik = µik ∀(i, k), it follows from the above verification equations that σ′ = σ
which contradicts our assumption. Let us define ∆µik = µ
′
ik − µik (1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ k ≤ s).
It must be the case that at least one of {∆µik}1≤i≤n
1≤k≤s
is nonzero. Dividing the verification
equation for the malicious response by the verification equation for the expected response,
we obtain























We set uk = g
αkhβk for αk, βk ∈ Zp, and thus
































Hence, we have found a solution to the CDH problem unless evaluating the exponent
causes a division by zero. However, we noted that not all of {∆µik}1≤i≤n
1≤k≤s
can be zero and
the probability that βk = 0 is
1
p
, which is negligible. Therefore, if σ′ 6= σ, we can use the
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adversary A to break the CDH problem, and thus we guarantee that σ′ must be equal to
σ.
It is only the values µ′ = {µ′ik}1≤i≤n
1≤k≤s
and µ = {µik}1≤i≤n
1≤k≤s
that can differ. Assume that
the adversary A responds with σ′ = σ and µ′ 6= µ. Now we have
ê(σ, g) = ê([
∏
(j,rj)∈Q













































































Now, we have found a solution to the DL problem unless evaluating the exponent
causes a division by zero. However, the probability that βk = 0 is
1
p
, which is negligible.




, we can use
the adversary A to break the DL problem. As a result, we guarantee that {µ′ik} must be
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equal to {µik} ∀(i, k). 
Data Extraction. We have shown that if a polynomial-time adversary A can win the
data possession game (with non-negligible probability) with a challenger C, then A is
actually storing the data in an uncorrupted state. For the purpose of data extraction, the
challenger C interacts with A to extract data blocks. Suppose that C challenges c blocks,




·σrj2j2 . . . σ
rjc
jc
and µ = {µik}1≤i≤n
1≤k≤s
, where µik = rj1 ·b̃ij1k+rj2 ·b̃ij2k+· · ·+rjc ·b̃ijck. The
challenger C can extract the actual data blocks {b̃ijk} in polynomially-many interactions
with A. If the challenge-response phase has been repeated c times (each time we challenge
c blocks), then there will be c proofs {P1,P2, . . . ,Pc}. Thus, a system of linear equations


















· b̃nj1s + rcj2 · b̃nj2s + · · ·+ r
c
jc · b̃njcs
Solving this system of linear equations yields the data blocks {b̃ijk}.
Finally, the MB-PMDDP scheme is secure against the following two attacks:
• File swapping attack. The file identifier IDF is embedded into the block tag, and
thus the CSP cannot use blocks from different files and pass the auditing procedures
even if the owner uses the same secret key x with all his files.
• Replay attack. If the CSP does not honestly perform the data modification requests
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issued by the owner, and sends old blocks and old tags during the challenge-response
protocol, it will be detected. The block version BVj – incremented in the MVT with
each modify request – is embedded into the block tag as a countermeasure against
such replay attacks.
4.7 Performance Analysis
Here we evaluate the performance of the presented schemes: MB-PMDDP and TB-PMDDP.
The file F used in our performance analysis is of size 64MB with 4KB block size. Without
loss of generality, we assume that the desired security level is 128-bit. Thus, we utilize an
elliptic curve defined over Galois field GF (p) with |p| = 256 bits (a point on this curve
can be represented by 257 bits using compressed representation [14]), and a cryptographic
hash of size 256 bits (e.g., SHA-256).
The computation cost for the two schemes is estimated in terms of the used crypto-
graphic operations, which are notated in Table 4.1. G indicates a group of points over a
suitable elliptic curve in the bilinear pairing.
Table 4.1: Notation of cryptographic operations
Notation Description Notation Description
hSHA Cryptographic hashing MZp Multiplication in Zp
HG Hashing to G AZp Addition in Zp
EG Exponentiation in G P Bilinear pairing
MG Multiplication in G EK Encryption under a key K
Let n, m, and s denote the number of copies, the number of blocks per copy, and
the number of sectors per block, respectively. Let c denotes the number of blocks to be
challenged, and |F | denotes the size of the file copy. Let the keys used with the PRP
and the PRF be of size 128 bits. Table 4.2 presents a theoretical analysis for the setup,







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Sytem Setup. Table 4.2 shows that the setup cost of the MB-PMDDP scheme is less than
that of the TB-PMDDP scheme. The TB-PMDDP scheme takes some extra cryptographic
hash operations to prepare the MHTs for the file copies to generate the metadata M.
Storage overhead. It is the additional space used to store some information other than
the outsourced file copies F̃ (n|F | bits are used to store F̃). The storage overhead on the
CSP for the MB-PMDDP scheme is much less than that of the TB-PMDDP model. Both
schemes need some additional space to store the aggregated block tags Φ = {σj}1≤j≤m,
where σj is a group element that can be represented by 257 bits. Besides Φ, the TB-
PMDDP scheme needs to store an MHT for each file copy which costs additional storage
space on the cloud servers. The MHTs can be computed on the fly during the operations
of the TB-PMDDP scheme. This slight modification can reduce the storage overhead on
the remote servers, but it will negatively affect the overall system performance. The MHTs
are needed through each dynamic operation of the file blocks and through the verification
phase of the system. Thus, being not explicitly stored on the CSP can influence the system
performance. For different number of copies of the file F , Figure 4.6a presents the CSP
storage overhead (in MB) of the two schemes. An important feature of the MB-PMDDP
scheme is that the CSP storage overhead is independent of the number of copies n, while
it is linear in n for the TB-PMDDP scheme. As shown in Figure 4.6a, for 20 copies of
the file F the overheads on the CSP are 0.50MB and 20.50MB for the MB-PMDDP and
TB-PMDDP schemes, respectively (about 97% reduction). Reducing the storage overhead
is economically a key feature to reduce the fees paid by the customers.
Regarding the verifier storage overhead, the MB-PMDDP scheme keeps an MVT on
the verifier side compared with M (one hash value) for the TB-PMDDP. It is important
to note there is only one table for all file copies, which mitigates the storage overhead
on the verifier side. An entry of the MVT is of size 8 bytes (two integers), and the total
number of entries equals to the number of file blocks. During implementation the SN is
not needed to be stored in the table; SN is considered to be the entry/table index (the









































































(b) Response communication cost (MB)
Figure 4.6: CSP storage overhead and communication cost of the MB-PMDDP and TB-
PMDDP schemes.
for unlimited number of copies.
Communication cost. From Table 4.2, the communication cost of the MB-PMDDP
scheme is much less than that of the TB-PMDDP scheme. During the response phase, the
map-based scheme sends one element σ (257 bits) and µ = {µik}1≤i≤n
1≤k≤s
, where µik is repre-





〉, where eachH(b̃ij) is represented by 257 bits, and Aij is an authentication path
of length O(log2m). Each node along Aij is a cryptographic hash of size 256 bits. For dif-
ferent number of copies of the file F , the communication cost (in MB) during the response
phase of the two schemes is depicted in Figure 4.6b. The response of the MB-PMDDP
scheme for 20 copies of F is 0.078MB, while it is 4.29MB for the TB-PMDDP scheme
(about 98% reduction). The challenge for both schemes is about 34 bytes.
Computation cost. The computation cost of the two schemes is estimated in terms of
the cryptographic operations (see Table 4.1) needed to generate the proof P and check the
verification equation that validates P. As observed from Table 4.2, the cost expression of
the proof for the MB-PMDDP scheme has two terms linear in the number of copies n,
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while the TB-PMDDP scheme has three terms linear in n. Moreover, the MB-PMDDP
scheme contains only one term linear in n in the verification cost expression, while there
are three terms linear in n in the verification cost expression for the TB-PMDDP scheme.
These terms affect the total computation time when dealing with a large number of copies
in practical applications.
Dynamic operations cost. Table 4.2 also presents the cost of dynamic operations for
both schemes. The communication cost of the MB-PMDDP scheme due to dynamic
operations is less than that of the TB-PMDDP scheme for the owner sends a request
〈IDF ,BlockOp, j, {b∗i }1≤i≤n, σ∗j 〉 to the CSP and receives no information back. During the
dynamic operations of the TB-PMDDP scheme, the owner sends a request to the CSP
and receives the authentication paths which are of order O(n log2(m)). The authentication
paths for updating 20 copies of F ≈ 8.75KB.
The owner in both schemes uses nEK operations to create the distinct blocks {b∗i }1≤i≤n,
and (s+ 1)n EG + nHG+ (sn+n - 1)MG to generate the aggregated tag σ∗j (the delete
operation does not require this computations). For the MB-PMDDP scheme, the owner
updates the state (the map-version table) without usage of cryptographic operations (add,
remove, or modify a table entry). On the other hand, updating the state (MHTs on the
CSP andM on the owner) of the TB-PMDDP scheme costs nHG + (2n log2(m) + 3n)hSHA
to update the MHTs of the file copies according to the required dynamic operations, and
regenerate the new directory root that constructs a new M. The experimental results
show that updating the state of the TB-PMDDP scheme has insignificant effect on the
total computation time of the dynamic operations.
4.8 Implementation and Experimental Evaluation
4.8.1 Implementation
We have implemented the proposed MB-PMDDP scheme and the TB-PMDDP reference
model on top of Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) [5] and Amazon Simple
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Storage Service (Amazon S3) [6] cloud platforms. Through Amazon EC2 customers can
lunch and manage Linux/Unix/Windows server instances (virtual servers) in Amazon’s
infrastructure. The number of EC2 instances can be automatically scaled up and down
according to customers’ needs. Amazon S3 is a web storage service to store and retrieve
almost unlimited amount of data. Moreover, it enables customers to specify geographic
locations for storing their data.
Our implementation of the presented schemes consists of three modules: OModule
(owner module), CModule (CSP module), and VModule (verifier module). OModule, which
runs on the owner side, is a library that includes KeyGen, CopyGen, TagGen, and PrepareUp-
date algorithms. CModule is a library that runs on Amazon EC2 and includes ExecuteUpdate
and Prove algorithms. VModule is a library to be run at the verifier side and includes the
Verify algorithm.
In the experiments, we do not consider the system pre-processing time to prepare the
different file copies and generate the tags set. This pre-processing is done only once during
the life time of the system which may be for tens of years. Moreover, in the implementation
we do not consider the time to access the file blocks, as the state-of-the-art hard drive
technology allows as much as 1MB to be read in just few nanoseconds [80]. Hence, the
total access time is unlikely to have substantial impact on the overall system performance.
Implementation settings. A ”large” Amazon EC2 instance is used to run CModule.
Through this instance, a customers gets total memory of size 7.5GB and 4 EC2 Compute
Units (2 virtual cores with 2 EC2 Compute Units each). One EC2 Compute Unit provides
the equivalent CPU capacity of a 1.0 - 1.2GHz 2007 Opteron or 2007 Xeon processor [4].
The OModule and VModule are executed on a desktop computer with Intel(R) Xeon(R)
2GHz processor and 3GB RAM running Windows XP. We outsource copies of a data
file of size 64MB to Amazon S3. Algorithms (encryption, pairing, hashing, etc.) are
implemented using MIRACL library version 5.4.2. For 128-bit security level, the elliptic
curve group we work on has a 256-bit group order. In the experiments, we utilize the
Barreto-Naehrig(BN)[13] curve defined over prime field GF (p) with |p| = 256 bits and
embedding degree = 12 (the BN curve with these parameters is provided by the MIRACL
library).
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4.8.2 Experimental Evaluation
We compare the presented two schemes from various perspectives: proof computation
times, verification times, and cost of dynamic operations. It has been reported in [8] that
if the remote server is missing a fraction of the data, then the number of blocks that
needs to be checked in order to detect server misbehavior with high probability is constant
independent of the total number of file blocks. For example, if the server deletes 1% of
the data file, the verifier only needs to check for c = 460-randomly chosen blocks of the
file so as to detect this misbehavior with probability larger than 99%. Therefore, in our
experiments, we use c = 460 to achieve a high probability of assurance.
Proof computation time. For different number of copies, Figure 4.7a presents the proof
computation times (in seconds) to provide an evidence that the file copies are actually
stored on the cloud servers in an updated, uncorrupted, and consistent state. The timing
curve of the MB-PMDDP scheme is much less than that of the TB-PMDDP scheme. For
20 copies, the proof computation times for the MB-PMDDP and the TB-PMDDP schemes
are 1.51 and 5.58 seconds, respectively (about 73% reduction in the computation time).
As observed from Figure 4.7a, the timing curve of the TB-PMDDP scheme grows with
increasing number of copies at a rate higher than that of the MB-PMDDP scheme. That
is because the proof cost expression of the TB-PMDDP scheme contains more terms which
are linear in the number of copies n (Table 4.2).
Verification time. Figure 4.7b presents the verification times (in seconds) to check
the responses/proofs received from the CSP. The MB-PMDDP scheme has verification
times less than that of the TB-PMDDP scheme. For 20 copies, the verification times for
the MB-PMDDP and the TB-PMDDP schemes are 1.58 and 3.13 seconds, respectively
(about 49% reduction in the verification time). The verification timing curve of the MB-
PMDDP scheme is almost constant. There is a very small increase in the verification
time with increasing number of copies. This is due to the fact that although the term
s(n− 1)AZp in the verification cost of the MB-PMDDP scheme is linear in n (Table 4.2),
in our experiments its numerical value is quite small compared to those of the other terms
in the cost expression. This feature makes the the MB-PMDDP scheme computationally
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(b) Verifier computation times (sec)
Figure 4.7: Computation costs of the MB-PMDDP and TB-PMDDP schemes.
cost-effective and more efficient when verifying a large number of file copies.
Dynamic operations cost. For different number of copies, Table 4.3 presents the compu-
tation times (in seconds) on the owner side of the two schemes due to dynamic operations
on a single block. The owner computation times for both schemes are approximately equal.
The slight increase of the TB-PMDDP scheme is due to some additional hash operations
required to regenerate a new directory root that constructs a new M (Table 4.2). As
noted, the computation overhead on the owner side is practical. It takes about 5 seconds
to modify/insert/append a block of size 4KB on 20 copies (< 1 minute for 200 copies). In
the experiments, we use only one desktop computer to accomplish the organization (data
owner) work. In practice during updating the outsourced copies, the owner may choose
to split the work among a few devices inside the organization or use a single device with
a multi-core processor which is becoming prevalent these days, and thus the computation
time on the owner side is significantly reduced in many applications.
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Table 4.3: Owner computation times (sec) due to dynamic operations on a single block.
# of Copies 1 5 10 15 20
MB-PMDDP 0.261 1.304 2.608 3.913 5.217
TB-PMDDP 0.261 1.305 2.610 3.916 5.221
4.9 Identifying Corrupted Copies
Here, we utilize similar ideas to that applied in the previous chapter to identify which
copies have been corrupted by slightly modifying the proposed MB-PMDDP scheme. Only
if all copies stored by the CSP are intact and consistent, the generated proof P = {σ, µ}
will be valid and will pass the verification equation (4.1). Thus, the overall system integrity
check fails when there is one or more corrupted copies. To address this issue and recognize
the corrupted copies, a slight modification can be applied to the MB-PMDDP scheme.
Through this modification, block tags are not aggregated, i.e., Φ = {σij} 1≤i≤n
1≤j≤m
. As a








rj ∈ G1. Upon receiving the proof P = {σ, µ}, the verifier first





ij . Thus, the verifier has two lists σList = {σi}1≤i≤n and µList =
{µik}1≤i≤n
1≤k≤s
(µList is a two dimensional list).
The verifier can utilize a recursive divide-and-conquer approach (binary search) [46]
to identify the indices of corrupted copies. The two lists σList and µList are divided into
halves: σList→ (σLeft:σRight), and µList→ (µLeft:µRight). The verifier applies equation
(4.1) recursively on σLeft with µLeft and σRight with µRight. To generate one σ that is used
during the recursive application of equation (4.1), individual tags in σLeft or σRight are
aggregated via multiplication. The procedural steps of identifying the indices of corrupted
copies are indicated in Algorithm 2.
The input parameters of the BS (binary search) algorithm are σList, µList, start (indi-
cates the start index of the currently working lists), and end (indicates the last index of
the currently working lists). Initially, the BS algorithm is called with (σList, µList, 1, n).
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Algorithm 2: BS(σList, µList, start, end)
begin
len←− (end−start)+1 /* The list length */
if len = 1 then
































if NOT verified then
/* work with the left and right halves of σList and µList */
mid←− b(start+end)/2c /* List middle */
BS(σList, µList, start, mid) /* Left part */




A global data structure invalidList is used to store the indices of corrupted copies.
This slight modification to the proposed MB-PMDDP scheme will be associated with
some extra storage overhead on the cloud servers. The CSP has to store mn tags for the
file copies F̃ (m tags in the original version). Moreover, the challenge-response phase may
be done in two rounds if the initial round to verify all copies fails.
We design experiments (using same file/parameters from Section 4.8) to show the effect
of identifying the corrupted copies on the verification time. We generate 100 copies, which
are verified in 1.584 seconds when all copies are accurate. A percentage – ranging from 1%
to 20% – of the file copies is randomly corrupt. Figure 4.8 shows the verification time (in
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seconds) with different corrupted percentages. The verification time is about 20.58 seconds




































Figure 4.8: Verification times with different percentages of corrupted copies.
As observed from Figure 4.8, when the percentages of corrupted copies are up to 15%
of the total copies, the performance of using the BS algorithm in the verification is more
efficient than individual verification for each copy. It takes about 1.58 seconds to verify
one copy, and thus individual verifications of 100 copies requires 100×1.58 = 158 seconds.
Shortly, a slight modification can be applied to the proposed scheme to support the fea-
ture of identifying the corrupted copies at the cost of some extra storage, communication,
and computation overheads. It is crucial for the CSP – to remain in business and maintain
a good reputation – to send valid responses to verifier’s challenges. Invalid responses are
sent in very rare situations, and thus the original version of the proposed scheme is used
in most of the time.
Remark 6. To validate the integrity of outsourced data, the MB-PMDDP scheme relies
on checking the relationship between the data blocks and their authentication tags. For
the TB-PMDDP scheme, it relies on that relationship and the hash trees structure. There-
fore, the divide-and-conquer approach used to identify corrupted copies cannot be directly
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applied to the TB-PMDDP scheme. Instead, a more complex method should be used to
efficiently locate the corruption under a two-level hash tree.
4.10 Summary
Outsourcing data to remote servers has become a growing trend for many organizations
to alleviate the burden of local data storage and maintenance. In this chapter, we have
studied the problem of creating multiple copies of dynamic data file and verifying those
copies stored on untrusted cloud servers.
We have proposed a new PDP scheme (referred to as MB-PMDDP), which supports
outsourcing of multi-copy dynamic data, where the data owner is capable of not only
archiving and accessing the data copies stored by the CSP, but also updating and scaling
these copies on the remote servers. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed scheme is the
first to address multiple copies of dynamic data. The interaction between the authorized
users and the CSP is considered in our scheme, where the authorized users can seamlessly
access a data copy received from the CSP using a single secret key shared with the data
owner. Moreover, the proposed scheme supports public verifiability, enables arbitrary
number of auditing, and allows possession-free verification where the verifier has the ability
to verify the data integrity even though he neither possesses nor retrieves the file blocks
from the server.
The MB-PMDDP scheme is proved to be secure against colluding servers, where only
valid responses can be accepted from the CSP. Through performance analysis and experi-
mental results, we have demonstrated that the proposed MB-PMDDP scheme outperforms
the TB-PMDDP approach derived from a class of dynamic single-copy PDP models. The
TB-PMDDP leads to high storage overhead on the remote servers and high computations
on both the CSP and the verifier sides. The MB-PMDDP scheme significantly reduces the
computation time during the challenge-response phase, which makes it more practical for
applications where a large number of verifiers are connected to the CSP causing a huge
computation overhead on the servers. Besides, it has lower storage overhead on the CSP,
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and thus reduces the fees paid by the cloud customers. The CSP’s response and dynamic
block operations of the map-based approach are done with less communication cost than
that of the tree-based approach.
A slight modification can be done on the proposed scheme to support the feature of
identifying the indices of corrupted copies. The corrupted data copy can be reconstructed
even from a complete damage using duplicated copies on other servers.
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Chapter 5
Dynamic Data and Mutual Trust
To complement our research, in this chapter we consider achieving mutual trust between
data owners and cloud service providers (CSPs). We propose a cloud-based storage scheme
[21, 17] that enables the data owner to utilize facilities offered by the CSP, and release con-
cerns regarding confidentiality, integrity, and access control of the outsourced data. Mean-
while, a dishonest owner is not able to falsely accuse the CSP and claim data corruption
over cloud servers to get illegal compensations. Section 5.1 highlights the motivation of
this work. Section 5.2 contains some related concepts. Our system and assumptions are
presented in Section 5.3. Some techniques pertaining to the design of our proposed scheme
are reviewed in Section 5.4. The proposed scheme is elaborated in Section 5.5. Section 5.6
contains the security analysis of the proposed scheme. The performance analysis is shown
in Section 5.7. Section 5.8 presents the implementation and experimental results. Section
5.9 discusses a slight modification to the proposed scheme to optimize the communication
cost. The chapter is summarized in Section 5.10.
5.1 Introduction
Storage-as-a-Service (SaaS) offered by cloud service providers (CSPs) is a paid facility
that enables organizations to outsource their sensitive data to be stored on remote servers.
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Thus, SaaS reduces the maintenance cost and mitigates the burden of large local data
storage at the organization’s end. A data owner pays for a desired level of security and
must get some compensation in case of any misbehavior committed by the CSP. On the
other hand, the CSP needs a protection from any false accusation that may be claimed by
the owner to get illegal compensations. This concern, if not properly handled, can cause
the CSP to go out of business [73].
The material of this chapter addresses some important issues related to outsourcing
the storage of data, namely dynamic data, newness, mutual trust, and access control. Dy-
namic scalability of data is one of the core design principles of data outsourcing for various
applications. This means that the remotely stored data can be not only accessed by au-
thorized users, but also updated and scaled by the owner. After updating, the authorized
users should receive the latest version of the data (newness property), i.e., a technique is
required to detect whether the received data is stale. This issue is crucial for applications
in which critical decisions are taken based on the received data. For example, in e-Health
applications a physician may write a prescription based on a patient’s medical history
received from remote servers. If such medical data is not up-to-date, the given prescrip-
tion may conflict with the patient’s current circumstances causing severe health problems.
Mutual trust between the data owner and the CSP is another imperative issue, which is
addressed in this chapter. A mechanism is needed to determine the dishonest party, i.e.,
misbehavior from any side should be detected and the responsible party is identified. Last
but not least, the access control is considered, which allows the data owner to grant or
revoke access rights to the outsourced data.
In this work, we propose a cloud-based storage scheme that allows the data owner to
benefit from the facilities offered by the CSP and enables indirect mutual trust between
them. The proposed scheme has four important features: (i) it allows the owner to out-
source sensitive data to a CSP, and perform full block-level dynamic operations on the
outsourced data, i.e., block modification, insertion, deletion, and append, (ii) it ensures
that authorized users (i.e., those who have the right to access the owner’s file) receive the
latest version of the outsourced data, (iii) it enables indirect mutual trust between the
owner and the CSP, and (iv) it allows the owner to grant or revoke access to the out-
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sourced data. We discuss the security issues of the proposed scheme. Besides, we justify
its performance through theoretical analysis and a prototype implementation on Amazon
cloud platform to evaluate storage, communication, and computation overheads.
5.2 Related Concepts
Existing research close to our work can be found in the areas of integrity verification
of outsourced data, cryptographic file systems in distributed networks, access control of
outsourced data, and and non-repudiation protocols. The reader can refer to Chapter 2
for more details about verifying the integrity of data stored on remote servers using PDP
(provable data possession) and POR (proof of retrievability) techniques.
5.2.1 Cryptographic File Systems
Kallahalla et al. [57] designed a cryptography-based file system called Plutus for secure
sharing of data on untrusted servers. Some authorized users of the data have the privilege
to read and write, while others can only read the data. In Plutus, a file-group represents a
set of files with similar attributes, and each file-group is associated with a symmetric key
called file-lockbox key. A data file is fragmented into blocks, where each block is encrypted
with a unique symmetric key called a file-block key. The file-block key is further encrypted
with the file-lockbox key of the file-group to which the data file belongs. If the data owner
wants to share a file-group with a set of users, the file-lockbox key is just distributed to
them. Plutus supports two operations on the file blocks: read and write/modify. Delete
operation can be supported by overwriting an existing block with null.
Goh et al. [50] have presented SiRiUS, which is designed to be layered over existing
file systems such as NFS (network file system) to provide end-to-end security. To enforce
access control in SiRiUS, each data file (d-file) is attached with a metadata file (md-file)
that contains an encrypted key block for each authorized user with some access rights (read
or write). More specifically, the md-file represents the d-file’s access control list (ACL). The
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d-file is encrypted using a file encryption key (FEK), and each entry in the ACL contains an
encrypted version of the FEK under the public key of one authorized user. For large-scale
sharing, the authors in [50] presented SiRiUS-NNL that uses NNL (Naor-Naor-Lotspiech)
broadcast encryption algorithm [70] to encrypt the FEK of each file instead of encrypting
using each authorized user’s public key. SiRiUS supports two operations on the file blocks:
read and write/modify. Other cryptographic file systems can be found in the literature,
e.g., [23, 31, 63]
5.2.2 Access Control for Outsourced Data
Commonly, traditional access control techniques assume the existence of the data owner
and the storage servers in the same trust domain. This assumption, however, no longer
holds when the data is outsourced to a remote CSP, which takes the full charge of the
outsourced data management, and resides outside the trust domain of the data owner. A
feasible solution can be presented to enable the owner to enforce access control of the data
stored on a remote untrusted CSP. Through this solution, the data is encrypted under
a certain key, which is shared only with the authorized users. The unauthorized users,
including the CSP, are unable to access the data since they do not have the decryption
key. This general solution has been widely incorporated into existing schemes [57, 50, 9, 40],
which aim at providing data storage security on untrusted remote servers. Another class of
solutions utilizes attribute-based encryption (ABE) to achieve fine-grained access control.
ABE [53]1 is a public key cryptosystem for one-to-many communications that enables
fine-grained sharing of encrypted data. The ABE associates the ciphertext with a set
of attributes, and the private key with an access structure (policy). The ciphertext is
decrypted if and only if the associated attributes satisfy the access structure of the private
key. Access revocation in ABE-based systems is an issue since each attribute is conceivably
shared by many users. Examples of ABE-based systems for achieving access control of
remotely stored data are [90, 91, 71].
1The construction presented in [53] is called key-policy ABE (KP-ABE), which contrasts with an-
other construction called ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) [22]. In the CP-ABE, an access structure is
associated with the ciphertext, and a set of attributes is associated with the private key.
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Based on proxy re-encryption [24], Ateniese et al. [9] have introduced a secure dis-
tributed storage protocol. In their protocol, a data owner encrypts the blocks with sym-
metric data keys, which are encrypted using a master public key. The owner keeps a master
private key to decrypt the symmetric data keys. Using the master private key and the au-
thorized user’s public key, the owner generates proxy re-encryption keys. A semi-trusted
server then uses the proxy re-encryption keys to translate a ciphertext into a form that
can be decrypted only by granted users, and thus enforces access control for the data.
Vimercati et al. [40] have constructed a scheme for securing data on semi-trusted
storage servers based on key derivation methods of [7]. In their scheme, a secret key is
assigned to each authorized user, and data blocks are grouped based on users that can
access these blocks. One key is used to encrypt all blocks in the same group. Moreover,
the data owner generates public tokens to be used along with the user’s secret key to derive
decryption keys of specific blocks. The blocks and the tokens are sent to remote servers,
which are not able to drive the decryption key of any block using just the public tokens.
The approach in [40] allows the servers to conduct a second level of encryption (over-
encryption) to enforce access control of the data. Repeated access grant and revocation
may lead to a complicated hierarchy structure for key management [88].
The concept of over-encryption to enforce access control has also been used by Wang
et al. [88]. In their scheme, the owner encrypts the data block-by-block, and constructs a
binary tree of the block keys. The binary tree enables the owner to reduce the number of
keys given to each user, where different keys in the tree can be generated from one common
parent node. The remote storage server performs over-encryption to prevent revoked users
from getting access to updated data blocks.
Popa et al. [73] have introduced a cryptographic cloud storage system called CloudProof
that provides read and write data sharing and enforce access control. CloudProof has
been designed to offer security guarantees in the service level agreements of cloud storage
systems. It divides the security properties in four categories: confidentiality, integrity,
read freshness, and write-serializability. CloudProof can provide these security properties
using attestations (signed messages) and chain hash. Besides, it can detect and prove to
a third party that any of these properties have been violated. Read freshness and write-
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serializability in CloudProof are guaranteed by periodic auditing in a centralized manner.
The time is divided into epochs, which are time periods at the end of each the data owner
performs the auditing process. The authorized users send the attestations – they receive
from the CSP during the epoch – to the owner for auditing. CloudProof supports two
operations on the file blocks: read and write/modify.
5.2.3 Non-Repudiation
Feng et al. [44] analyzed several existing cloud storage platforms, e.g., Amazon S3, Mi-
crosoft Azure storage service, and Google secure data connector. They identified the
problem of repudiation and presented a non-repudiation protocol for cloud data storage
platforms to identify which party is dishonest: a data owner or a service provider. Their
protocol is based on using evidence (extra information transmitted with the data to resolve
repudiation when occurs) and trusted third party. The literature contains other work done
on non-repudiation protocols; for example, see [45, 72, 78].
5.2.4 Discussion
Some aspects related to outsourcing data storage are beyond the setting of both PDP and
POR, e.g., enforcing access control, and ensuring the newness of data delivered to autho-
rized users. Even in the case of dynamic PDP, a verifier can validate the correctness of
data, but the server is still able to cheat and return stale data to authorized users after the
auditing process is done. The schemes presented in [57, 50, 9, 40] have focused on access
control and secure sharing of data on untrusted servers. The issues of full block-level dy-
namic operations (modify, insert, delete, and append), and achieving mutual trust between
the data owners and the remote servers were outside the scope of those schemes. Although
the authors of [88] have presented an efficient access control technique and handled full
dynamic operations for the data over remote servers, data integrity, newness property,
and mutual trust are not addressed. Authorized users in CloudProof [73] do not perform
immediate checking for freshness of received data; the attestations are sent at the end of
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each epoch to the owner for completing the auditing task. Instantaneous validation of data
freshness is crucial before taking any decisions based on the received data from the cloud.
CloudProof guarantees write-serializability, which is outside the scope of our current work
as we are focusing on owner-write-users-read applications. Performing dynamic operations
at the block-level and enforcing access control for remote data were not considered in the
non-repudiation protocol of [44].
5.3 Our System and Assumptions
System components and relations. The cloud computing storage model considered in
this work consists of four main components as illustrated in Figure 5.1: (i) a data owner
that can be an organization generating sensitive data to be stored in the cloud and made
available for controlled external use; (ii) a CSP who manages cloud servers and provides
paid storage space on its infrastructure to store the owner’s files and make them available
for authorized users; (iii) authorized users – a set of owner’s clients who have the right
to access the remote data; and (iv) a trusted third party (TTP), an entity who is trusted
by all other system components, and has expertise and capabilities to detect and specify
dishonest parties.
In Figure 5.1, the relations between different system components are represented by
double-sided arrows, where solid and dashed arrows represent trust and distrust relations,
respectively. For example, the data owner, the authorized users, and the CSP trust the
TTP. On the other hand, the data owner and the authorized users have mutual distrust
relations with the CSP. Thus, the TTP is used to enable indirect mutual trust between
these three components. There is a direct trust relation between the data owner and the
authorized users.
The storage model used in this work can be adopted by many practical applications.
For example, e-Health applications can be envisioned by this model, where the patients’
database that contains large and sensitive information can be stored on cloud servers. In
these types of applications, a medical center can be considered as the data owner, physicians
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Figure 5.1: Cloud computing data storage system model.
as the authorized users who have the right to access the patients’ medical history, and
an independent-trusted organization as the TTP. Many other practical applications like
financial, scientific, and educational applications can be viewed in similar settings.
Remark 1. The idea of using a third party auditor has been used before in outsourcing
data storage systems, especially for customers with constrained computing resources and
capabilities, e.g., [82, 83, 54, 86]. The main focus of a third party auditor is to verify
the data stored on remote servers, and give incentives to providers for improving their
services. The proposed scheme in this work uses the TTP in a slightly different fashion.
The auditing process of the data received from the CSP is done by the authorized users,
and we resort to the TTP only to resolve disputes that may arise regarding data integrity
or newness. Reducing the storage overhead on the CSP side is economically a key feature
to lower the fees paid by the customers. Moreover, decreasing the overall computation cost
in the system is another crucial aspect. To achieve these goals, a small part of the owner’s
work is delegated to the TTP.
Outsourcing, updating, and accessing. The data owner has a file F consisting of m
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blocks to be outsourced to a CSP, where storage fees are pre-specified according to the
used storage space. For confidentiality, the owner encrypts the data before sending to
cloud servers. After data outsourcing, the owner can interact with the CSP to perform
block-level operations on the file. These operations includes modify, insert, append, and
delete specific blocks. In addition, the owner enforces access control by granting or revoking
access rights to the outsourced data.
An authorized user sends a data-access request to the CSP, and receives the data file
in an encrypted form that can be decrypted using a secret key generated by the autho-
rized user (more details will be explained later). We assume that the interaction between
the owner and the authorized users to authenticate their identities has already been com-
pleted, and it is not considered in this work. Moreover, all authorized users have the same
privileges, i.e., access hierarchy is outside the current scope.
The TTP is an independent entity, and thus has no incentive to collude with any party
in the system. However, any possible leakage of data towards the TTP must be prevented
to keep the outsourced data private. The TTP and the CSP are always online, while the
owner is intermittently online. The authorized users are able to access the data file from
the CSP even when the owner is offline. Throughout this chapter, the terms cloud server
and cloud service provider are used interchangeably.
Threat model. The CSP is untrusted, and thus the confidentiality and integrity of data
in the cloud may be at risk. For economic incentives and maintaining a reputation, the
CSP may hide data loss (due to hardware failure, management errors, various attacks), or
reclaim storage by discarding data that has not been or is rarely accessed. To save the
computational resources, the CSP may totally ignore the data-update requests issued by
the owner, or execute just a few of them. Hence, the CSP may return damaged or stale
data for any access request from the authorized users. Furthermore, the CSP may not
honor the access rights created by the owner, and permit unauthorized access for misuse
of confidential data.
On the other hand, a data owner and authorized users may collude and falsely accuse
the CSP to get a certain amount of reimbursement. They may dishonestly claim that data
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integrity over cloud servers has been violated, or the CSP has returned a stale file that
does not match the most recent modifications issued by the owner.
Security requirements. Confidentiality : outsourced data must be protected from the
TTP, the CSP, and users that are not granted access. Integrity : outsourced data is required
to remain intact on cloud servers. The data owner and authorized users must be enabled
to recognize data corruption over the CSP side. Newness : receiving the most recent
version of the outsourced data file is an imperative requirement of cloud-based storage
systems. There must be a detection mechanism if the CSP ignores any data-update requests
issued by the owner. Access control : only authorized users are allowed to access the
outsourced data. Revoked users can read unmodified data, however, they must not be able
to read updated/new blocks. CSP’s defence: the CSP must be safeguarded against false
accusations that may be claimed by dishonest owner/users, and such a malicious behavior
is required to be revealed.
Combining the confidentiality, integrity, newness, access control, and CSP’s defence
properties in the proposed scheme enables the mutual trust between the data owner and
the CSP. Thus, the owner can benefit from the wide range of facilities offered by the CSP,
and at the same time, the CSP can mitigate the concern of cheating customers.
5.4 System Preliminaries
5.4.1 Lazy Revocation
The proposed scheme in this work allows the data owner to revoke the right of some users
for accessing the outsourced data. In lazy revocation, it is acceptable for revoked users
to read (decrypt) unmodified data blocks. However, updated or new blocks must not be
accessed by such revoked users. The notation of lazy revocation was first introduced in [49].
The idea is that allowing revoked users to read unchanged data blocks is not a significant
loss in security. This is equivalent to accessing the blocks from cashed copies. Updated or
new blocks following a revocation are encrypted under new keys. Lazy revocation trades re-
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encryption and data access cost for a degree of security. However, it causes fragmentation
of encryption keys, i.e., data blocks could have more than one key. Lazy revocation has
been incorporated into many cryptographic systems [73, 88, 12, 75].
5.4.2 Key Rotation
Key rotation [57] is a technique in which a sequence of keys can be generated from an
initial key and a master secret key. The sequence of keys has two main properties: (i)
only the owner of the master secret key is able to generate the next key in the sequence
from the current key, and (ii) any authorized user knowing a key in the sequence is able
to generate all previous versions of that key. In other words, given the i-th key Ki in the
sequence, it is computationally infeasible to compute keys {Kl} for l > i without having
the master secret key, but it is easy to compute keys {Kj} for j < i.
The first property enables the data owner to revoke access to the data by producing new
keys in the sequence, which are used to encrypt updated/new blocks following a revocation
(lazy revocation). It is intended to prevent a user revoked during the i-th time from getting
access to data blocks encrypted during the l-th time for l > i.
The second property allows authorized users to maintain access to blocks that are
encrypted under older versions of the current key. It enables the data owner to transfer only
a single key Ki to authorized users for accessing all data blocks that are encrypted under
keys {Kj}j≤i (rather than transferring a potentially large set of keys {K1, K2, . . . , Ki}).
Thus, the second property reduces the communication overhead on the owner side.
The proposed scheme in this work utilizes the key rotation technique [57]. Let N = pq
denote the RSA modulus (p& q are prime numbers), a public key = (N, e), and a master
secret key d. The key d is known only to the data owner, and ed ≡ 1 mod (p− 1)(q − 1).
Whenever a user’s access is revoked, the data owner generates a new key in the sequence
(rotating forward). Let ctr indicate the index/version number of the current key in the keys
sequence. The owner generates the next key by exponentiating Kctr with the master secret
key d: Kctr+1 = K
d
ctr mod N . Authorized users can recursively generate older versions of
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the current key by exponentiating with the public key component e: Kctr−1 = K
e
ctr mod N
(rotating backward). The RSA encryption is used as a pseudorandom number generator;
it is unlikely that repeated encryption results in cycling, for otherwise, it can be used to
factor the RSA modulus N [66].
5.4.3 Broadcast Encryption
Broadcast encryption (bENC) [26, 47] allows a broadcaster to encrypt a message for an
arbitrary subset of a group of users. The users in the subset are only allowed to decrypt
the message. However, even if all users outside the subset collude they cannot access the
encrypted message. Such systems have the collusion resistance property, and are used
in many practical applications including TV subscription services and DVD content pro-
tection. The proposed scheme in this work uses bENC [26] to enforce access control in
outsourced data. The bENC [26] is composed of three algorithms: Setup, Encrypt, and
Decrypt.
Setup. This algorithm takes as input the number of system users n. It defines a
bilinear group G of prime order p with a generator g, a cyclic multiplicative group GT , and
a bilinear map ê : G×G→ GT , which has the properties of bilinearity, computability, and
non-degeneracy [65]. The algorithm picks a random α ∈ Zp, computes gi = g(α
i) ∈ G for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n, n + 2, . . . , 2n, and sets v = gγ ∈ G for γ ∈R Zp. The outputs are a public




Encrypt. This algorithm takes as input a subset S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n}, and a public key
PK. It outputs a pair (Hdr, K), where Hdr is called the header (broadcast ciphertext),
and K is a message encryption key. Hdr = (C0, C1) ∈ G2, where for t ∈R Zp, C0 = gt and




t. The key K = ê(gn+1, g)
t is used to encrypt a message M (symmetric
encryption) to be broadcast to the subset S.
Decrypt. This algorithm takes as input a subset S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n}, a user-ID i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n}, the private key di for user i, the header Hdr = (C0, C1), and the public key
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can be used to decrypt the encrypted version of M .
In the above construction of the bENC [26], a private key contains only one element of
G, and the broadcast ciphertext (Hdr) consists of two elements of G. On the other hand,
the public key PK is comprised of 2n+ 1 elements of G. A second construction, which is a
generalization of the first one was presented in [26] to trade the PK size for the Hdr size.
The main idea is to run multiple parallel instances of the first construction, where each
instance can broadcast to at most B users. Setting B = b
√
nc results in a system with
O(
√
n) elements of G for each of PK and Hdr. The private key is still just one element.
In this work, we utilize the second construction to achieve a balance between the sizes
of PK and Hdr. For an organization (data owner) with 105 users, each of PK and Hdr
contains only 317 elements of G.
5.5 Proposed Cloud-Based Storage Scheme
5.5.1 Warmup Discussion
Before presenting our main scheme, we discuss a straightforward solution. Once the data
has been outsourced to a remote CSP, which may not be trustworthy, the owner loses the
direct control over the sensitive data. This lack of control raises the data owner’s concerns
about the integrity of data stored in the cloud. Conversely, a dishonest owner may falsely
claim that the data stored in the cloud is corrupted to get some compensation. This mutual
distrust between the data owner and the CSP, if not properly handled, may hinder the
successful deployment of cloud architecture.
A straightforward solution to detect cheating from any side is through using authenti-
cation tags (digital signatures). For a file F = {bj}1≤j≤m, the owner attaches a tag OWNσj
with each block before outsourcing. The tags are generated per block not per file to enable
dynamic operations at the block level without retrieving the whole outsourced file. The
125
5.5. PROPOSED CLOUD-BASED STORAGE SCHEME
owner sends {bj, OWNσj}1≤j≤m to the CSP, where the tags {OWNσj}1≤j≤m are first verified.
In case of failed verification, the CSP rejects to store the data blocks and asks the owner
to re-send the correct tags. If the tags are valid, both the blocks and the tags are stored
on the cloud servers. The tags {OWNσj}1≤j≤m achieve non-repudiation from the owner side.
When an authorized user (or the owner) requests to retrieve the data file, the CSP sends
{bj, OWNσj, CSPσj}1≤j≤m, where CSPσj is the CSP’s signature/tag on bj||OWNσj. The autho-
rized user first verifies the tags {CSPσj}1≤j≤m. In case of failed verification, the user asks
the CSP to re-perform the transmission process. If {CSPσj}1≤j≤m are valid tags, the user
then verifies the owner’s tag OWNσj on the block bj ∀ j. If any tag OWNσj is not verified,
this indicates the corruption of data over the cloud servers. The CSP cannot repudiate
such corruption for the owner’s tags {OWNσj}1≤j≤m are previously verified and stored by the
CSP along with the data blocks. Since the CSP’s signatures {CSPσj}1≤j≤m are attached
with the received data, a dishonest owner cannot falsely accuse the CSP regarding data
integrity.
Although the previous straightforward solution can detect cheating from either side, it
cannot guarantee the newness property of the outsourced data; the CSP can replace the
new blocks and tags with old versions without being detected (replay attack). The above
solution increases the storage overhead – especially for large files in order of gigabytes – on
the cloud servers as each outsourced block is attached with a tag. Moreover, there is an
increased computation overhead on different system components; the data owner generates
a signature for each block, the CSP performs a signature verification for each outsourced
block, and the authorized user (or the owner) verifies two signatures for each received
block from the cloud servers. Thus, for a file F containing m blocks, the straightforward
solution requires 2m signature generations and 3m signature verifications, which may be
computationally a challenging task for large data files. For example, if the outsourced
file is of size 1GB with 4KB block size, the straightforward solution requires 219 signature
generations and 3× 218 signature verifications.
If the CSP receives the data blocks from a trusted entity (other than the owner), the
block tags and the signature operations are not needed since the trusted entity has no
incentive for repudiation or collusion. Therefore, delegating a small part of the owner’s
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work to the TTP reduces both the storage and computation overheads. However, the
outsourced data must be kept private and any possible leakage of data towards the TTP
must be prevented.
5.5.2 Overview and Rationale
The proposed scheme in this work addresses important issues related to outsourcing data
storage: dynamic data, newness, mutual trust, and access control. The owner is allowed to
update and scale the outsourced data file. Validating such dynamic data and its newness
property requires the knowledge of some metadata that reflects the most recent modifica-
tions issued by the owner. Moreover, it requires the awareness of block indices to guarantee
that the CSP has inserted, added, or deleted the blocks at the requested positions. To this
end, the proposed scheme is based on using combined hash values and a small data struc-
ture, which we call block status table (BST). The TTP establishes the mutual trust among
different system components in an indirect way.
For enforcing access control of the outsourced data, the proposed scheme utilizes and
combines three cryptographic techniques: bENC, lazy revocation, and key rotation. The
bENC enables a data owner to encrypt some secret information to only authorized users
allowing them to access the outsourced data file. Through lazy revocation, revoked users
can read unmodified data blocks, while updated/new blocks are encrypted under new
keys generated from the secret information broadcast to the authorized users. Using key
rotation, the authorized users are able to access both updated/new blocks and unmodified
ones that are encrypted under older versions of the current key.
5.5.3 Notations
− F is a data file to be outsourced, and is composed of a sequence of m blocks, i.e.,
F = {b1, b2, . . . , bm}.
− h is a cryptographic hash function.
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− DEK is a data encryption key.
− EDEK is a symmetric encryption algorithm under DEK, e.g., AES (advanced en-
cryption standard) [38, 1].
− E−1DEK is a symmetric decryption algorithm under DEK.
− F̃ is an encrypted version of the file blocks.
− FHTTP is a combined hash value for F̃ , and is computed and stored by the TTP.
− THTTP is a combined hash value for the BST, and is computed and stored by the
TTP.
− ctr is a counter kept by the data owner to indicate the version of the most recent
key.
− Rot = 〈ctr, bENC(Kctr)〉 is a rotator, where bENC(Kctr) is a broadcast encryption of
the key Kctr.
− ⊕ is an XOR operator.
5.5.4 Block Status Table
The block status table (BST) is a small dynamic data structure used to reconstruct and
access file blocks outsourced to the CSP. The BST consists of three columns: serial number
(SN ), block number (BN ), and key version (KV). SN is an indexing to the file blocks.
It indicates the physical position of each block in the data file. BN is a counter used to
make a logical numbering/indexing to the file blocks. Thus, the relation between BN and
SN can be viewed as a mapping between the logical number BN and the physical position
SN . KV indicates the version of the key that is used to encrypt each block in the file.
The BST is implemented as a linked list to simplify the insertion and deletion of table
entries. During implementation, SN is not needed to be stored in the table; SN is
considered to be the entry/table index. Thus, each table entry contains just two integers
BN and KV (8 bytes), i.e., the total table size is 8m bytes, where m is the number of file
blocks.
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When a data file is initially created, the owner initializes both ctr and KV of each
block to 1. If block modification or insertion operations are to be performed following a
revocation, ctr is incremented by 1 and KV of that modified/new block is set to be equal
to ctr.
Figure 5.2 shows some examples demonstrating the changes in the BST due to dynamic
operations on a data file F = {bj}1≤j≤8. When the file blocks are initially created (Figure
5.2a), ctr is initialized to 1, SN j = BN j = j, and KVj = 1: 1 ≤ j ≤ 8. Figure 5.2b shows
no change for updating the block at position 5 since no revocation is performed. To insert
a new block after position 3 in the file F , Figure 5.2c shows that a new entry 〈4, 9, 1〉 is
inserted in the BST after SN 3, where 4 is the physical position of the newly inserted block,
9 is the new logical block number computed by incrementing the maximum of all previous
logical block numbers, and 1 is the version of the key used for encryption.
A first revocation in the system increments ctr by 1 (ctr = 2). Modifying the block
at position 5 following a revocation (Figure 5.2d) results in setting KV5 = ctr. Thus, the
table entry at position 5 becomes 〈5, 4, 2〉. Figure 5.2e shows that a new block is to be
inserted after position 6 following a second revocation, which increments ctr to be 3. In
Figure 5.2e, a new table entry 〈7, 10, 3〉 is inserted after SN 6, where KV7 is set to be
equal to ctr (the most recent key version). Deleting a block at position 2 from the data file
requires deleting the table entry at SN 2 and shifting all subsequent entries one position up
(Figure 5.2f). Note that during all dynamic operations, SN indicates the actual physical
positions of the data blocks in F .
5.5.5 Procedural Steps of the Proposed Scheme
 Setup and File Preparation. The setup is done only once during the life time of
the data storage system, which may be for tens of years. The system setup has two
parts: one is done on the owner side, and the other is done on the TTP side.
 Owner Role. The data owner initializes ctr to 1, and generates an initial se-
cret key Kctr/K1. Kctr can be rotated forward following user revocations, and
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Figure 5.2: Changes in the BST due to different dynamic operations on a file F = {bj}1≤j≤8.
SN is the serial number, BN is the block number, and KV is the key version.
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rotated backward to enable authorized users to access blocks that are encrypted
under older versions of Kctr.
For a file F = {bj}1≤j≤m, the owner generates a BST with SN j = BN j = j
and KVj = ctr. To achieve privacy-preserving, the owner creates an encrypted
file version F̃ = {b̃j}1≤j≤m, where b̃j = EDEK(BN j||bj) and DEK = h(Kctr).2
Moreover, the owner creates a rotator Rot = 〈ctr, bENC(Kctr)〉, where bENC
enables only authorized users to decrypt Kctr and access the outsourced file.
The owner sends {F̃ ,BST, Rot} to the TTP, and deletes the data file from its
local storage.
Embedding BN j with the block bj during the encryption process helps in recon-
structing the file blocks in the correct order. If the encrypted blocks {b̃j}1≤j≤m
are not corrupted over cloud servers, but randomly delivered to an authorized
user, the latter can utilize the embedded BN j and the BST to orderly recon-
struct the data file F . More details will be explained later.
 TTP Role. As previously explained, a small part of the owner’s work is dele-
gated to the TTP to reduce the storage overhead and lower the overall system
computation. For the TTP to resolve disputes that may arise regarding data
integrity/newness, it computes and locally stores combined hash values for the
encrypted file F̃ and the BST. The TTP computes FHTTP = ⊕mj=1 h(b̃j) and
THTTP = ⊕mj=1 h(BN j||KVj), then sends {F̃ ,BST} to the CSP (it is possi-
ble for the owner to use the technique of one-sender-multiple-receiver (OSMR)
transmission to send {F̃ ,BST} to both the TTP and the CSP). The TTP keeps
only FHTTP and THTTP on its local storage.
Remark 2. The BST is used by the authorized users to reconstruct and access the
outsourced data file. The proposed scheme in this work assumes that the data owner
is intermittently online and the authorized users are enabled to access the data file
even when the owner is offline. To this end, the CSP stores a copy of the BST along
2 Hash in needed to compress the size of Kctr
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with the outsourced data file. When an authorized user requests to access the data,
the CSP responds by sending both the BST and the encrypted file F̃ .
...Moreover, the BST is used during each dynamic operation on the outsourced data
file, where one table entry is modified/inserted/deleted with each dynamic change
on the block level. If the BST is stored only on the CSP side, it needs to be re-
trieved and validated each time the data owner wants to issue a dynamic request on
the outsourced file. To avoid such communication and computation overheads, the
owner keeps a local copy of the BST, and thus there are two copies of the BST: one
is stored on the owner side referred to as BSTO, and the other is stored on the CSP
side referred to as BSTC . Recall that the BST is a small dynamic data structure
with a table entry size = 8 bytes. For 1GB file with 4KB block size, the BST size
is only 2MB (0.2% of the file size). Table 5.1 summarizes the data stored by each
component in the proposed scheme.
Table 5.1: Data stored by each component in the proposed scheme.
Owner TTP CSP
ctr, Kctr, BSTO Rot, FHTTP , THTTP F̃ , BSTC
 Dynamic Operations on the Outsourced Data. The dynamic operations in the
proposed scheme are performed at the block level via a request in the general form
〈BlockOp, TEntryBlockOp, j, KVj, h(b̃j), RevFlag, b∗〉, where BlockOp corresponds
to block modification (denoted by BM), block insertion (denoted by BI), or block
deletion (denoted by BD). TEntryBlockOp indicates an entry in BSTO corresponding
to the issued dynamic request. The parameter j indicates the block index on which
the dynamic operation is to be performed, KVj is the value of the key version at index
j of BSTO before running a modification operation, and h(b̃j) is the hash value of
the block at index j before modification/deletion. RevFlag is a 1-bit flag (true/false
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and is initialized to false) to indicate whether a revocation has been performed, and
b∗ is the new block value.
 Modification. Data modification is one of the most frequently used dynamic
operations in the outsourced data. For a file F = {b1, b2, . . . , bm}, suppose
the owner wants to modify a block bj with b
′
j. Figure 5.3 describes the steps
performed by each system component (owner, CSP, and TTP) during block
modification. The owner uses the technique of OSMR transmission to send the
modify request to both the CSP and the TTP.
The TTP updates the combined hash value FHTTP for F̃ through the step
FHTTP = FHTTP ⊕ h(b̃j) ⊕ h(b̃′j), which simultaneously replaces the hash of
the old block h(b̃j) with the new one h(b̃
′
j). This is possible due to the basic
properties of the ⊕ operator. The same idea is used when RevFlag = true to
update the combined hash value THTTP on the TTP side by replacing the hash
of the old table entry at index j with the hash of the new value.
 Insertion. In a block insertion operation, the owner wants to insert a new
block b̄ after index j in a file F = {b1, b2, . . . , bm}, i.e., the newly constructed
file F ′ = {b1, b2, . . . , bj, b̄, . . . , bm+1}, where bj+1 = b̄. The block insertion opera-
tion changes the logical structure of the file, while block modification does not.
Figure 5.4 describes the steps performed by each system component (owner,
CSP, and TTP) during block insertion.
 Append. Block append operation means adding a new block at the end of the
outsourced data. It can simply be implemented via insert operation after the
last block of the data file.
 Deletion. Block deletion operation is the opposite of the insertion operation.
When one block is deleted all subsequent blocks are moved one step forward.
Figure 5.5 describes the steps performed by each system component (owner,
CSP, and TTP) during block deletion. The step FHTTP = FHTTP ⊕ h(b̃j) is
used to delete the hash value of the block b̃j from the combined hash FHTTP
(properties of ⊕ operator). The same idea is used with the THTTP value.
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/* Modification of a block bj with b
′
j for the outsourced file */
/* RevFlag is initialized to false */
Data Owner
1. If the access of one or more users has been revoked then
(a) Rolls Kctr forward (using key rotation)
(b) Increments ctr = ctr + 1, and sets RevFlag = true
(c) Copies KVj from BSTO to KVj (i.e., KVj = KVj)
(d) Sets KVj = ctr in BSTO, and generates Rot = 〈ctr, bENC(Kctr)〉
(e) Sends Rot to the TTP
2. Creates an encrypted block b̃′j = EDEK(BN j||b′j), where DEK = h(Kctr)
3. Forms a block-modify table entry TEntryBM = {BN j,KVj}
4. Sends a modify request 〈BM, TEntryBM, j, KVj, h(b̃j), RevFlag, b̃′j〉 to both the
CSP and the TTP (OSMR transmission), where h(b̃j) is the hash of the outsourced
block to be modified. The KVj is not sent in the modify request if RevFlag = false
5. The CSP accepts the modify request only if {BN j,KVj} sent from the owner matches
{BN j,KVj} in BSTC , and h(b̃j) is equal to the hash of the block b̃j on the cloud
server (to guarantee that correct values are sent to the TTP)
CSP /* upon accepting the modify request from the owner */
1. Replaces the block bj with b
′
j in the outsourced file F̃
2. If RevFlag = true then
Updates the table entry at index j of BSTC using TEntryBM components
TTP
1. Updates FHTTP = FHTTP ⊕ h(b̃j)⊕ h(b̃′j)
2. If RevFlag = true then
(a) Updates the previously stored Rot with the newly received value
(b) Updates THTTP = THTTP ⊕ h(BN j||KVj)⊕ h(BN j||KVj)
Figure 5.3: Block modification procedure in the proposed scheme.
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/* Insertion of a block b̄ after index j in the outsourced file */
/* RevFlag is initialized to false */
Data Owner
1. If the access of one or more users has been revoked then
(a) Rolls Kctr forward (using key rotation)
(b) Increments ctr = ctr + 1, and sets RevFlag = true
(c) Generates Rot = 〈ctr, bENC(Kctr)〉
(d) Sends Rot to the TTP
2. Constructs a new block-insert table entry TEntryBI = {BN j+1,KVj+1} = {1 +
Max{BN j}1≤j≤m, ctr}, and inserts this entry in BSTO after index j
3. Creates an encrypted block ˜̄b = EDEK(BN j||b̄), where DEK = h(Kctr)
4. Sends an insert request 〈BI, TEntryBI, j, null, null, RevFlag, ˜̄b〉 to both the CSP
and the TTP (OSMR transmission)
CSP /* upon receiving the insert request from the owner */
1. Inserts the block ˜̄b after index j in the outsourced file F̃
2. Inserts the table entry TEntryBI after index j in the BSTC
TTP
1. Updates FHTTP = FHTTP ⊕ h(˜̄b)
2. Updates THTTP = THTTP ⊕ h(BN j+1||KVj+1)
3. If RevFlag = true then
Replaces the previously stored Rot with the newly received value
Figure 5.4: Block insertion procedure in the proposed scheme.
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/* Deletion of a block bj from the outsourced file */
Data Owner
1. Copies the entry at index j from BSTO to a block-delete table entry TEntryBD =
{BN j,KVj}
2. Deletes the entry at index j from BSTO
3. Sends a delete request 〈BD, TEntryBD, j, null, h(b̃j), false, null〉 to both the CSP
and the TTP (OSMR transmission), where h(b̃j) is the hash of the outsourced block
to be deleted
4. The CSP accepts the delete request only if TEntryBD sent from the owner matches
{BN j,KVj} in BSTC and h(b̃j) is equal to the hash of the block b̃j on the cloud
server (to guarantee that correct values are sent to the TTP).
CSP /* upon receiving the delete request from the owner */
1. Deletes the block at index j (block b̃j) from the outsourced file F̃
2. Deletes the entry at index j from the BSTC
TTP
1. Updates FHTTP = FHTTP ⊕ h(b̃j)
2. Updates THTTP = THTTP ⊕ h(BN j||KVj)
Figure 5.5: Block deletion procedure in the proposed scheme.
136
5.5. PROPOSED CLOUD-BASED STORAGE SCHEME
 Data Access and Cheating Detection. Figure 5.6 shows the verifications per-
formed for the data received from the CSP, and presents how authorized users get
access to the outsourced file.
An authorized user sends a data-access request to both the CSP and the TTP to
access the outsourced file. For achieving non-repudiation, the CSP generates two
signatures σF and σT for F̃ and BSTC , respectively. The authorized user receives
{F̃ , BSTC σF , σT} from the CSP, and {FHTTP , THTTP , Rot} from the TTP. The
authorized user verifies the signatures, and proceeds with the data access procedure
only if both signatures are valid.
The authorized user verifies the contents of BSTC entries by computing a combined
hash value THU = ⊕mj=1 h(BN j||KVj), and comparing it with the authentic value
THTTP received from the TTP. If the user claims that THU 6= THTTP , a report is
issued to the owner and the TTP is invoked to determine the dishonest party.
In case of THU = THTTP , the authorized user continues to verify the contents of the
file F̃ . A combined hash value FHU = ⊕mj=1 h(b̃j) is computed and compared with
FHTTP . If there is a dispute that FHU 6= FHTTP , the owner is informed and we
resort to the TTP to resolve such a conflict.
For the authorized user to access the encrypted file F̃ = {b̃j}1≤j≤m, BSTC and Rot
are used to generate the key DEK that decrypts the block b̃j. The component
bENC(Kctr) of Rot is decrypted to get the most recent key Kctr. Using the key ro-
tation technique, the authorized user rotates Kctr backward with each block until it
reaches the version that is used to decrypt the block b̃j. Both ctr and the key version
KVj can determine how many rotation steps for Kctr with each block b̃j. Decrypting
the block b̃j returns (BN j||bj). Both BN j and BSTC are utilized to get the phys-
ical block position SN j into which the block bj is inserted, and thus the file F is
reconstructed in plain form.
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1. An authorized user sends a data-access request to both the CSP and the TTP
2. The CSP responds by sending the outsourced file F̃ = {b̃j}1≤j≤m associated with a
signature σF (CSP’s signature on the entire file), and sending BSTC associated with
a signature σT (CSP’s signature on the entire table) to the authorized user
3. The authorized user verifies σF and σT , and accepts the data only if σF and σT
are valid signatures
4. The TTP sends FHTTP , THTTP , and Rot = 〈ctr, bENC(Kctr)〉 to
the authorized user
5. Verification of the BSTC entries
(a) The authorized user computes THU = ⊕mj=1 h(BN j||KVj)
(b) If the authorized user claims that THU 6= THTTP then report ”integrity
violation” to the owner and invoke cheating detection procedure (Figure 5.7)
6. Verification of the data file F̃
(a) The authorized user computes FHU = ⊕mj=1 h(b̃j)
(b) If the authorized user claims that FHU 6= FHTTP then report ”integrity
violation” to the owner and invoke cheating detection procedure (Figure 5.7)
7. Data access
(a) The authorized user gets Kctr by decrypting bENC(Kctr) part in Rot
(b) for j = 1 to m do
/* rotate backward the current Kctr to the version that is used to decrypt b̃j */
– Set Kj = Kctr
– for i = 1 to ctr - KVj do
. Kj = (Kj)
e mod N /* N is RSA modulus and (N, e) is the public key */
end for
– (BN j||bj) = E−1DEK(b̃j), where DEK = h(Kj)
– Get the physical position SN j of bj using BN j and BSTC
– The authorized user places bj in the correct order of the decrypted file F
end for
Figure 5.6: Data access procedure in the proposed scheme.
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Optimization. In Figure 5.6, the backward key rotation done in the inner for loop
of step 7.b can be highly optimized by computing a set of keys Q = {Ki} from Kctr.
Each key Ki in Q is the result of rotating Kctr backward ctr− i times. For example,
if ctr = 20, a set Q = {K1, K5, K10, K15} can be computed from Kctr. To decrypt
a block b̃j, the authorized user chooses one key Ki from Q, which has the minimum
positive distance i−KVj. The key Ki is then rotated backward to get the actual key
that is used to decrypt the block b̃j. A relatively large portion of the outsourced data
is kept unchanged on the CSP, and thus K1 from Q can be used to decrypt many
blocks without any further key rotation. The size of the set Q is negligible compared
with the size of the received data file.
Figure 5.7 shows how the TTP determines the dishonest party in the system. The
TTP verifies the signatures σT and σF , which are previously verified and accepted by
the authorized user. If any signature is invalid, this indicates that the owner/user is
dishonest for corrupting either the data or the signatures. In case of valid signatures,
the TTP computes temporary combined hash values THtemp = ⊕mj=1 h(BN j||KVj)
and FHtemp = ⊕mj=1 h(b̃j). If THtemp 6= THTTP or FHtemp 6= FHTTP , this indicates
that the CSP is dishonest for sending corrupted data to the authorized user, otherwise
the owner/user is dishonest for falsely claiming integrity violation of received data.
5.6 Security Analysis
In this section, we investigate the security of the proposed scheme by analyzing its fulfill-
ment of the security requirements described in Section 5.3, namely, confidentiality, integrity,
newness, access control, and CSP’s defence.
Data confidentiality. For this requirement, we need to prove that the CSP, the TTP,
and unauthorized users cannot access the outsourced data.
Theorem 1. The proposed scheme preserves the confidentiality of the outsourced data
against the CSP, the TTP, and unauthorized users.
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Cheating Detection Procedure: determination of the dishonest party.
The TTP is invoked to determine which component is misbehaving as follows.
1. The TTP verifies σT and σF
2. If any signature verification fails then
. TTP reports ”dishonest owner/user” and exits
3. The TTP computes THtemp = ⊕mj=1 h(BN j||KVj) and FHtemp = ⊕mj=1 h(b̃j)
4. If THtemp 6= THTTP or FHtemp 6= FHTTP then
. TTP reports ”dishonest CSP” and exits /* data is corrupted */
else
. TTP reports ”dishonest owner/user” and exits /* data is NOT corrupted */
Figure 5.7: Cheating detection procedure in the proposed scheme.
Proof (Sketch). Before outsourcing a data file F = {bj}1≤j≤m, the owner generates an
encrypted version F̃ = {b̃j}1≤j≤m, where b̃j = EDEK(BN j||bj), and DEK = h(Kctr). The
encrypted data file F̃ is sent to the TTP for computing FHTTP and to the CSP for storage.
Based on the security of the underlying symmetric encryption algorithm EDEK , the
confidentiality of the outsourced file F̃ is preserved on the CSP side (e.g., our proposed
scheme utilizes AES – a standardized encryption algorithm by NIST [1] – with 128-bit
security level to achieve a robust security requirement).
The data confidentiality on the TTP side is based on the security of the underlying
broadcast encryption algorithm bENC. To decrypt F̃ , the key Kctr is needed to generate
DEK. The TTP stores Rot = 〈ctr, bENC(Kctr)〉. Thus, for the TTP to get Kctr, bENC
must be broken (the proposed scheme utilizes bENC [26], which is proved to be semantically
secure).
bENC also prevents unauthorized users from getting Kctr to access the data file F̃ .
Moreover, based on the hardness of the RSA problem [28], revoked users who possess Kl
(l < ctr) are not able to generate Kctr. Hence, such revoked users can access only stale
data blocks, while updated or new blocks encrypted using Kctr are kept secret. 
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Detection of data integrity violation. We want the assurance that any corruption to
the outsourced data file F̃ or the table BSTC on cloud servers can be detected. We prove
this feature for F̃ and the same ideas are applied to BSTC . The proof depends on the
preimage and second-preimage resistance properties of the cryptographic hash function h.
Definitions.
1. Preimage resistance: given a hash value y, it is computationally infeasible to find
any input x such that h(x) = y [77]. Input x is called a preimage of y.
2. Second-preimage: given an input x, it is computationally infeasible to find a second
input x′ 6= x such that h(x) = h(x′) [77].
Theorem 2. Given a cryptographic hash function h with preimage and second-preimage
resistance properties along with the non-collusion incentive of the TTP, any attempt to
violate the integrity of outsourced data file on cloud servers will be detected.
Proof. We prove the theorem by contradiction. The goal of a dishonest CSP is to send a
corrupted or stale data file to authorized users without being detected. Let D̃ = {d̃j}1≤j≤m
be the data file received by an authorized user from the CSP during the data access phase
of the proposed scheme, where {d̃j}1≤j≤m denotes the file blocks. Let F̃ = {b̃j}1≤j≤m be
the actual outsourced data file. The authorized user receives the authentic FHTTP from
the TTP, computes FHU = ⊕mj=1 h(d̃j), and checks FHU
?
= FHTTP . If FHU 6= FHTTP ,
then D̃ 6= F̃ (data has been corrupted on cloud servers).
For violating data integrity without being detected there are two possible scenarios.
First, the CSP has to generate values {h∗j}1≤j≤m such that FHTTP = ⊕mj=1 h∗j , and at least
one h∗j 6= h(b̃j). If the CSP could create D̃ = {d̃j}1≤j≤m such that h∗j = h(d̃j) ∀j, the
cheating is possible. Due to the preimage-resistance property of h (one-way function), the
CSP cannot generate such data file D̃, i.e., d̃j must be equal to b̃j ∀j.
Second, the received data D̃ has at least one block d̃j 6= b̃j, but h(d̃j) = h(b̃j) ∀j to
guarantee that FHU = FHTTP . Due to the second-preimage resistance property of h,
there is no such data file D̃, i.e., d̃j must be equal to b̃j ∀j. 
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Remark 3. The encrypted block b̃j = EDEK(BN j||bj). Block number BN j is embedded
with the block bj to be used along with BSTC to orderly reconstruct the plain file F if the
blocks {bj}1≤j≤m are randomly received. Using a proof similar to that of Theorem 2, we
can show that BSTC cannot be corrupted without being detected. Swapping the entries
of BSTC without changing their contents can cause the file F to be reconstructed in an
incorrect order. Although the CSP has no incentive and no financial benefit of doing such
swapping, one can defend this weird behavior by storing the BN column of BSTO on the
TTP side. The authorized user can retrieve and use this column during the data access
phase. This countermeasure adds little extra storage on the TTP (4m bytes).
Assurance of newness property. Assurance of newness property is identical to de-
tection of data integrity violation. With each dynamic operation (modification, insertion,
deletion, append), the TTP updates the values FHTTP and THTTP to reflect the most
recent state of the outsourced data. Thus, the CSP cannot respond to an access request
by sending stale data without being detected.
Enforcement of access control. The proposed scheme combines the techniques of broad-
cast encryption, key rotation, and lazy revocation to enforce access control of outsourced
data.
Theorem 3. The data owner can grant or revoke access to users for outsourced data.
Proof (Sketch). The owner creates Rot = 〈ctr, bENC(Kctr)〉 and encrypts the outsourced
data using DEK = h(Kctr). Broadcast encryption bENC allows the data owner to en-
crypt the key Kctr for an arbitrary subset of a group of users. According to the security
strength of bENC [26], the users in the subset are only allowed to decrypt Kctr and access
the outsourced data.
It is acceptable for revoked users to access unmodified data blocks. However, up-
dated/new blocks must be inaccessible by such revoked users. In case of data modifica-
tion/insertion following a revocation, the data owner rolls Kctr forward: Kctr+1 = K
d
ctr mod
N , and then increments ctr by 1 (preparing for next rotation). Since factoring the RSA
modulus N is assumed to be intractable [28], revoked users who possess Kl (l < ctr) are
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not able to generate Kctr. Thus, combining broadcast encryption, key rotation, and lazy
revocation achieves access control in the proposed scheme.
Detection of dishonest owner/user. The CSP signs both the file F̃ and the table
BSTC . The generated signatures σF and σT are sent along with F̃ and BSTC to an autho-
rized user during the data access phase. If the signature scheme is existentially unforgeable,
the owner/user cannot falsely accuse the CSP regarding data integrity; the TTP performs
signature verifications if there is a claim of data corruption. Recall that the signatures σF
and σT are accepted by the authorized user as valid signatures in the beginning of the data
access phase (step 3 in Figure 5.6).
5.7 Performance Analysis
5.7.1 Settings and Overheads
The data file F used in our performance analysis is of size 1GB with 4KB block size.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the desired security level is 128-bit. Thus, we
utilize a cryptographic hash h of size 256 bits (e.g., SHA-256), an elliptic curve defined over
Galois field GF (p) with |p| = 256 bits (used for bENC), and BLS (Boneh-Lynn-Shacham)
signature [27] of size 256 bits (used to compute σF and σT ).
Here we evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme by analyzing the storage,
communication, and computation overheads. We investigate overheads that the proposed
scheme brings to a cloud storage system for static data with only confidentiality require-
ment. This investigation demonstrates whether the features of our scheme come at a rea-
sonable cost. The computation overhead is estimated in terms of the used cryptographic
functions, which are notated in Table 5.2.
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Table 5.2: Notation of cryptographic functions
Notation Description
h Cryptographic hashing
FR Forward key rotation
BR Backward key rotation
Sσ Signature genration
Vσ Signature verification
EDEK Symmetric encryption using the key DEK
bENC−1 Decryption of bENC
Let m and n denote the number of file blocks and the total number of system users,
respectively. Table 5.3 presents a theoretical analysis for the storage, communication, and
computation overheads of the proposed scheme. Table 5.4 summarizes the storage and
communication overheads for our data file F (1GB with 4KB block size) and 100,000
authorized users.
5.7.2 Comments
Storage overhead. It is the additional storage space used to store necessary information
other than the outsourced file F̃ . The overhead on the owner side is due to storing BSTO.
An entry of BSTO is of size 8 bytes (2 integers), and the total number of entries equals the
number of file blocks m. During implementation SN is not needed to be stored in BSTO;
SN is considered to be the entry/table index (BSTO is implemented as a linked list). The
size of BSTO for the file F is only 2MB (0.2% of F ). BSTO size can be further reduced if
the file F is divided into larger blocks (e.g., 16KB). Like the owner, the storage overhead
on the CSP side comes from the storage of BSTC . To resolve disputes that may arise
regarding data integrity or newness property, the TTP stores FHTTP and THTTP , each of
size 256 bits. Besides, the TTP stores Rot = 〈ctr, bENC(Kctr)〉 that enables the data owner
to enforce access control for the outsourced data. ctr is 4 bytes, and bENC has storage
complexity O(
√
n), which is practical for an organization (data owner) with n = 100,000
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Table 5.3: Overhead analysis of the proposed scheme. The overheads shown in square
brackets are not always present and are incurred when revocation(s) actually occur.
Overheads Operations Owner User CSP TTP
Storage
(in bytes)







45 + [8 + 32
√
n] — — —






h + EDEK +
[FR+ bENC] — — 2h + [2h]
‡
Data Access —
2Vσ + 3mh + 2Sσ —bENC−1 + [BR] ‡
Cheating
Detection
2Vσ + [2mh] ‡
‡ The cost of ⊕ is usually negligible and is omitted in the overhead expressions.
Table 5.4: Storage and communication overheads for the data file F (1GB with 4KB block
size) and 100,000 authorized users. The values shown in square brackets are not always
present and are incurred when revocation(s) actually occur.
Overheads Operations Owner User CSP TTP




45 bytes + [≈ 10KB] — — —
Data Access — — ≈ 2MB ≈ 10KB
† Storage overhead is independent of F .
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users. A point on the elliptic curve used to implement bENC can be represented by 257
bits (≈ 32 bytes) using compressed representation [14]. Therefore, the storage overhead on
the TTP side is close to 10KB, which is independent of the outsourced file size. Overall,
the storage overhead of the proposed scheme for the file F is less than 4.01MB (≈ 0.4% of
F ).
Communication overhead. It is the additional information sent along with the out-
sourced data blocks. During dynamic operations, the communication overhead on the
owner side comes from the transmission of a block operation BlockOP (can be represented
by 1 byte), a table entry TEntryBlockOP (8 bytes), and a block index j (4 bytes). If a block is
to be modified following a revocation process, KVj (4 bytes) is sent to the TTP. Moreover,
in case of a block modification/deletion, the owner sends a hash (32 bytes) of the block to
be modified/deleted to the TTP for updating FHTTP . Recall that the owner also sends
Rot (4 + 32
√
n bytes) to the TTP if block modifications/insertions are to be performed
following user revocations. Therefore, in the worst case scenario (i.e., block modifications
following revocations), the owner’s overhead is less than 10KB. The Rot represents the ma-
jor factor in the communication overhead, and thus the overhead is only 45 bytes if block
modification/deletion operations are to be preformed without revocations (only 13 bytes
for insertion operations). In practical applications, the frequency of dynamic requests to
the outsourced data is higher than that of user revocations. Hence, the communication
overhead due to dynamic changes on the data is about 1% of the block size (the block is
4KB in our analysis).
As a response to access the outsourced data, the CSP sends the file along with σF (32
bytes), σT (32 bytes), and BSTC (8m bytes). Moreover, the TTP sends FHTTP (32 bytes),
THTTP (32 bytes), and Rot. Thus, the communication overhead due to data access is 64
+ 8m bytes on the CSP side, and 68 + 32
√
n bytes on the TTP side. Overall, to access
the file F , the proposed scheme has communication overhead close to 2.01MB (≈ 0.2% of
F ).
Computation overhead. A cloud storage system for static data with only confidentiality
requirement has computation cost for encrypting the data before outsourcing and decrypt-
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ing the data after being received from the cloud servers. For the proposed scheme, the com-
putation overhead on the owner side due to dynamic operations (modification/insertion)
comes from computing DEK = h(Kctr) and encrypting the updated/inserted block, i.e.,
the overhead is one hash and one encryption operations. If a block modification/insertion
operation is to be performed following a revocation of one or more users, the owner performs
FR to roll Kctr forward, and bENC to generate the Rot. Hence, the computation overhead
on the owner side for the dynamic operations is h + EDEK + FR + bEnc (worst case
scenario). Updating BSTO and BSTC is done without usage of cryptographic operations
(add, remove, or modify a table entry).
To reflect the most recent version of the outsourced data, the TTP updates the values
FHTTP and THTTP . If no revocation has been performed before sending a modify request,
only FHTTP is updated on the TTP side. Therefore, the maximum computation overhead
on the TTP side for updating both FHTTP and THTTP is 4h.
Before accessing the data received from the CSP, the authorized user verifies two sig-
natures (generated by the CSP), BSTC entries, and the data file. These verifications cost
2Vσ + 2mh. Moreover, the authorized user decrypts bENC(Kctr) part in the Rot to get
Kctr. For each received block, Kctr is rotated backward to obtain the actual key that is
used to decrypt the data block. The optimized way of key rotation (using the set Q) highly
affects the performance of data access; many blocks need a few or no rotations. Moreover,
one hash operation is performed per block to compute DEK. Overall, the computation
overhead due to data access is 2Vσ + 3mh + bENC−1 + [BR] on the owner side, and 2Sσ
on the CSP side.
For determining a dishonest party, the TTP verifies σT and σF . In case of valid signa-
tures, the TTP proceeds to compute THtemp and FHtemp. The values THtemp and FHtemp
are compared with THTTP and FHTTP , respectively. Hence, the maximum computation
overhead on the TTP side due to cheating detection is 2Vσ + 2mh.
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5.8 Implementation and Experimental Evaluation
5.8.1 Implementation
We have implemented the proposed scheme on top of Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud
(Amazon EC2) [5] and Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) [6] cloud platforms.
Virtual servers (Linux/Unix/Windows) can be launched and managed on Amazon’s data
centers through Amazon EC2 web service. Amazon S3 is a web service that can be used
to store and retrieve almost unlimited amount of data, where customers are enabled to
specify geographic locations for their outsourced data.
Our implementation of the proposed scheme consists of four modules: OModule (owner
module), CModule (CSP module), UModule (user module), and TModule (TTP module).
OModule, which runs on the owner side, is a library to be used by the owner to perform
the owner role in the setup and file preparation phase. Moreover, this library is used by
the owner during the dynamic operations on the outsourced data. CModule is a library
that runs on Amazon EC2 and is used by the CSP to store, update, and retrieve data
from Amazon S3. UModule is a library to be run at the authorized users’ side, and include
functionalities that allow users to interact with the TTP and the CSP to retrieve and
access the outsourced data. TModule is a library used by the TTP to perform the TTP
role in the setup and file preparation phase. Moreover, the TTP uses this library during
the dynamic operations and to determine the cheating party in the system.
Implementation settings. In our implementation we use a ”large” Amazon EC2 instance
to run CModule. This instance type provides total memory of size 7.5GB and 4 EC2
Compute Units (2 virtual cores with 2 EC2 Compute Units each). One EC2 Compute
Unit provides the equivalent CPU capacity of a 1.0 - 1.2GHz 2007 Opteron or 2007 Xeon
processor [4]. A separate server in the lab is used to run TModule. This server has Intel(R)
Xeon(TM) 3.6GHz processor, 2.75GB RAM, and Windows XP operating system. The
OModule is executed on a desktop computer with Intel(R) Xeon(R) 2GHz processor and
3GB RAM running Windows XP. A laptop with Intel(R) Core(TM) 2.2GHz processor and
4GB RAM running Windows 7 is used to execute the UModule. We outsource a data file
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of size 1GB to Amazon S3. Algorithms (hashing, broadcast encryption, digital signatures,
etc.) are implemented using MIRACL library version 5.5.4. For a 128-bit security level,
bENC uses an elliptic curve with a 256-bit group order. In the experiments, we utilize
SHA-256, 256-bit BLS signature, and Barreto-Naehrig (BN) [13] curve defined over prime
field GF (p) with |p| = 256 bits and embedding degree = 12 (the BN curve with these
parameters is provided by the MIRACL library).
5.8.2 Experimental Evaluation
In this section we describe the experimental evaluation of the computation overhead the
proposed scheme brings to a cloud storage system that has been dealing with static data
with only confidentiality requirement.
Owner computation overhead. To experimentally evaluate the computation overhead
on the owner side due to the dynamic operations, we have performed 100 different block
operations with number of authorized users ranging from 20,000 to 100,000. We have run
our experiment three times, each time with a different revocation percentage. In the first
time, 5% of 100 dynamic operations are executed following revocations. We increased the
revocation percentage to 10% for the second time and 20% for the third time. Figure 5.8
shows the owner’s average computation overhead per operation. For a large organization
(data owner) with 100,000 users, performing dynamic operations and enforcing access
control with 5% revocations add about 63 milliseconds of overhead. With 10% and 20%
revocation percentages, which are high percentages than an average value in practical
applications, the owner overhead is 0.12 and 0.25 seconds, respectively.
Scalability (i.e., how the system performs when more users are added) is an important
feature of cloud storage systems. The access control of the proposed scheme depends on
the square root of the total number of system users. Figure 5.8 shows that for a large or-
ganization with 100,000 users, performing dynamic operations and enforcing access control
for outsourced data remains practical.
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Figure 5.8: Owner’s average computation overhead due to dynamic operations.
Table 5.5 shows the computation overheads of the proposed scheme on the TTP, the
CSP, and the authorized users sides.
Table 5.5: Experimental results of the computation overheads
Component TTP Authorized Users CSP
Computation Overhead 0.04 ms / 3.59 s 0.55 s 6.04 s
TTP computation overhead. In the worst case, the TTP executes only 4 hashes per
dynamic request to reflect the change on the outsourced data. Thus, the maximum com-
putation overhead on the TTP side is about 0.04 milliseconds, i.e., the proposed scheme
brings light overhead on the TTP during the normal system operations.
To identify the dishonest party in the system in case of disputes, the TTP verifies
two signatures (σF and σT ), computes combined hashes for the data (file and table), and
compare the computes hashes with the authentic values (THTTP and FHTTP ). Thus, the
computation overhead on the TTP side is about 3.59 seconds. Through our experiments,
we use only one desktop computer to simulate the TTP and accomplish its work. The TTP
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may choose to split the work among a few devices or use a single device with a multi-core
processor which is becoming prevalent these days, and thus the computation time on the
TTP side is significantly reduced in many applications.
User computation overhead. The computation overhead on the user side due to data
access comes from five aspects divided into two groups. The first group involves signatures
verification and hash operations to verify the received data (file and table). The second
group involves broadcast decryption, backward key rotations, and hash operations to com-
pute the DEK. The first group costs about 5.87 seconds, which can be easily hidden in
the receiving time of the data (1GB file and 2MB table).
To investigate the time of the second group, we access the file after running 100 different
block operations (with 5% and 10% revocation percentages). Moreover, we implement the
backward key rotations in the optimized way. The second group costs about 0.55 seconds,
which can be considered as the user’s computation overhead due to data access.
CSP computation overhead. As a response to the data access request, the CSP com-
putes two signatures: σF and σT . Thus, the computation overhead on the CSP side due
to data access is about 6.04 seconds and can be easily hidden in the transmission time of
the data (1GB file and 2MB table).
5.9 Reducing the Communication Cost
In this section, we discuss a slight modification to the proposed cloud-based storage scheme
to reduce the communication cost on the owner and the TTP sides. This slight modifi-
cation will be applied during the system setup phase and the dynamic operations on the
outsourced data. After preparing the BST and the encrypted version F̃ of the data to be
outsourced, the owner sends {F̃ ,BST} to the CSP, and {Rot, FHO, THO} to the TTP. The
values FHO = ⊕mj=1 h(b̃j) and THO = ⊕mj=1 h(BN j||KVj) are combined hashes computed
by the owner for F̃ and BST, respectively.
Upon receiving the data from the owner, the CSP computes FHC = ⊕mj=1 h(b̃j) and
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= THC . If they match, the TTP sets FHTTP = FHO (or FHC) and
THTTP = THO (or THC). In case of mismatch, the TTP asks the owner to follow the
procedures of the original scheme.
Similar ideas can be applied during the dynamic operations. For example, to modify a
data block bj with b
′
j, the owner sends 〈BM, TEntryBM, j, KVj, h(b̃j), b̃′j〉 to the CSP, and
〈BM, TEntryBM, KVj, RevFlag, hO, h′O〉 to the TTP, where hO = h(b̃j) and h′O = h(b̃′j).
If the CSP accepts the modify request (based on conditions of step 5 in Figure 5.3), it






j)) to the TTP. The
latter checks h′O
?
= h′C and if they match, it updates FHTTP = FHTTP ⊕ hO ⊕ h′O. The
values THTTP and Rot will also be updated as in Figure 5.3. If h
′
O 6= h′C , the owner sends
the original modify request (step 4 in Figure 5.3) to both the TTP and the CSP.
The slight modification presented here allows the owner to send the outsourced data
(or modified blocks) directly to the CSP and hash values along with some metadata to the
TTP, which reduces the communication cost on both the owner and the TTP sides. To
guarantee the consistency of data between the owner and the CSP, the TTP checks hash
values sent from both parties. Only if there is a mismatch, both the TTP and the CSP
will receive the data blocks from the owner (the original proposed scheme). The existence
of the TTP motivates the owner and the CSP to behave honestly, and thus most of the
time they should send equal hash values.
Nevertheless, the discussed modification will cause some extra computation overhead
on both the owner and the CSP sides to compute the hash values. Moreover, a slight
communication overhead will be imposed on the CSP during the system setup phase and
with each dynamic operation to send the computed hash to the TTP.
5.10 Summary
Outsourcing data to remote servers has become a growing trend for many organizations to
alleviate the burden of local data storage and maintenance. In this chapter, we have studied
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different aspects of outsourcing data storage: block-level dynamic operations, newness,
mutual trust, and access control.
We have proposed a cloud-based storage scheme which supports outsourcing of dynamic
data, where the owner is capable of not only archiving and accessing the data stored by the
CSP, but also updating and scaling this data on the remote servers. The proposed scheme
enables the authorized users to ensure that they are receiving the most recent version of
the outsourced data. Moreover, in case of dispute regarding data integrity/newness, a
TTP is able to determine the dishonest party. The data owner enforces access control for
the outsourced data by combining three cryptographic techniques: broadcast encryption,
lazy revocation, and key rotation. We have studied the security features of the proposed
scheme.
In this work, we have investigated the overheads added by the proposed scheme when
incorporated into a cloud storage model for static data with only confidentiality require-
ment. The storage overhead is ≈ 0.4% of the outsourced data size, the communication
overhead due to block-level dynamic changes on the data is ≈ 1% of the block size, and the
communication overhead due to retrieving the data is ≈ 0.2% of the outsourced data size.
For a large organization (data owner) with 100,000 users, performing dynamic operations
and enforcing access control add about 63 milliseconds of overhead. Therefore, impor-
tant features of outsourcing data storage can be supported without excessive overheads in
storage, communication, and computation.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we conclude our dissertation and present future research directions.
6.1 Conclusions
The research area of cloud computing is not merely academic, but has also received con-
siderable attention from industry due to a number of key advantages it offers: cost ef-
fectiveness, low management overhead, immediate access to a wide range of applications,
flexibility to scale up and down information technology capacity, and mobility where cus-
tomers can access information wherever they are, rather than having to remain at their
desks.
Currently, we are living in a digital world, where a large amount of sensitive data (e.g.,
personal information, electronic health records, and financial data) is generated by various
organizations. Managing such huge amount of data locally at the organization’s end is
problematic and costly due to the requirements of high storage capacity and qualified
personnel. Therefore, cloud service providers (CSPs) offer Storage-as-a-Service as a paid
facility to reduce the maintenance cost and mitigates the burden of large local data storage.




For data owners, being not the direct controller over the data raises serious concerns
regarding confidentiality, integrity, and access control of the data in cloud computing sys-
tems. Provable data possession (PDP) has been introduced as a technique that allows a
verifier to efficiently, periodically, and securely validate that a remote server – which sup-
posedly stores the owner’s potentially very large amount of data – is actually storing the
data in its original form. In this dissertation, we have taken some steps towards mitigating
the concerns of outsourcing data storage. These steps can be summarized as follows.
• In Chapter 3, we have addressed the problem of guaranteeing the storage of multiple
data copies over untrusted cloud servers. To tackle this problem, we have proposed
a pairing-based provable multi-copy data possession (PB-PMDP) scheme that re-
motely verifies the integrity of multiple data copies stored by the CSP. The proposed
scheme considers three main parties: a data owner, a CSP, and authorized users. To
seamlessly access any data copy received from the CSP, authorized users decrypt the
received copy using a single key shared with the data owner. In that sense, it is not
necessarily to recognize which copy has been received. The PB-PMDP scheme has
important features including public verifiability, unlimited number of auditing, and
possession-free verification where the verifier is enabled to verify data integrity even
though he neither possesses nor retrieves the file blocks from the server.
We have performed security analysis and showed that the proposed PB-PMDP scheme
is provably secure against colluding servers. In our analysis we have investigated all
possible combinations of malicious CSP responses {(σ′, µ′), (σ, µ′), (σ′, µ)}. For the
case (σ′, µ′), if it is accepted as a valid response, then the CDH (computational Diffie-
Hellman) problem can be solved. The response (σ, µ′) is rejected, otherwise there is
an adversary that can break the DL (discrete logarithm) problem. According to the
correctness of verification equation 3.1, (σ′, µ) is not accepted unless σ′ = σ.
We have illustrated the performance of the PB-PMDP scheme through theoretical
analysis, which is then validated by experimental results. Moreover, a comparative
study has been held between the proposed PB-PMDP scheme and the MR-PDP
(multiple-replica provable data possession) model. Experimental results have shown
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that the verification time of PB-PMDP is practically independent of the number of
file copies, which makes the scheme computationally cost-effective and more efficient
when verifying a large number of file copies.
To recognize which copy has been corrupted in case of failed verification, a slight
modification can be applied to the PB-PMDP scheme. This modification utilizes a
recursive divide-and-conquer (binary search) approach, where the verifier can identify
the indices of corrupted copies. To show the effect of identifying the corrupted copies
on the verification time, we have designed some experiments by generating data copies
and randomly corrupting different percentages of these copies. Interestingly, when
the percentage of corrupted copies is up to 15% of the total copies, the performance of
using the binary search algorithm in the verification is more efficient than individual
verification for each copy.
• In Chapter 4, we have studied creating multiple copies of dynamic data file and ver-
ifying those copies stored on untrusted cloud servers. We have proposed a new PDP
scheme referred to as MB-PMDDP (map-based provable multi-copy dynamic data
possession), which supports outsourcing of dynamic data, i.e., it supports block-level
operations such as block modification, insertion, deletion, and append. The proposed
MB-PMDDP scheme provides a guarantee that the CSP is storing all data copies that
are agreed upon in the service contract, and all these copies are consistent with the
most recent modifications issued by the owner. To the best of our knowledge, MB-
PMDDP is the first to address the integrity verification of multiple copies of dynamic
data. The MB-PMDDP scheme enables unlimited number of auditing, considers the
interaction between authorized users and the CSP (i.e., users can seamlessly access
a data copy received from the CSP using a single secret key shared with the data
owner), supports public verifiability, and allows possession-free verification.
To verify dynamic data, a verifier needs to be aware of block versions and indices.
Therefore, the proposed MB-PMDDP scheme is based on using a small data struc-
ture, which we call a map-version table (MVT). The MVT stores the version of each
block, and updates this version with each block modification operation. In addition,
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it keeps a mapping between logical block numbers and their physical positions in the
data file. It is important to note that the verifier retains only one table for unlimited
number of file copies, which mitigates the storage overhead on the verifier side.
Homomorphic linear authenticators are basic building blocks of the MB-PMDDP
scheme, and their unforgeability is the base to prove the security of the proposed
scheme. In our security analysis, we have shown that only correctly computed proof
P = {σ, µ} is accepted as a valid response to a challenge vector sent from a verifier,
and thus the MB-PMDDP scheme is provably secure against colluding servers.
To illustrate the performance of the proposed MB-PMDDP scheme, we have pre-
sented an extension – labelled as TB-PMDDP (tree-based provable multi-copy dy-
namic data possession) – to provable possession models for single-copy dynamic data
to work in the setting of multiple copies of dynamic data. We have performed a com-
parative study between the MB-PMDDP and the TB-PMDDP schemes. Theoreti-
cal analysis, implementation, and experimental results have demonstrated that the
proposed MB-PMDDP scheme outperforms the TB-PMDDP approach from many
perspectives: storage overhead on the CSP side, computation cost on both the CSP
and the verifer sides, and communication cost for the CSP’s response and dynamic
block operations.
As we have done with the PB-PMDP scheme for static data, the proposed MB-
PMDDP scheme can be slightly modified to support the feature of identifying the
indices of corrupted copies. We have also designed experiments to show the effect of
identifying the corrupted copies on the verification time. The experiments have indi-
cated that up to 15% corruption percentage, applying divide-and-conquer approach
during verification is more efficient than individual verification for each copy.
• In Chapter 5, we have complemented our research by proposing a new cloud-based
storage scheme that allows the data owner to benefit from facilities offered by the
CSP and enables indirect mutual trust between them. The proposed scheme have
considered important aspects of outsourcing data storage: block-level dynamic oper-
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ations, newness, mutual trust, and access control. It enables data owners to release
their concerns regarding confidentiality, integrity, and access control of the outsourced
data. Moreover, the CSP is protected from any false accusation that may be claimed
by a dishonest owner to get some sort of compensation.
The proposed scheme allows authorized users to make sure that they are receiving
the most recent version of the outsourced data. To resolve disputes that may oc-
cur regarding data integrity/newness, a trusted third party is invoked to determine
the dishonest side (owner/users or CSP). In addition, our scheme combines three
cryptographic techniques: broadcast encryption, lazy revocation, and key rotation to
enforce access control for outsourced data.
We have studied the security features of the proposed scheme, and showed that the
scheme satisfies: (i) data confidentiality based on the security of underlying encryp-
tion algorithm, (ii) detection of data integrity violation based on the preimage and
second-preimage resistance properties of the utilized cryptographic hash function,
(iii) assurance of newness property, which is identical to detection of data integrity
violation, (iv) enforcement of access control based on combining broadcast encryp-
tion, lazy revocation, and key rotation; and (v) detection of dishonest owner/user
based on unforgeable signatures.
The performance of the proposed scheme has been justified through theoretical anal-
ysis and a prototype implementation on Amazon cloud platform to evaluate storage,
communication, and computation overheads. We have showed that important fea-
tures of outsourcing data storage can be supported without excessive overheads.
6.2 Future Research Directions
The area of cloud computing has attracted many researchers from diverse fields; however,
much effort remains to achieve the wide acceptance and usage of cloud computing tech-
nology. A number of future research directions stem from our current research. Below, we
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summarize some problems to address during our future research.
Ensuring data replication across diverse geographic location. In this disserta-
tion work, we have proposed schemes to verify that the CSP is actually storing all data
copies that are agreed upon in the service contact. Replicating data in different geographic
locations is crucial to prevent simultaneous failure caused by natural disasters or power
outages. Moreover, it is effective in reducing access time and communication cost for users
in different parts in the world.
It will be interesting to study the problem of verifying that the data is actually repli-
cated in diverse geolocations. This will require collaboration between researchers from
both industry (to build data center components, services, and software) and academia (to
provide mathematical models and theoretical frameworks for the verification process).
Self-organized data replication over cloud servers. Current data centers are sub-
ject to failure of any type, and high access to the data stored can be one reason for such
failure. As the number of access requests to outsourced data increases, its availability be-
comes more complex. For example, the University of Waterloo has an online course system
(LEARN) based on cloud computing technology. During exam days, almost all students
access course materials on LEARN, which might affect data availability.
One possible future direction is to address the problem of designing self-managed stor-
age systems that can dynamically adapt to varying query load by allocating/deallocating
storage space for data copies on cloud servers. An optimization model is needed to specify
the optimal number of copies and their storage locations across the servers. Through this
model one can minimize the response time for data access requests, and optimize the use
of CSP’s storage capacity.
User authentication for cloud computing systems. The development of cloud com-
puting encourages the use of resource-constrained devices (PDA/cell phones) on the client
side. Thus, rather than local data storage and software installation, users will be authen-
ticated to access data and use applications from the cloud. Such computing model makes
software piracy more difficult and enables centralized monitoring. Although cloud comput-
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ing architecture stimulates mobility of users, it increases the need of secure authentication.
Relying on passwords for user authentication in not an efficient approach for sensitive
data/applications on the cloud. Passwords is a major point of vulnerability in computer
security; they are often easy to guess by automated programs running dictionary attacks,
users cannot remember very long passwords, and the common use of meaningful passwords
makes them subject to dictionary attacks.
Implicit authentication is another interesting area of research to address user authenti-
cation problem. One can use learning algorithms to construct a model for the user based
on previous behavior patterns, and then compare the recent behavior with the user model
to authorize legitimate users. This may require collaboration with researchers from com-
puter science to develop efficient learning algorithms using artificial intelligence, machine
learning, and neural networks tools.
Outsourcing computation to untrusted cloud servers. Outsourcing computation
is a growing desire for resource-constrained clients to benefit from powerful cloud servers.
Such clients prefer to outsource computationally-intensive operations (e.g., image process-
ing) to the cloud and yet obtaining a strong assurance that the computations are correctly
performed. To save the computational resources, a dishonest CSP may totally ignore the
computations, or execute just a portion of them. Sometimes the computations outsourced
to the cloud are so critical that it is essential to preclude accidental errors during the
processing.
The ability to verify computations and validate the returned results is a key requirement
of cloud customers. Another imperative point is that the amount of work performed
by the clients to verify the outsourced computations must be substantially cheaper than
performing the actual computations on the client side. One direction of future research is
to investigate the area of verifiable computations and outsourcing computational tasks to
untrusted cloud servers. It is also interesting to address mutual trust feature, so a client
who receives incorrect results from cloud servers can detect and prove this misbehavior.
Moreover, a dishonest client must not be able to falsely accuse a CSP and claim that the
outsourced computations are malformed.
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Examples of the TB-PMDDP scheme
This appendix contains some examples of the TB-PMDDP scheme that demonstrate the
effect of dynamic operations on the MHTs over the CSP side. Moreover, these examples
show how the owner uses the information received from the CSP to generate the new
directory root and update the metadata. We assume that the data owner has a file of 4
blocks and the CSP stores n copies of this file. Also we assume that during the system
setup, the owner and the CSP have agreed to use left-to-right sequence to generate the
Merkle trees.
 Modification. Figure A.1 shows that the second block is to be modified in all
copies outsourced to the CSP. On the CSP side, the dashed nodes indicate the tree
nodes that are updated due to the modification of the second block. The dashed
leaf nodes {h12, h22, . . . , hn2} are updated as hi2 = h(H(b̃′i2)), where b̃′i2 – created and
sent from the owner – is the modified second block dedicated for copy i: 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
The dashed non-leaf nodes are updated by h(left child || right child). The grey
nodes indicate the authentication paths of the modified blocks, e.g., {h11, h1B} is the
authentication path of the modified block b̃′12. On the owner side, the owner uses the
authentication paths 〈{h11, h1B}, {h21, h2B}, . . . , {hn1, hnB}〉 sent from the CSP and
the modified blocks {b̃′12, b̃′22, . . . , b̃′n2} to generate the new directory root h′DR and
update the metadata M′ = h(IDF ||h′DR). The dashed nodes indicate the generated
cryptographic hashes using the authentication paths (grey circles) sent from the CSP
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and the modified blocks {b̃′i2}1≤i≤n. Thus, h12 = h(H(b̃′12)), h1A = h(h11||h12), and
h1R = h(h1A||h1B). The computation of {hiR}2≤i≤n is done the same way. The owner
uses the computed {hiR}1≤i≤n to generate the updated directory root h′DR, and finally
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Figure A.1: Effect of block modification operation on the MHTs and the directory root.
 Insertion. Figure A.2 shows that a new block is to be inserted after position 2 in
all copies outsourced to the CSP. On the CSP side, the cross-dashed nodes indicate
the newly added leaf nodes, i.e., ĥi2 = h(H(b̂i)), where b̂i – created and sent from
the owner – is the new block to be inserted in copy i: 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The dashed
nodes indicate the tree nodes that are updated due to the insertion of the new block.
The updated hash values of these nodes are computed as h(left child||right child).
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The nodes {ĥiC}1≤i≤n are generated to re-arrange the structure of the MHTs ac-
cording to the newly added leaf nodes. The grey nodes indicate the authentication
paths of the newly inserted blocks, e.g., {h12, h11, h1B} is the authentication path
of the new block b̂1. On the owner side, the owner uses the authentication paths
〈{h12, h11, h1B}, {h22, h21, h2B}, . . . , {hn2, hn1, hnB}〉 sent from the CSP and the new
blocks {b̂1, b̂2, . . . , b̂n} to generate the new directory root h′DR and update the meta-
data M′ = h(IDF ||h′DR). The dashed nodes indicate the generated cryptographic
hashes using the authentication paths (grey circles) sent from the CSP and the new
blocks {b̂i}1≤i≤n. Thus, ĥ1 = h(H(b̂1)), ĥ1C = h(h12||ĥ1), h1A = h(h11||ĥ1C), and
h1R = h(h1A||h1B). The computation of {hiR}2≤i≤n is done the same way. The owner
uses the computed {hiR}1≤i≤n to generate the updated directory root h′DR, and finally
computes the updated metadata M′ = h(IDF ||h′DR).
 Deletion. Figure A.3 shows that the second block is to be deleted from all copies
outsourced to the CSP. On the CSP side, the leaf nodes with crosses indicate the
nodes to be deleted. The fragmented curved arrows indicate that after deleting
the specified leaf nodes, the nodes {hi1}1≤i≤n replace the nodes {hiA}1≤i≤n, and
thus the MHTs are re-arranged. The dashed nodes indicate the tree nodes that
are updated due to the deletion of the second block. The updated hash values
of these nodes are computed as h(left child||right child). The grey nodes indicate
the authentication paths of the deleted blocks, e.g., {h11, h1B} is the authentication
path of the deleted block b̃12. On the owner side, the owner uses the authentication
paths 〈{h11, h1B}, {h21, h2B}, . . . , {hn1, hnB}〉 sent from the CSP to generate the new
directory root h′DR and update the metadataM′ = h(IDF ||h′DR). The dashed nodes
indicate the generated cryptographic hashes using the authentication paths (grey
circles) sent from the CSP. Thus, hiR = h(hi1||hiB) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The owner uses
the computed {hiR}1≤i≤n to generate the updated directory root h′DR, and finally
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Figure A.3: Effect of block deletion operation on the MHTs and the directory root.
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